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Abstract
In today’s society, we are dependent on a number of services provided by interconnected
systems. These services may be anything from electricity to services provided by social
media platforms. Interconnected systems are challenging to analyze from a quality
perspective in general and from a security perspective in particular. The systems
depend on each other through services. Thus, the quality of services provided by
one system is often directly linked to the quality of services provided by another.
Moreover, the systems may be under diﬀerent managerial control and within diﬀerent
jurisdictions, and the systems may evolve rapidly in a manner that may be diﬃcult to
predict. All of this makes it challenging to assess risk to the quality of services.
In this thesis we present a framework for analyzing and monitoring the impact
of dependencies on quality. More speciﬁcally, the framework should be used in the
context of interconnected systems to analyze and monitor the impact of service depen-
dencies on quality of services. The framework is the result of the integration of three
artifacts: (1) a method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indica-
tors; (2) a method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service dependencies on
the quality of provided services; and (3) an architectural pattern for constructing en-
terprise level monitoring tools based on indicators. The three artifacts may be viewed
as contributions on their own, since they can be used independently of each other. In
addition, the thesis contributes in terms of two industrial case studies: (1) an empirical
study on trust-based decisions in interconnected systems; and (2) an empirical study
on the design of indicators for monitoring risk. The industrial case studies have mainly
been carried out to support the development of the artifacts, but since the industrial
case studies also provide insight into issues of a more general nature, they may be seen
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Over time we have gradually become more and more dependent on services that are
provided by interconnected systems. Such systems may, for instance, be found in
power grids or in the Internet. They provide services like electricity, communication
services, etc. The importance of the quality of these services in general and the security
in particular is not new. In 1988, the Morris worm [3] infected about 4% of the
approximate Internet population of 60000 computers. Much has however changed
since the early days of the Internet. Since then, the Internet and other networks
have increased much in size and become more interconnected, while incidents with
respect to interconnected systems have increased both with respect to number and
severity [4]. Moreover, the realization of the Internet of Things [5] will lead to even
more interconnected networks. The Internet of Things refers to a world where physical
objects and beings have virtual components that can produce and consume services.
Such extreme interconnection will in particular result in new challenges for the security
of services [6].
Despite of the importance of quality in general, security in particular, and the in-
terconnected systems that surround us, there is often a lack of understanding of the
interconnections’ potential eﬀect on quality of services. On January 25, 2003, the
David-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio was infected by a SQL slammer worm [7] due
to a network connection that circumvented the ﬁrewall. The infection resulted in the
internal network being overloaded, which again resulted in the unavailability of crucial
control systems for about ﬁve hours. Although the operators were burdened by these
losses, the plant was not aﬀected because of analogue backup systems which remained
unaﬀected. Later the same year, the so-called “Northeast blackout” [8] occurred. This
blackout left 50 million people in North America without electrical power and aﬀected
other critical infrastructures such as transportation, communication, and water sup-
ply. A major contributing factor to the incident was a software bug, while the severe
consequences were the result of the many interconnections.
Interconnected systems are often so-called system of systems (SoS). An SoS may
be thought of as a kind of “super system” comprising a set of interconnected systems
that work together towards some common goal. The common goal may be as simple
as enabling all the individual systems to achieve their capabilities, or to construct a
set of new capabilities not achievable by the individual systems alone.
Interconnected systems, such as SoS, are challenging from a quality perspective for
the following reasons:
1. The services provided by one system may rely on services provided by other
3
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systems, resulting in so-called service dependencies. Changes in the quality at-
tributes of one service may easily cause the quality attributes of its dependent
services to change as well. This means that in order to capture the impact of risk
to quality of services provided by one system, we not only need to capture the
risks arising in the system in question, but also risks which are solely or partially
due to dependencies on other services.
2. The systems may be under diﬀerent managerial control and within diﬀerent juris-
dictions. For the systems that are outside our control, we have limited knowledge
of their risks, structure, and behavior. Thus, we need means for capturing the
impact of service dependencies involving systems for which we have insuﬃcient
information on risk.
3. Such a large number of systems, controlled and operated by diﬀerent parties,
evolve rapidly in a manner that may be diﬃcult to predict. Thus, there is a need
for updating the risk picture as the interconnected systems change with values
based on observable properties of the interconnected systems. It is however not
trivial to achieve this. The data from which the updates are calculated may be
associated with many diﬀerent sources of uncertainty. Thus, the validity of the
data must be taken into account in order to ensure the correctness of the risk
picture.
Traditional approaches to risk analysis such as [9–11] lack capabilities for addressing
these challenges in a satisfactory manner. Moreover, a critical infrastructure may often
be thought of as a set of interconnected systems that interact by the use of services.
Hence, research on critical infrastructure protection is relevant in this thesis. In [12–14],
state of the art on critical infrastructure protection are presented. With respect to the
above mentioned challenges, the approaches are either not relevant at all or they lack
capabilities for addressing them in a satisfactory manner. Based on all of this, we see
the need for new artifacts for addressing the above mentioned challenges.
1.1 Objective
The purpose of this thesis has been to develop a framework for analyzing and monitor-
ing the impact of dependencies on quality. More speciﬁcally, the framework should be
useful in the context of interconnected systems to analyze and monitor the impact of
service dependencies on quality of services. The overall objective has been to: develop
a framework that is:
1. well-suited to analyze the impact of service dependencies on quality of services;
2. well-suited to support the set-up of monitoring of the impact of service dependen-
cies on quality of services; and
3. applicable in an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
1.2 Contribution
The framework is the result of the development and integration of three artifacts. Since
the artifacts may be employed and used in practice independently of each other, they
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may be seen as contributions on their own. Besides contributing in terms of new arti-
facts, the thesis also contributes in terms of empirical results from two industrial case
studies. The industrial case studies were mainly carried out to support the develop-
ment of the artifacts, but since they also provide insight into issues of a more general
nature, they may be seen as contributions on their own. The main contributions of this
thesis are: (1) a method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indica-
tors; (2) a method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service dependencies on
the quality of provided services; (3) an architectural pattern for constructing enterprise
level monitoring tools based on indicators; (4) an empirical study on trust-based deci-
sions in interconnected systems; and (5) an empirical study on the design of indicators
for monitoring risk.
1. Method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business objectives
with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators: The
method takes business objectives focusing on quality as input, and delivers valid
indicators as output. By valid indicators we mean that the indicators measure to
what extent the business or relevant part thereof fulﬁlls the business objectives.
The method also results in deployment and design speciﬁcations for the diﬀerent
indicators. The deployment speciﬁcations document how sensors for gathering
the data needed in the calculation of the indicators should be deployed in the rele-
vant part of business, while the design speciﬁcations document how the indicators
should be calculated based on data provided by the sensors. These speciﬁcations
may be used to implement ICT-supported monitoring of the indicators.
Analysts will manage the application of the method and document its results,
while domain experts will participate during the application of the method. The
domain experts are supposed to communicate their knowledge in such a way that
correct models are achieved.
2. Method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service dependencies on the
quality of provided services: The method is used for capturing the impact of ser-
vice dependencies on risk to the quality of provided services in interconnected
systems, and for setting up monitoring of selected risks by the use of indicators
for the purpose of providing a dynamic risk picture for the provided services.
The result of applying the method is a risk picture that captures the impact of
services dependencies on the quality of the provided services. The risk picture
is parameterized by indicators, each deﬁned by design and deployment speciﬁca-
tions. These speciﬁcations may be used in the implementation of a risk monitor.
Analysts will manage the application of the method and document its results,
while domain experts will participate during the application of the method. The
domain experts are supposed to communicate their knowledge in such a way that
correct models are achieved.
3. Architectural pattern for constructing enterprise level monitoring tools based on
indicators: The pattern serves as a basis for constructing enterprise level moni-
toring tools based on indicators. These are tools that: collect low-level indicators
from the ICT infrastructure or similar; aggregate the low-level indicators into
high-level indicators, useful at the enterprise level; and present the high-level
5
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indicators in a way that is understandable to the intended users. The pattern
structures an enterprise level monitoring tool into a set of components, and it
captures features that are general to a broad class of enterprise level monitoring
tools.
The architectural pattern will be employed by developers of ICT-based enterprise
level monitoring tools.
4. Empirical study on trust-based decisions in interconnected systems: The empirical
study was conducted as part of an industrial project focusing on the use of a
UML-based trust analysis method to model and analyze a public eProcurement
system (used by public authorities to award contracts to economic operators).
This system makes use of a Validation Authority (VA) service for validating
electronic IDs and digital signatures. The goal of the trust analysis was to obtain
a better understanding of the potential usefulness of a VA service for supporting
trust-based decisions in systems which rely on electronically signed documents.
The study gave strong indications that the trust analysis method is feasible in
practice.
5. Empirical study on the design of indicators for monitoring risk: The empirical
study was integrated in a commercial security risk analysis conducted in 2010.
In this analysis, indicators were designed for the purpose of validating likelihood
estimates obtained from expert judgments. The main result from the empirical
study was the identiﬁcation of several challenges related to the design of indicators
for monitoring security risks.
1.3 Organization
The thesis is structured into two main parts. Part I provides the context and an overall
view of the work, while Part II contains the research papers. Each of the papers is
self-contained and can therefore be read separately. We have structured Part I into
eight chapters:
Chapter 1 – Introduction provides the background and motivation for the thesis,
brief explanations of the objective and contributions, and the structure of the
thesis.
Chapter 2 – Problem characterization clariﬁes the interpretation of core concepts
used throughout the thesis and reﬁnes the overall objective into success criteria
that the framework and the three artifacts must fulﬁll.
Chapter 3 – Research method presents the research method used in the thesis
work.
Chapter 4 – State of the art provides an overview of work related to the research
presented in the thesis.
Chapter 5 – Summary of contribution presents the framework and provides an
overview of the ﬁve contributions.
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Chapter 6 – Overview of research papers provides an overview of the papers re-
sulting from the research.
Chapter 7 – Discussion discusses to what extent the success criteria has been ful-
ﬁlled and how our artifacts relate to and extend the state of the art.







In Chapter 1 we presented the overall motivation and objective for our research. In
this chapter we reﬁne this objective into a set of success criteria. In Section 2.1 we
clarify the interpretation of core concepts used throughout the thesis. In Section 2.2
we present success criteria that should be fulﬁlled in order to successfully accomplish
the research objective. Section 2.2 is divided into four sub-sections. In Section 2.2.1
we present success criteria for the framework for analyzing and monitoring the impact
of dependencies on quality, while in Sections 2.2.2–2.2.4 we present success criteria for
the three artifacts.
2.1 Conceptual clariﬁcation
This section characterizes the main terminology used throughout the thesis.
2.1.1 System and service
As already explained in Chapter 1, the framework should be useful in the context of
interconnected systems. Both computerized and non-computerized systems are ad-
dressed in this thesis. In our context, a system is characterized by a set of components
which interact and operate as a whole. Based on this, we deﬁne system as “a group of
interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex whole” [15].
In our context, systems are interconnected if they interact by the use of services.
The diﬀerent systems act as providers and/or consumers of services, where each service
represents the exchange of some commodity (electricity, information, etc.). Moreover,
we limit each service to have one provider and one consumer. Based on the above, we
end up with the following deﬁnition for service: “A service is provided by a system and
consumed by a system, and it represents the exchange of some commodity.”
2.1.2 Quality and quality of service
The framework has a strong focus on quality and quality of service. Generally, quality
is concerned with the degree to which relevant non-functional requirements are fulﬁlled.
In [16], quality is deﬁned as “the degree to which a system, component, or process meets
speciﬁed requirements,” while [17] deﬁnes quality as “the ability of a product, service,
system, component, or process to meet customer or user needs, expectations, or require-
ments.” Based on the two deﬁnitions above, we deﬁne quality as “the degree to which
9
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a system, service, component, or process meets speciﬁed non-functional requirements.”
Moreover, based on this deﬁnition we deﬁne quality of service as “the degree to which
a service meets speciﬁed non-functional requirements.”
2.1.3 Service dependency
As already explained in Chapter 1, the framework has been developed to analyze and
monitor the impact of service dependencies on quality of services. A service may require
other services in order to be provided with the required quality. A service dependency
describes a relationship between a service provided by a system and services this system
requires from its environment to provide the service in question. In this thesis, we
consider a service to be dependent on other services if “a change in the quality of the
latter may lead to a change in the quality of the former.”
2.1.4 Indicator and metric
In this thesis, the impact of service dependencies on quality of services is monitored by
the use of indicators. Hammond et al. deﬁnes indicator as “something that provides
a clue to a matter of larger signiﬁcance or makes perceptible a trend or phenomenon
that is not immediately detectable” [18]. For example, a drop in barometric pressure
may signal a coming storm, while an unexpected rise in the traﬃc load of a web server
may signal a denial of service attack in progress. Thus, the signiﬁcance of an indicator
extends beyond what is actually measured to a larger phenomenon of interest.
Indicators are closely related to metrics. In [17], metric is deﬁned as “a quantitative
measure of the degree to which a system, component, or process possesses a given
attribute,” while it deﬁnes attribute as “the speciﬁc characteristic of the entity being
measured.” For the web server mentioned above, an example of an attribute may be
availability. An availability metric may again act as an indicator for denial of service
attacks, if we compare the metric with a baseline or expected result [19]. As we can see,
metrics are not that diﬀerent from indicators. For that reason, indicators and metrics
are often used interchangeably in the literature.
It should also be noticed that indicators are often referred to as key indicators in a
business context. Here, the key indicators are used to measure to what extent business
objectives/goals are fulﬁlled. In Paper A (presented in Chapter 9), we refer to indicator
as key indicator, while in the rest of the thesis we only use the term indicator.
2.1.5 Trust
In the context of the thesis, trust is relevant for reasoning about third-party service
dependencies. Inspired by [20, 21], [22] deﬁnes trust as “the subjective probability by
which an actor (the trustor) expects that another entity (the trustee) performs a given
transition on which its welfare depends.” In other words, trust is the belief of a trustor
that a trustee will perform a speciﬁc transaction on which the welfare of the trustor
depends. For instance, the operator of a system may have a certain amount of trust
in the ability of an operator of another system to deliver a service according to re-





In this thesis, we present an architectural pattern for constructing enterprise level
monitoring tools based on indicators. A pattern captures the essence of solving a
recurring problem. It is a description or template for how to solve a problem that
can be used in many diﬀerent situations. In software engineering, patterns are best
known as design patterns [23]. These patterns are used for solving recurring design
problems. In [17], design pattern is deﬁned as “a description of the problem and the
essence of its solution to enable the solution to be reused in diﬀerent settings.” In
this thesis we focus on architectural patterns [24]. The diﬀerence between a design
pattern and an architectural pattern is that design patterns describe design solutions
at the object/class level, while architectural patterns describe design solutions at the
architectural level, e.g., design of components and their relationships.
2.2 Success criteria
In Chapter 1 we outlined the problem area that motivates the work of this thesis, and
we argued that there is a need for a framework for the analysis and monitoring of the
impact of service dependencies on quality of services in the context of interconnected
systems. As explained in Chapter 1, the overall objective has been to: develop a
framework that is:
1. well-suited to analyze the impact of service dependencies on quality of services;
2. well-suited to support the set-up of monitoring of the impact of service dependen-
cies on quality of services; and
3. applicable in an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
The framework is the result of the development and integration of three artifacts:
1. Method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business objectives
with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators
2. Method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service dependencies on the
quality of provided services
3. Architectural pattern for constructing enterprise level monitoring tools based on
indicators
As already explained in Chapter 1, each of the three artifacts may be viewed as
contributions on their own. In Chapter 5, we relate the three artifacts to each other,
and we summarize their contributions to the overall objective. The main hypothesis
for each of the artifacts is that it fulﬁlls its intended purpose (as elaborated below),
and that it is feasible to be used by its intended users. As explained in Chapter 1, the
artifacts target the following diﬀerent types of user groups:
• The target group of Artifact 1 is the analyst and the domain experts.
• The target group of Artifact 2 is the analyst and the domain experts.
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• The target group of Artifact 3 is the developer of ICT-based enterprise level
monitoring tools.
For the framework and each of the artifacts, we have identiﬁed a set of success
criteria that the framework/artifact should fulﬁll. These are presented in Sections
2.2.1–2.2.4.
2.2.1 Framework for analyzing and monitoring the impact of
dependencies on quality
The framework is the result of integrating the three artifacts. The purpose of the
framework is to: (1) analyze the impact of service dependencies on quality of services;
and (2) support the set-up of monitoring of the impact of service dependencies on
quality of services. Hence, the following overall success criterion:
Success criterion 1 The framework fulﬁlls its intended purpose.
2.2.2 Artifact 1: Method for designing indicators to moni-
tor the fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular
focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indi-
cators
The purpose of Artifact 1 is to facilitate the design and assessment of indicators to be
used in ICT-supported monitoring of the fulﬁllment of business objectives focusing on
quality.
Success criterion 2 The application of the method results in indicators that measure
correctly to what extent the business objectives received as input are fulﬁlled.
Indicators are not suitable for measuring the fulﬁllment of business objectives if
they cannot measure correctly to what extent the business objectives are fulﬁlled. The
use of such indicators may lead to bad business decisions, which again can harm the
company. To ensure that suitable indicators are designed, we need to evaluate whether
the designed indicators measure correctly to what extent the business objectives are
fulﬁlled.
Success criterion 3 The application of the method results in speciﬁcations of indica-
tors that are well-suited for ICT-based monitoring.
The main output from the application of the method is speciﬁcations of the indi-
cators. These speciﬁcations are to be used to implement ICT-based monitoring of the
indicators. Thus, the speciﬁcations need to be well-suited for implementing ICT-based
monitoring.




In order for the method to be useful, it must be possible to apply it in an industrial
context within acceptable eﬀort.
2.2.3 Artifact 2: Method for capturing and monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on the quality of pro-
vided services
The purpose of Artifact 2 is to facilitate the capture of the impact of service depen-
dencies on risk to the quality of provided services in interconnected systems, and to
facilitate the set-up of monitoring of selected risks by the use of indicators for the
purpose of providing a dynamic risk picture for the provided services.
Success criterion 5 The application of the method results in speciﬁcations of indi-
cators that correctly capture and measure the impact of service dependencies on the
quality of provided services.
The main output from the application of the method is speciﬁcations of indica-
tors for monitoring risk to quality of provided services. These speciﬁcations need to
correctly capture and measure the impact of service dependencies on the quality of
provided services in order to be useful.
Success criterion 6 The application of the method results in speciﬁcations for the
deployment and design of indicators that are suﬃcient for setting up risk monitoring
based on indicators.
In order to provide a dynamic risk picture for the provided services, the method
must result in speciﬁcations for the deployment and design of indicators that are suf-
ﬁcient for setting up risk monitoring based on indicators.
Success criterion 7 The method is applicable in an industrial context within accept-
able eﬀort.
In order for the method to be useful, it must be possible to apply it in an industrial
context within acceptable eﬀort.
2.2.4 Artifact 3: Architectural pattern for constructing en-
terprise level monitoring tools based on indicators
The purpose of Artifact 3 is to serve as a basis for implementing enterprise level mon-
itoring tools based on indicators.
Success criterion 8 The architectural pattern serves as a basis for building monitor-
ing tools based on indicators within a wide range of domains and enterprises.
It should be possible to use the architectural pattern as a basis for building mon-
itoring tools based on indicators within a wide range of domains and enterprises. In
order for this to be possible, the pattern must capture features that are general to a
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broad class of enterprise level monitoring tools.
Success criterion 9 The architectural pattern facilitates modularity and reuse.
We have identiﬁed two desirable properties for monitoring tools resulting from the
application the architectural pattern. The ﬁrst desirable property is that the applica-
tion of the pattern should result in tools that are modular, while the second desirable





In this chapter we present our research method. We start by three introductory sec-
tions. In Section 3.1 we discuss the standing of computer science as a science and
describe its overall research method. In Section 3.2 we relate classical and technology
research as deﬁned by Solheim and Stølen. In Section 3.3 we describe diﬀerent strate-
gies to evaluate the research results. Thereafter, in Section 3.4 we go on to describe the
research method used in this thesis. We emphasis in particular the role of empirical
studies in the invention and evaluation of the three artifacts.
3.1 The standing of computer science
Computer science is a relatively young discipline compared to classical sciences such as
mathematics, physics, astronomy, etc., which date back to the ancient Greeks. More-
over, computer science has a unique standing with respect to theory and practice
compared to the classical sciences. While the focal point of classical sciences is more
on the what than how, many advances in the history of computer science have been
driven by explaining how something can be achieved through the interaction between
theory and the technology that realizes it [25, 26]. For this reason, [25] states that
the science and engineering aspects of computer science are much closer than in many
other disciplines.
With computer science being such a young discipline and closely connected to en-
gineering, its qualiﬁcation as a science has been widely debated [25, 27–30]. Abelson
and Sussman [30] claim that computer science is not a science and that its signiﬁcance
has little to do with computers. The authors do not explain what qualiﬁes as a science
or why computer science does not qualify as one. They do however relate computa-
tion to mathematics by describing mathematics as the framework for dealing precisely
with notions of what is, while they describe computation as the framework for dealing
precisely with notions of how to.
Similarly, Brooks [29] claims that computer science is not a science but merely an
engineering discipline. According to Brooks, computer scientists are engineers since
they study in order to build things such as computers, algorithms, software systems,
etc. The scientist, on the other hand, is concerned with the discovery of facts and laws.
The scientist does only build things that are needed for supporting his/hers studies.
Even though we ﬁnd some objections to the classiﬁcation of computer science as
a science, there is a widely established agreement that computer science is in fact a
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science, because of its many similarities with the classical sciences. Denning [27] de-
scribes computer science as the blend of mathematics, science, and engineering. More-
over, Denning criticizes the ones who object to computer science being a science on the
grounds that man-made objects (technologies) are studied. According to Denning, com-
puter science is about studying natural and artiﬁcial information processes. To study
these processes, computer science relies on the same method as the classical sciences;
namely the scientiﬁc method, or what we often refer to as the hypothetico-deductive
method: (1) recognition of a theoretical problem; (2) proposal of conjectured solution
to the problem (hypothesis); (3) critical testing of the hypothesis; and (4) conclusion:
retain hypothesis if test is positive, otherwise reject hypothesis as falsiﬁed and possibly
devise new tests/hypotheses/problems [31]. According to Denning, there are many ex-
amples of the usage of the scientiﬁc method within computer science. One example is
that software engineering researchers hypothesize models for how programming is done
and how eﬀects arise. These models go through testing where the researchers seek to
understand which models work well and how to use them to create better programs
with fewer defects.
Tichy [32] shares Denning’s view on computer science being the study of information
processes. According to Tichy, the applicability of the scientiﬁc method is as relevant
in computer science as it is in for instance physics. It does not make any diﬀerence
that the subject of inquiry is information instead of energy or matter. In both cases we
would need to observe a phenomenon, formulate explanations and theories, and test
them.
3.2 Classical versus technology research
Solheim and Stølen [1] distinguish between classical and technology research. For both
classical and technology research we start with an overall hypothesis on the form “B
solves the problem A.” In the case of classical research, A is the need for forming a
new or improved theory about a real-world phenomenon, while B is the new theory.
The real-world phenomenon addressed may take place in nature, space, the human
body, society, etc. In its simplicity, classical research is concerned with seeking new
knowledge about the real world. On the other hand, in technology research A is the
need for a new or improved human-made object, i.e., artifact, while B is this artifact.
The technology researcher strives to manufacture artifacts which are better than those
that already exist. The result of conducting technology research may for instance be a
new or improved material, medicine, algorithm, software engineering method, etc.
Solheim and Stølen [1] argue that despite the diﬀerences in the problems addressed
and the solutions sought after, classical and technology research have a lot in common
and follow the same principal steps for ﬁnding a solution to the research problem.
Moreover, Solheim and Stølen claim that technology research should be conducted in
accordance with the hypothetico-deductive method of classical research. In technology
research, the development of an artifact is motivated by a need. The overall hypoth-
esis of technology research is that the artifact satisﬁes the need. A common way to
evaluate the satisfaction of the overall hypothesis is to formulate a set of predictions.
The falsiﬁcation of a prediction results in the rejection the overall hypothesis. Hence,
the predictions serve as a basis for gathering evidence on the validity of the overall
hypothesis.
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Identify a potential need
Make an artifact that satisfies the need
Show that the artifact satisfies the need
Figure 3.1: The main steps of the method for technology research (adopted from [1])
Technology research, like classical research, is driven by an iterative process [1].
In Figures 3.1 and 3.2 (both adopted from [1]) we have summarized the processes of
technology research and classical research. The main steps of the technology research
method are as follows:
1. Problem analysis – The researcher identiﬁes a potential need for a new or im-
proved artifact by interacting with potential users and other stakeholders. During
this step, the researcher expresses the satisfaction of the potential need through
a set of of success criteria.
2. Innovation – The researcher tries to manufacture an artifact that satisﬁes the
success criteria. The overall hypothesis is that the artifact satisﬁes the success
criteria, or more precisely the potential need.
3. Evaluation – Based on the success criteria, the researcher formulate a set of
predictions about the artifact and evaluate whether these predictions come true.
If the evaluation results in a positive outcome, then the researcher may argue
that the artifact satisﬁes the potential need.
Moreover, the main steps of the classical research method are as follows:
1. Problem analysis – The researcher identiﬁes a need for a new or better theory.
The need is either due to the lack of a theory or a deviation between present
theory and reality.
2. Innovation – The researcher suggests a new explanation. The researcher works
according to the overall hypothesis that the new explanation agrees with reality.
3. Evaluation – The researcher checks whether the hypothesis is true by performing
observations. Based on the hypothesis, the researcher formulates predictions
and checks whether the predictions come true. If the observations verify the
predictions, the researcher can argue that the new explanation agrees with reality.
Technology research is similar to technology development. In both technology re-
search and technology development, artifacts are developed to satisfy potential needs.






Identify a need for a new or better theory
Suggest a new explanation to replace to 
replace or extend present theory 
Overall hypothesis: The new explanation 
agrees with reality
Argument for the validity of the overall 
hypothesis
Figure 3.2: The main steps of the method for classical research (adopted from [1])
development of the artifact results in new knowledge; (2) the new knowledge is of in-
terest to others; and (3) the development of the artifact is documented in such a way
that it enables others to repeat and verify the development of the artifact [1].
Technology research is also closely related to design science. This paradigm and
the behavioral-science paradigm characterize much of the research in the information
systems discipline [33]. Moreover, the paradigm has its roots in engineering and the
sciences of the artiﬁcial [34]. In information systems research, design science is used
to create and evaluate IT artifacts intended to solve problems related to some aspect
of the design of an information system. Design science diﬀers from routine design or
system development by contributing with new knowledge in the form of foundations
and methodologies for design.
3.3 Strategies for evaluation
As mentioned in Section 3.2, evaluation is to ﬁnd out if the predictions are true.
Regardless of whether classical or technology research is being conducted, diﬀerent
strategies may be used to gather the evidence necessary to test the predictions. Ac-
cording to McGrath [35], when you gather evidence, you are always trying to maximize
three things: (A) generality – results that are valid across populations; (B) precision –
precise measurements; and (C) realism – the evaluation is performed in environments
similar to reality. Diﬀerent strategies all have their strengths and weaknesses with
respect to A, B, and C. According to McGrath, the eight most common strategies are:
• Field studies refer to eﬀorts to make direct observations of ongoing systems, while
interfering with the systems as little as possible.
• Laboratory experiments are attempts from a researcher to observe systems in a
context where the researcher may control and isolate the variables whose eﬀects
are to be examined.
• Field experiments are ﬁeld studies with one major diﬀerence; the deliberate ma-
nipulation of the variables whose eﬀects are to be examined.
• Experimental simulations are conducted in a laboratory setting. The researcher
makes an eﬀort to create a system that is like some class of natural occurring
systems. The system is artiﬁcial in the sense that it is only created for the study.
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• Sample survey, or just survey, are eﬀorts to obtain information from a broad and
carefully selected group of actors. The information is often given in the form of
verbal responses to a set of questions.
• Judgment studies, or what may also be referred to as qualitative interviews, are
eﬀorts to obtain information from a small set of actors. The information obtained
tends to be more precise than information obtained from sample surveys, but
cannot be generalized in the same way.
• Formal theory is a theoretical approach where evidence is gathered by the use of
argumentation based on logical reasoning.
• Computer simulations is another theoretical approach where attempts are made
to model a speciﬁc real life system or class of systems.
None of the strategies is able to maximize A, B, and C simultaneously. Laboratory
experiments score high on precision, while ﬁeld studies have the greatest realism. More-
over, formal theory and sample surveys deliver the greatest generality. The solution
must therefore be to choose several strategies that complement each other. When
choosing strategies to evaluate the predictions, the researcher needs to consider a num-
ber of aspects [1]:
• Is the strategy feasible? Time, cost, and the availability of resources, such as
individuals to participate in the evaluation, are important aspects to consider
when selecting a strategy.
• How to ensure that a measurement really measures the property it is supposed to
measure? The property to be measured needs to be isolated, and diﬀerent factors
that may inﬂuence the measurement need to be accounted for. The researcher
also needs to take into account the nature of the property, i.e., whether it is
qualitative, quantitative, or formal, when selecting the strategy to be used.
• What is needed to falsify the prediction? The strategy selected is nothing worth
if it cannot cause the prediction to be rejected.
3.4 Our research method
The overall objective of the thesis has been to develop a framework for analyzing the
impact of service dependencies on quality of services, and to support the set-up of
monitoring of the impact of service dependencies on quality of services. As previously
mentioned, the framework integrates three artifacts. Each of the three artifacts also
serves a purpose outside the context of the framework. Thus, the artifacts have been
developed in such a way that they can be employed and used in practice independently
of each other. To develop the artifacts, the technology research method described
in Section 3.2 was applied. The result of applying this highly iterative method was
that the framework, artifacts, and success criteria were constantly improved as the
evaluation provided us with new insight into the research problems.
Figure 3.3 describes the process that was followed in our thesis work. The ﬁgure also
shows how this process relates to the process depicted in Figure 3.1. For each artifact,
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Figure 3.3: Our research method (adopted from [2] and modiﬁed)
its independent usage were taken into account when identifying the success criteria.
The next step was to conduct industrial case studies. Besides providing valuable input
to the development of the framework and the artifacts, the two case studies may also
be seen as contributions on their own, since they provide insight into issues of a more
general nature. The following industrial case studies were conducted:
• Study 1: Empirical study on trust-based decisions in interconnected systems
• Study 2: Empirical study on the design of indicators for monitoring risk
Study 1 and Study 2 were conducted for the purpose of identifying challenges with
respect to the use of trust-based decisions in interconnected systems and design of
indicators for monitoring risk, respectively. In the innovation phase, each artifact was
developed with respect to the success criteria. And ﬁnally, the artifact was evaluated
with respect to the success criteria.
The following three artifacts have been developed by following the process in Figure
3.3:
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• Artifact 1: Method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of
indicators
• Artifact 2: Method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service depen-
dencies on the quality of provided services
• Artifact 3: Architectural pattern for constructing enterprise level monitoring
tools based on indicators
The three artifacts have been checked against the literature. To evaluate Artifact 1
and Artifact 2, the following two case studies were conducted:
• Study 3: Case study for evaluating the method for designing indicators to monitor
the fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-
supported monitoring of indicators
• Study 4: Case study for evaluating the method for capturing and monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on the quality of provided services
Both Study 3 and Study 4 are the results of development of large, realistic examples for
the purpose of evaluating the success criteria associated with Artifact 1 and Artifact
2, respectively. Both case studies cover all the steps of the two methods from start to
ﬁnish. Thus, the entire method was considered in both cases.
Artifact 3 (the architectural pattern) is a generalization of the architecture of the
CORAS risk monitor [36] that was developed in the MASTER1 [37] research project.
The artifact has been evaluated based on experiences from the MASTER project, and
by arguing for its ability to serve as a basis for building monitoring tools based on
indicators within a wide range of domains and enterprises.
Figure 3.4 shows how the artifacts and the framework are related to the four case
studies. The two industrial case studies, Study 1 and Study 2, identiﬁed challenges that
have been taken into consideration when identifying the challenges to be addressed by
the artifacts and the framework. In particular, the main result from Study 1 is the
need for reasoning about trust in interconnected systems. This challenge has been
addressed by Artifact 2. The main results from Study 2 is the need for valid indicators
when monitoring risk and domain knowledge for systems with dependencies. The
former challenge has been addressed by Artifact 1, while the latter result has mainly
been used in the development of Artifact 2. As already explained, Study 3 and Study
4 have been used to evaluate Artifact 1 and Artifact 2, respectively. On the other
hand, the development of the two case studies has also resulted in new challenges
being identiﬁed. These challenges have been addressed during the development of the
two artifacts.
1According to [37], the MASTER (Managing Assurance Security and Trust for sERvices) project
aimed at “providing methodologies and infrastructures that facilitate the monitoring, enforcement,
and audit of quantiﬁable indicators on the security of a business process, and that provide manageable
assurance of the security levels, trust levels and regulatory compliance of highly dynamic service-
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Figure 3.4: How the artifacts and the framework are related to the empirical studies
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State of the art
In this chapter we provide an overview of the state of the art of relevance to the
contributions of this thesis. In the following we motivate the structure of this chapter.
The main result of Artifact 1 is a method for specifying the design and deployment
of indicators to be used in ICT-supported monitoring of the fulﬁllment of business
objectives focusing on quality. In Section 4.1.1 we present state of the art of relevance
to measuring the fulﬁllment of business objectives. Section 4.1.2 presents state of the
art related to the speciﬁcation of design and deployment of indicators, while state of
the art related to the validation of indicators is presented in Section 4.1.3. Moreover,
state of the art of relevance to the monitoring of quality is presented in Section 4.4.1.
In all four sections we put particular emphasis on the issue of quality.
The main result of Artifact 2 is a method for capturing the impact of service
dependencies on risk to quality of provided services in interconnected systems. This
includes facilitating monitoring of selected risks by the use of indicators to oﬀer a
dynamic risk picture for the provided services. The method relies on modeling and
analysis of service dependencies in order to capture their impact on risk. In Sections
4.2.1 and 4.2.2 we provide an overview of state of the art related to the modeling and
analysis of dependencies in general and service dependencies in particular, respectively.
The method also provides a solution for estimating the trustworthiness of services
provided by third-parties. Related state of the art is presented in Section 4.5.1. To
capture the impact of service dependencies on risk to quality, the method employs an
asset-based risk analysis approach. In Section 4.3.1 we present approaches of this kind,
while in Section 4.3.2 we direct our attention to state of the art of relevance to the
analysis of risk in the context of dependencies in general and service dependencies in
particular. As already explained, the method is also used for setting up monitoring of
selected risks to quality. Thus, in Section 4.4.2 we discuss state of the art of relevance
to dynamic risk monitoring.
The main result of Artifact 3 is an architectural pattern that serves as a basis for
implementing enterprise level monitoring tools based on indicators. In Section 4.4.3
we present state of the art related to patterns and the implementation of monitoring
tools.
The ﬁrst industrial case study investigates the use of trust to reason about the
behavior of systems/actors in cases where the behavior of these systems/actors may
result in risks and/or opportunities. In Section 4.5.2 we discuss state of the art related
to trust-based decisions in interconnected systems.
The second industrial case study investigates the use of indicators to validate likeli-
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hood estimates based on expert judgments in security risk analysis. In Section 4.3.3 we
present state of the art related to the validation of expert judgments used in risk anal-
ysis, while in Section 4.3.4 we focus on state of the art related to the use of indicators
in risk analysis.
4.1 Indicators
4.1.1 Measurement of the fulﬁllment of business objectives
There exist numerous approaches for measuring business performance. Some of these
are presented in [38]. Regardless of the approach being used, the organization must
translate their business objectives/goals into a set of key performance indicators in
order to measure performance. An approach that is widely used [39] is balanced score-
card [40]. This approach translates the company’s vision into four ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial perspectives. For each perspective, a set of business objectives (strategic
goals) and their corresponding key performance indicators are identiﬁed. However, the
implementation of a balanced scorecard is not necessarily straight forward. In [41],
Neely and Bourne identify several reasons for the failure of measurement initiatives
such as balanced scorecards. One problem is that the identiﬁed measures do not mea-
sure fulﬁllment of the business objectives, while another problem is that measures are
identiﬁed without putting much thought into how the data must be extracted in order
to compute the measures.
There exist a number of frameworks and best practice approaches that are sup-
ported by metrics/indicators for measuring the achievement of goals. One example is
COBIT (Control Objectives for Information and related Technology) [42], which is a
framework for IT management and IT governance. The framework provides an IT gov-
ernance model that helps in delivering value from IT and understanding and managing
the risks associated with IT. In the governance model, business goals are aligned with
IT goals, while metrics, in the form of leading and lagging indicators [43], and matu-
rity models are used to measure the achievement of the IT goals. Another example is
Val IT [44], which is a framework that is closely aligned with and that complements
COBIT. It consists of a set of guiding principles and a number of processes and best
practices for measuring, monitoring, and optimizing the realization of business value
from investment in IT.
ITIL [45–49] (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) provides best prac-
tice guidance for IT service management for the purpose of aligning IT services with
business needs. The current version of ITIL (version 3) provides a holistic perspective
of the full life cycle of services by covering the entire IT organization and all supporting
components needed to deliver services to customers. Under ITIL guidelines, services
are designed to be measurable. To support measurement, ITIL comes with a number
of metrics/indicators.
4.1.2 Speciﬁcation of the design and deployment of indicators
A number of standards and guides provide guidance on the design of indicators/metrics.
The ISO/IEC 27004 [50] standard provides guidance on the development and use of
measures and measurement for assessing information security management systems
and controls, as speciﬁed in ISO/IEC 27001 [51]. The appendix of the standard also
24
4.1 Indicators
suggests security metrics which have been selected to align with ISO/IEC 27002 [52].
Moreover, the NIST Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security [53]
provides guidance on the development, selection, and implementation of suitable mea-
sures for information security. It also comes with a number of candidate measures for
measuring information security.
The Goal-Question-Metric [54,55] (GQM) is an approach for measuring the achieve-
ment of goals. Even though GQM originated as an approach for measuring achievement
in software development, it can also be used in other contexts where the purpose is to
measure achievement of goals. In GQM, business goals are used to drive the identiﬁ-
cation of measurement goals. These goals do not necessarily measure the fulﬁllment
of the business goals, but they should always measure something that is of interest
to the business. Each measurement goal is reﬁned into questions, while metrics are
deﬁned for answering the questions. The data provided by the metrics are interpreted
and analyzed with respect to the measurement goal in order to conclude whether it is
achieved or not.
An approach that is closely related to GQM is the Goal-Question-Indicator-
Measurement [56, 57] (GQ(I)M) approach. In this approach, we start by identifying
business goals that we break down to manageable sub-goals. The approach ends with
a plan for implementing measures and indicators that support the goals.
In [58], Popova and Sharpanskykh present a framework for modeling performance
indicators within a general organization modeling framework. Two of the main con-
tributions of this framework are the formalization of the concept of a performance
indicator, and the formalization of the relationships between performance indicators.
In [59], the same authors present a formal framework for modeling goals based on
performance indicators. This formal framework is also used within the general organi-
zation modeling framework mentioned above. To enable evaluation of organizational
performance, the framework deﬁnes mechanisms for establishing goal satisfaction. By
using the frameworks presented in [58, 59], goal and performance indicator structures
can be modeled. The goal structure is given in the form of a hierarchy. It shows how
diﬀerent goals are related and how goals are reﬁned into sub-goals. It also deﬁnes how
goal satisfaction should be propagated through the hierarchy. On the other hand, the
performance indicator structure shows the diﬀerent relationships that exist between the
performance indicators. It may for instance show that one indicator is the aggregation
of other indicators, or that the value of one indicator inﬂuences the value of another.
In order to identify goals and performance indicators and to create the two structures,
both frameworks rely on organizational documents and expert knowledge. The frame-
works also provide mechanisms for checking consistency of and correspondence between
the goal and the performance indicator structures.
4.1.3 Validation of indicators
No speciﬁc method, beyond reviews, is speciﬁed for validating whether the correct
questions/sub-goals and metrics/indicators have been identiﬁed by the use of GQM
or GQ(I)M. In the case of GQM, the diﬀerent kinds of data used for computing the
metrics should be checked for correctness, completeness, and consistency [55].
In the software engineering literature, the validity of metrics that measure attributes
of software products is an important topic (see e.g., [60–62]). Even though this litera-
ture targets software engineering, it is still relevant to diﬀerent extents in other domains
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that also focus on the validity of measurements/metrics/indicators. Even though the
validity of software engineering metrics have received a lot of attention, no agreement
have been reached upon what constitutes a valid metric [63]. In [63], Meneely et al.
present a systematic literature review of papers focusing on validation of software en-
gineering metrics. The literature review began with 2288 papers, which were later
reduced to 20 papers. From these 20 papers, the authors extracted and categorized 47
unique validation criteria. The authors argue that metric researchers and developers
should select criteria based on the intended usage of the metric when validating it.
A number of the software metrics validation approaches advocate the use of mea-
surement theory [64–66] in the validation (see e.g., [67–69]). Measurement theory is a
branch of applied mathematics that is useful in measurement and data analysis. The
fundamental idea of this theory is that there is a diﬀerence between measurements and
the attribute being measured. Thus, in order to draw conclusions about the attribute,
there is a need to understand the nature of the correspondence between the attribute
and the measurements. In [70], Morali and Wieringa present an approach that relies
on measurement theory for the validation of indicators. More speciﬁcally, the approach
uses measurement theory to validate the meaningfulness of IT security risk indicators.
Measurement theory has been criticized of being too rigid and restrictive in a prac-
tical measurement setting. Briand et al. [68] advocate a pragmatic approach to mea-
surement theory in software engineering. The authors show that even if their approach
may lead to violations of the strict prescriptions and proscriptions of measurement
theory, the consequences are small compared to the beneﬁts. Another approach that
takes a pragmatic approach to measurement theory is [69]. Here, the authors propose
a framework for evaluating software metrics. The applicability of the framework is
demonstrated by applying it on a bug count metric.
4.2 Dependencies
4.2.1 Modeling and analysis of dependencies in general
Dependencies are often modeled by the use of directed graphs. In these graphs, vertices
represent diﬀerent entities, while edges represent dependencies between the entities.
The direction of an edge speciﬁes the direction of the dependency. There exist a number
of graph-based approaches that can be used in the modeling of dependencies. One
example is semantic networks [71], which is a technique for knowledge representation.
The main idea behind semantic networks is that knowledge is often best understood
as a set of concepts that are related to each other. A semantic network is given in
the form of a graph, where vertices represent concepts, while directed labeled edges
connect the concepts. The meaning of a concept is deﬁned by its semantic relations to
other concepts. With a semantic network we can show which concepts that depend on
each other and why.
In [72], Cox et al. present an approach to dependency analysis that relies on
conceptual graphs [73], which is a formalism for knowledge representation. In [72],
the conceptual graphs are used to represent, characterize, and analyze dependencies
between the entities of a model. Cox et al. claim that the use of conceptual graphs




Another approach to dependency modeling and analysis is block diagrams [74,75].
These diagrams are often used in reliability assessments. The diagrams show how
components of a system are parallel or serial, and thereby identify possible weak points
in the form of dependencies.
4.2.2 Modeling and analysis of service dependencies
There exist a number of approaches that focus on the modeling and analysis of service
dependencies and their applications in diﬀerent domains. In [76], Ensel and Keller
present an XML-based model for specifying service dependencies in distributed sys-
tems. The purpose of the model is to facilitate information sharing between the diﬀer-
ent systems. In [77], a UML-based service dependency model for ad hoc collaborative
systems is presented. In such systems, diﬀerent computing devices participate in col-
laborative applications by using and oﬀering services to each other. Besides handling
static aspects of service dependencies, the modeling approach also handles dynamic
aspects of service dependencies due to the possibility of devices coming and going. An-
other approach that also takes dynamic aspects of service dependencies into account is
presented in [78]. This approach provides a service dependency classiﬁcation for system
management analysis. It traces the ﬂow of dependency information from the design
to the run time stages of services. It relies on two types of models: a function model
that deﬁnes generic service dependencies, and a structural model containing detailed
information on the software components realizing the services.
In [79], Ding and Sha present a dependency algebra, consisting of a formal theoreti-
cal framework and a prototype toolkit, for service dependency management in real-time
systems. The algebra can be used to ensure that critical components only use and do
not depend on services provided by non-critical components. By ensuring that critical
services do not depend on non-critical services, the system will not be brought down by
minor failures in non-critical services. The algebra also oﬀers a metric for measuring
the strength of dependencies.
There are also approaches that address service dependencies with respect to security.
Such approaches take into account that the dependencies have security implications,
i.e., that a change in the security state of a component providing a service implies a
change in the security state of the component requiring the service. One such approach
is [80]. This approach is used for constructing formal models of services dependencies
in information systems. The constructed dependency models are to be used in security
policy-based management. More precisely, the dependency models are used to ﬁnd
enforcement points for security rules, which then support countermeasure deployment,
and for computing the impact of attacks and countermeasures that propagate over the
information system. A related approach is [81], which presents a framework for risk
assessment of information infrastructures. The framework generalizes the notion of
dependency with respect to security attributes, such as conﬁdentiality, integrity, and
availability. These security dependencies are used to describe relationships between
components, to discover attack strategies, and to deﬁne risk mitigation plans.
Service dependencies are also used in fault analysis [82] and dependability anal-
ysis [83], as well as in analyses targeting critical infrastructures. A number of the
approaches that address critical infrastructures use graph-based models to model and
analyze service dependencies (see e.g., [84–87]). Moreover, a number of the approaches
focus primarily on the consequences of infrastructure services not being provided. One
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such approach is [86]. This approach is used to create models of infrastructure sys-
tems and their interactions. The models are used in computer simulations where the
main purpose is to investigate how the functionality of infrastructure systems and in-
terconnections react to diﬀerent attack scenarios (“what if” scenarios where one or two
systems are removed), and how mechanisms for strengthening the underlying depen-
dency graph can be used.
4.3 Risk analysis
4.3.1 Asset-based risk analysis methods
According to [88], risk analysis is the process to comprehend the nature of risk and to
determine the level of risk, whereby a risk is the eﬀect of uncertainty on objectives.
For an organization, this eﬀect of uncertainty on objectives may be the result of inter-
nal and/or external factors, while the eﬀect may be either positive or negative, since
uncertainty is a deviation from the expected.
An asset is something to which a party assigns value and hence for which the party
requires protection. Asset-based risk analysis methods focus on identifying the assets
that requires protection, and then assess how they may be protected from threats and
risks. There exist a number of well-established methods for asset-based risk analysis.
Examples include: Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation
(OCTAVE) [9]; CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) [10]; (Mi-
crosoft) Threat Modeling [89]; and CORAS [11]. In the following we focus on CORAS,
since it is the method most relevant for Artifacts 1 and 2.
The CORAS approach for model-based risk analysis consists of the CORAS lan-
guage for risk modeling; the CORAS method which is a step-by-step description of
the risk analysis process, and that comes with a detailed guideline for constructing
CORAS diagrams; and the CORAS tool which is used for documenting, maintaining,
and reporting risk analysis results in the form of CORAS diagrams.
The CORAS method is structured into eight steps: (1) preparation for the analysis;
(2) customer presentation of target; (3) reﬁning the target description using asset dia-
grams; (4) approval of target description; (5) risk identiﬁcation using threat diagrams;
(6) risk estimation using threat diagrams; (7) risk evaluation using risk diagrams; and
(8) risk treatment using treatment diagrams.
The CORAS approach is based on the ISO 31000 standard [88] which is preceded
by the AS/NZS 4360 standard [90]. This results in the CORAS method being very
similar to other methods that are based on these or similar standards. What really
distinguishes the CORAS method from many other methods is its strong focus on the
modeling of the target and the risks, for the purpose of supporting communication,
documentation, and analysis of the risk analysis results.
4.3.2 Analysis of risk in the context of dependencies
Markov analysis [91] is a stochastic mathematical analysis method that is well-suited for
assessing the reliability of systems with component dependencies. In Markov analysis,
the system is considered as a number of states, from perfect operation to no opera-
tion at all. A Markov model is used to describe the states and the state transitions.
The states and the transitions are modeled graphically, and statistical calculations are
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used for determining the likelihoods of the diﬀerent state transitions. The most impor-
tant weakness of Markov analysis is the high workload and complexity resulting from
analyzing large systems.
Dependent CORAS [11] is an approach for modular risk modeling, which can be
used to document and reason about risk in the context of dependencies. It extends the
CORAS risk modeling language with facilities for documenting and reasoning about
risk analysis assumptions. It was motivated by the need to deal with mutual dependen-
cies in risk analysis of systems of systems. By employing dependent CORAS we may
document risk separately for the individual systems. In addition, we document the risk
analysis assumptions for the diﬀerent systems. A risk analysis assumption documents
how a threat scenario or an unwanted incident of one system may lead to a threat
scenario or an unwanted incident of another system. These assumptions are due to
some form of dependencies, not necessarily service dependencies, between the diﬀerent
systems. The diﬀerent risk models may be combined in the end, if the dependencies
between them are well-founded, i.e., not circular.
There exist several approaches from the safety domain that apply component-based
hazard analysis to describe fault propagation in systems containing dependent com-
ponents. Giese et al. [92, 93] present a method for compositional hazard analysis of
components described in the form of restricted UML [94] component and deployment
diagrams. This method applies Fault Tree Analysis [95] (FTA) to describe hazards
and the combination of components that causes them. For each component, incoming,
outgoing, and internal failures are described, as well as the dependencies between the
diﬀerent failures. The dependency information is used to capture the propagation of
failures by combining failure information of the diﬀerent components. It should be no-
ticed that the method of Giese et al. only considers failures caused by software and/or
hardware. Thus, human failures, either accidental or deliberate, are not considered.
In [96], another approach to component-based hazard analysis is described. The ap-
proach extends, automates, and integrates well-established risk analysis techniques such
as Functional Failure Analysis [97] (FFA), Failure Mode Eﬀect Analysis [98] (FMEA),
and FTA. A specialized version of FMEA is applied to describe component output
failures of the individual components. The causes of the output failures are described
as a logical combination of internal malfunctions of the component or deviations of the
component’s inputs. Based on the results from the FMEA analyses, fault trees for the
components are constructed. The approach synthesizes the individual fault trees in
order to describe the fault propagation in the system.
Kaiser et al. [99] present a component concept for FTA. They divide a fault tree
into so-called fault tree components. Each fault tree component has incoming and
outgoing ports. These ports are used to connect the diﬀerent fault tree components
into a system fault tree. A major advantage of the approach is the ability to reuse
fault tree components.
4.3.3 Validation of expert judgments in risk analysis
In [100], Otway and von Winterfeldt describe two diﬀerent types of processes for making
expert judgments in risk analyses; informal and formal processes. Informal processes
are implicit, unstructured, and undocumented, while the formal processes are explicit,
structured, and documented. In general, formal processes focus more on detecting and
resolving biases than informal processes. On the other hand, formal processes are often
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time- and cost-consuming, have lack of ﬂexibility, and may result in possible loss of
creativity due to the formalism.
Many approaches for the elicitation of expert judgments focus on the aggregation
of expert judgments in order to achieve expert judgments of good quality. There
are two classes of aggregation methods: behavioral and mathematical. Behavioral
approaches (see e.g., [101–103]) focus on negotiation in order to achieve a consensus,
while mathematical approaches (see e.g., [104]) are rule or formula based.
4.3.4 Indicator-based risk analysis
In [105], Refsdal and Stølen present an approach to risk monitoring where risk values
are calculated from measurable indicators. The approach consists of three main steps.
In the ﬁrst step, a risk analysis of the system is performed, and risks to be monitored
are identiﬁed. The risk analysis provides information about how threats may exploit
vulnerabilities to initiate threat scenarios leading to the risks. In the second step, rel-
evant measurable indicators are identiﬁed for risks or vulnerabilities, threat scenarios,
etc., leading up to the risks. Functions for calculating likelihood, consequence, and
risk values based on indicators are identiﬁed in the third step. In [105], the authors
also provide guidelines for how to evaluate the internal consistency of the dynamic risk
picture. The authors also present a view on how to measure conﬁdence in the dynamic
risk picture, based on the discovered internal inconsistencies.
In [106], Baker et al. propose an approach which uses measurable, real-world met-
rics to improve information security risk assessment and decision making. The main
motivation behind the approach is the inability of business leaders to identify the most
eﬀective information security strategies for limiting organizational loss. In particular,
the approach aims to do the following three things: allow accurate measurement and
tracking of threats; enable determination of the impact of loss of successful threats;
and aid in evaluating the eﬀectiveness and return on investment of countermeasures.
Breier and Hudec [107] present an approach which uses metrics as an instrument for
security risk assessment. In the paper, metrics are used for evaluating the fulﬁllment
of security control objectives. The authors propose a mathematical model based on
metrics for evaluating the security control objectives.
4.4 Monitoring
4.4.1 Monitoring of quality
Quality monitoring is often concerned with the monitoring of quality of service (QoS).
A large number of approaches focus on the monitoring of service level agreement
(SLA) fulﬁllment. SLAs are used to establish a contract between service providers
and consumers concerning quality of service parameters. One such approach is pre-
sented in [108]. The paper addresses the problem of service providers that deviate from
the SLAs when providing web services. QoS monitoring is necessary for measuring the
fulﬁllment of the SLAs. The problem is that neither the service provider nor the con-
sumer can be trusted when it comes to monitoring. The paper presents QoS monitoring
mechanisms that are based on feedback from the consumers. The consumers are run-
ning the monitoring code, and they report periodically feedback to a trusted reputation
mechanism (RM), which estimates the delivered QoS for the diﬀerent providers based
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on the reports. Providers that do not fulﬁll their SLAs are penalized by the RM. The
RM also applies incentives for the consumers to report honestly.
In [109], Wang et al. present a QoS management framework and QoS manage-
ment services, including monitoring and diagnostics, for service level management in
networked enterprise systems. The monitoring service does not only monitor the fulﬁll-
ment of SLAs, it also monitors the health of the systems responsible for providing the
services. The diagnostics service performs analyses and QoS related diagnostics based
on data provided by the monitoring service. If SLA violations or system degradations
are detected by the diagnostics service, adaption mechanisms are activated in order to
maximize the systems’ ability to meet QoS parameters speciﬁed in the SLAs.
Monitoring is also employed within business intelligence, often for the purpose of
measuring achievement of business objectives. Data [110] and process [111] mining
tools are two types of tools that do some sort of monitoring. Within business intelli-
gence, data mining uses techniques from statistics and artiﬁcial intelligence to identify
interesting patterns in often large sets of business data, while process mining is used
to extract information about business processes by the use of event logs. Another
type of tools that rely on monitoring is business performance management [112] tools.
These tools are used to monitor, control, and manage the implementation of business
strategies.
4.4.2 Dynamic risk monitoring
In [113], Trad et al. present a distributed system monitoring application called Fac-
tors Estimation System (FES), which is an application that can be used for proactive
monitoring of information system risk and quality. By monitoring diﬀerent sources
to problems, the application can detect problems before they become critical. When
problems are detected, reports and alarms are generated. Another tool for monitoring,
called MASTER ESB, is presented in [114]. This tool is used to monitor compliance
with access and usage policies in a system. The tool monitors low-level evidence data
that is aggregated into meaningful evidence on how diﬀerent parties comply with the
policies. This evidence is then evaluated, and actions against compliance violations
may be taken.
NIST [115] provides a guideline for information security continuous monitoring
(ICSM). NIST deﬁnes ICSM as “maintaining ongoing awareness of information secu-
rity, vulnerabilities, and threats to support organizational risk management decisions.”
In this context, ongoing means that “security controls and organizational risks are as-
sessed and analyzed at a frequency suﬃcient to support risk-based security decisions
to adequately protect organizational information.” The purpose of the guideline is to
assist organizations in the development of an ICSM strategy and the implementation
of an ICSM program. The guideline describes the fundamentals of ongoing monitoring
of information security in support of risk management, and it describes the process of
ICSM, including implementation guidelines.
Risk monitoring is also central in approaches that focus on the protection of critical
infrastructures (see e.g., [116,117]), as well as in approaches that focus on the protection
of computerized networks (see e.g., [118,119]).
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4.4.3 Patterns and the implementation of monitoring tools
The two main categories of patterns within software engineering are design patterns [23]
and architectural patterns [24]. As already mentioned in Section 2.1.6, the diﬀerence
between a design pattern and an architectural pattern is that design patterns describe
design solutions at the object/class level, while architectural patterns describe design
solutions at the architectural level, e.g., design of components and their relationships.
There exist a number of diﬀerent templates for describing patterns (see e.g., [23, 24]).
It may of course be discussed what classiﬁes as a good description of a pattern, but in
general the description must capture the essence of solving the recurring problem in
such a way that the pattern is easy to learn, compare, and use [23, 24].
In this thesis we focus on architectural patterns. The Model-View-Controller (MVC)
pattern [24, 120] is one of the best-known examples of architectural patterns. MVC
divides an interactive application into three main components: model, view, and con-
troller. The model encapsulates core data and functionality, while views and controllers
together comprise the user interface of the application. Each view displays data ob-
tained from the model in a speciﬁc way, while the controllers are used to handle user
input. The MVC pattern makes it easy to change the user interface of an interactive
application, since the model is independent of the user interface.
Design patterns that speciﬁcally target the building of software health monitoring
applications are described in [121]. The paper focuses on design patterns for sensors
collecting information about the internal state and operation of software, and how
this information can be combined into software health indicators describing diﬀerent
aspects of software health.
The tool framework called Mozart [122] uses a model driven approach to create
monitoring applications that uses key performance indicators (KPIs). The framework
mines KPIs from a data warehouse and builds an initial KPI net. In this net there will
be KPIs that are central for reaching a goal. These KPIs are identiﬁed by the use of
a goal model. There will also be other KPIs that can directly or indirectly inﬂuence
the KPIs that are central for reaching the goal. In the next step, the framework makes
use of the goal model and historical data on the diﬀerent KPIs to discover how the
diﬀerent KPIs correlate with each other. This step results in a new KPI net. The new
net contains dependencies that specify the correlations between the diﬀerent KPIs.
The next step is then to discover which of the dependency chains in the KPI net that
are most inﬂuential for monitoring the achievement of the goal. After having identiﬁed
these chains, a monitor model is constructed. This model can be transformed into a
monitor application.
In [123], the design and implementation of a performance monitoring tool for clus-
tered streaming media server systems is presented. The tool focuses on monitoring
resources such as CPU utilization, memory usage, disk usage, and network bandwidth.
In addition to the tool presented in [123], there are also commercial monitoring solu-
tions that focus on similar monitoring tasks. Examples include SolarWinds ipMoni-
tor [124] (for monitoring network devices, servers, and applications) and the IBM Tivoli
Monitoring software [125] (for monitoring operating systems, databases, and servers in




4.5.1 Estimating the trustworthiness of external services
In [117,126], the challenge of security risk assessment in interdependent critical infras-
tructures is addressed. To assess risk, a critical infrastructure operator needs informa-
tion about services provided by its own infrastructure, as well as information about
services provided by infrastructures that its own infrastructure depends on. Thus, in
the approach of [117,126], risk information is shared between the diﬀerent interdepen-
dent critical infrastructures. The problem is that information provided by one critical
infrastructure may be inaccurate. Such information will again aﬀect the correctness
of the risk assessment results. To tackle this problem, [117, 126] use trust indicators
to classify how accurate the exchanged information is. Information that is not trusted
may be given a low weight during the risk assessment or it may be discarded.
Subjective logic [127, 128] is another approach that can be used to deal with un-
certainty. It is a probabilistic logic that captures uncertainty about probability values
explicitly. The logic operates on subjective belief about the world. Diﬀerent actors
have diﬀerent subjective beliefs, and these beliefs are associated with uncertainty. The
approach makes it possible, for example, to calculate to what degree an actor believes
that a service will be provided based on the actor’s beliefs about services that the
service in question depends on, or to calculate the consensus opinion of a group of
actors. Subjective logic deals strictly with the actors’ beliefs and reasoning, and does
not address the question of how their beliefs aﬀect their behavior. The belief calculus
of subjective logic can be applied in risk analysis to capture the uncertainty associated
with such analysis, as shown in [129]. This is achieved by using subjective beliefs about
threats and vulnerabilities as input parameters to the analysis. Through application
of the belief calculus, the computed risk assessments provide information about the
uncertainty associated with the result of the analysis.
A Bayesian network [130] is a directed acyclic graph consisting of nodes with states
and edges describing causal relationships between nodes. Each node is characterized
by a probability distribution over its possible states, where these probabilities depend
on the probabilities of the states of its parents. The probabilities of nodes are changed
by the gathering of new evidence. For any changes of the probabilities of nodes, the
eﬀects both forwards (towards child nodes) and backwards (towards parent nodes) may
be computed.
In [131], Wu et al. present a Bayesian network based QoS assessment model for
web services. The purpose of the model is to predict whether diﬀerent service providers
can deliver a service that satisﬁes service consumers’ QoS requirements. The model
is trained by computing the compliance between consumers’ QoS requirements and
the QoS of the delivered service. The capability of the service to deliver the correct
QoS is inferred based on the compliance values, and the Bayesian network is updated
by using the inference outcome. In [132], Melaye and Demazeau propose a Bayesian
dynamic trust model for determining an agent’s trust in another agent. The model
can for instance be used to determine whether an agent delivers a service with the
expected quality. The notion of trust is formalized by using a Bayesian network that is
structured into three layers. The top layer is the trust level, while the second and third
level represent basic beliefs and belief sources, respectively. A Bayesian Kalmar ﬁlter is
used to capture dynamic aspects of trust, e.g., changes in beliefs. In [133], a Bayesian
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network trust model for peer-to-peer networks is proposed. A peer can use trust to
assess other peers’ ability to provide services with the expected quality. In [133], a
peer calculates trust by the use of Bayesian networks. The peer maintains a Bayesian
network for each peer that it has received services from. After each service interaction,
the peer updates the Bayesian network based on the quality of the provided service.
The trust values calculated by the Bayesian networks are used to rank the diﬀerent
service providers.
Fuzzy Logic [134] is a form of reasoning for computers that is very close to human
reasoning. It is used to draw conclusions from uncertain, vague, ambiguous, or impre-
cise information. Fuzzy logic is therefore suitable for reasoning about trust, since trust
assessments are often based on such information. In Fuzzy logic, we ﬁrst perform a
fuzziﬁcation by gathering crisp numerical values that are assigned to fuzzy sets by the
use of fuzzy linguistic variables, fuzzy linguistic terms, and membership functions. A
crisp numerical value can be the member of more than one fuzzy set. The degree of
membership in a set ranges between 0 and 1 in fuzzy logic. Thus, a crisp value that
represent some assessment of service quality can have a membership degree of 0.1 in
the set “low” (quality) and a membership degree of 0.8 in the set “medium” (quality).
After the fuzziﬁcation has been conducted, the fuzzy values are used to evaluate a set
of IF ... THEN ... rules. A rule can for instance say: IF quality is low THEN trust
is low. Afterwards, the results from the evaluation of the rules are aggregated. The
last step is to perform a defuzzyﬁcation by mapping the aggregation results to crisp
numerical values. Such a crisp numerical value can for instance specify the trust in a
service provider’s ability to provide a service with the required quality.
In [135], Griﬃths et al. present a trust model based on fuzzy logic for peer-to-peer
systems. The trust model uses fuzzy logic to represent and reason with imprecise and
uncertain information regarding peers’ trustworthiness. A peer can use the model to
select the most appropriate service providers among the other peers. More precisely, the
model enables a peer to maximize the quality of the services that it requires according
to its current preferences.
4.5.2 Trust-based decisions in interconnected systems
Reputation systems [136] are often used to decide whom to trust on the Internet.
Such systems collect, distributes, and aggregates feedback about participants’ past
behavior. In [137], Resnick and Zeckhauser present an empirical analysis of eBay’s
reputation system. The analysis was based on a large data set from 1999 provided by
eBay. The analysis resulted in discoveries such as: feedback was provided more than
half the time; the feedback was almost always positive; and sellers’ feedback proﬁles
were predictive of future performance. The authors found the low rate of negative
feedback highly suspicious. Despite this, the authors come to the conclusion that the
system appears to be working. One of the explanations that the authors consider is
that the system may still work, even if it is unreliable and unsound, if its participants
think it is working. Thus, if sellers believe that a strong reputation is needed in order
to sell goods, then they will behave in ways that result in positive feedback.
In [138], Lim et al. investigate the eﬀectiveness of two trust-building strategies
to inﬂuence actual buying behavior in online shopping environments, particularly for
ﬁrst-time visitors to an Internet store without an established reputation. The two
strategies investigated were portal association (e.g., the store is associated with Yahoo,
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Amazon, etc.) and satisﬁed customer endorsements. Two studies were conducted at
a large public university in Hong Kong with students as test subjects. Of the two
strategies investigated, satisﬁed customer endorsements by similar (local, non-foreign)
peers was found to increase the test subjects’ trust in the online store investigated in
the two studies. Portal association did not lead to an increase in trust.
In addition to the two studies presented above, a number of other surveys, reviews,
and empirical studies on trust and reputation approaches have been conducted (see
e.g., [139–142]).
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This thesis makes two kinds of contributions. Firstly, it contributes in terms of new
artifacts. Secondly, it contributes in terms of industrial case studies. The industrial
case studies were mainly carried out to support the development of the artifacts, but
since the industrial case studies also provide insight into issues of a more general nature,
they may be seen as contributions on their own. The three artifacts are
1. Artifact 1: Method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of
indicators
2. Artifact 2: Method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service depen-
dencies on the quality of provided services
3. Artifact 3: Architectural pattern for constructing enterprise level monitoring
tools based on indicators
The two industrial case studies are
1. Empirical study on trust-based decisions in interconnected systems
2. Empirical study on the design of indicators for monitoring risk
Although the three new artifacts may be viewed as a contribution on their own, and
also be employed and used in practice independently of each other, they are also closely
related and may be integrated. As indicated by Figure 5.1, we refer to the result of this
integration (which is represented by the gray circle) as the ValidKI Framework, while
we refer to the application of Artifacts 1, 2, and 3 within the framework as Indicator
Design, Dependency Analysis, and Monitoring Pattern, respectively.
The gray circle does only cover parts of the three artifacts, since the artifacts have
applications that go beyond the framework. In the framework, Artifact 1 is applied to
business objectives focusing on service quality. The artifact is however not limited to
this kind of business objectives only. The artifact can be used to design indicators to
monitor the fulﬁllment of all sorts of business objectives focusing on quality, as long as
ICT-supported monitoring of the indicators is possible.
In the framework, Artifact 2 is used to capture the impact of service dependencies
on risk to the fulﬁllment of business objectives with respect to service quality. In this
context, all unacceptable risks to the fulﬁllment of a business objective need to be
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Figure 5.1: Relations between the ValidKI Framework and Artifacts 1–3
still on service quality, but not on business objectives focusing on the achievement of
service quality. Then it is up to the client on whose behalf the artifact is applied to
select the risks to be monitored.
In the framework, Artifact 3 is used to implement a risk cockpit based on indicators
that facilitates the monitoring of business objectives focusing on the achievement of
service quality. Artifact 3 is however not limited to the implementation of risk cockpits
only. It may be used to implement all sorts of enterprise level monitoring tools based
on indicators.
The remainder of this chapter consists of three sections. In Section 5.1 we present
the ValidKI Framework. In Section 5.2 we provide an overview of the three contributed
artifacts. Finally, Section 5.3 is devoted to the two industrial case studies.
5.1 The ValidKI Framework
In Figure 5.2, the ValidKI Framework is described. The ﬁgure shows in particular the
integration of Indicator Design and Dependency Analysis corresponding to Artifacts 1
and 2, respectively. Arrows have been used to show in which order the diﬀerent steps
of the two methods are executed. Moreover, bold arrows are used to indicate inputs
to and outputs from the artifacts. It should also be noticed that the grayed steps of
Indicator Design method are not executed. These steps are replaced by steps of the
Dependency Analysis method. In the following we explain the integration of the three
artifacts. We use Step X (ID) to refer to Step X of Indicator Design, while we use Step
Y (DA) to refer to Step Y of Dependency Analysis.
The input to the framework is a business objective focusing on the achievement of
service quality. In Step 1.1 (ID) the business objective is expressed more precisely in
order to understand exactly what it means to fulﬁll it. Step 1.2 (ID) is used to describe
the part of the business that needs to reach the business objective and therefore is to
be monitored. With this relevant part of business being interconnected systems that
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Figure 5.2: The ValidKI Framework
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depend on each other through service interactions, we replace Step 1.2 (ID) with Step
1 (DA) in order to document the interconnected systems, their services, service de-
pendencies, quality requirements to services, and trust in services provided by systems
of which we have insuﬃcient documentation. Moreover, since we need to capture the
impact of service dependencies on risk to the fulﬁllment of the business objective, Step
2.1 (ID) and Step 2.2 (ID) are replaced by Step 2 (DA).
The result of conducting Step 2 (DA) is a risk model capturing the impact of
service dependencies on the fulﬁllment of the business objective. In Step 3.1 (DA),
which replaces Step 2.3 (ID), we identify the risks that should be monitored by the
use of indicators. All risks that are unacceptable with respect to the fulﬁllment of the
business objective are identiﬁed for monitoring. In Step 3.2 (DA) we identify indicators
for monitoring the risks, while in Step 3 (ID) we specify deployments of sensors in the
interconnected systems, and we specify requirements to the indicators with respect to
the sensor deployments. The sensors are needed for gathering the data necessary for
calculating the indicators. After having evaluated the internal validity of the indicators
in Step 4 (ID), the design and deployment of indicators are speciﬁed in Step 4 (DA).
The designs specify in the form of algorithms how indicators should be calculated, while
the deployments specify how data needed in the calculations should be extracted and
transmitted within the relevant part of business. In Step 5 (ID), the speciﬁcations from
Step 4 (DA) are reﬁned. The result of Step 5 (ID) is speciﬁcations that describe how
diﬀerent sensors, actors, and components/systems need to interact in order to calculate
the indicators. The ﬁnal step is to evaluate the construct validity of the indicators. A
risk analysis is conducted as part of Step 6 (ID). To analyze the risks we rely on Step
2 (DA) due to the dependencies between the interconnected systems.
The output from the two integrated artifacts is a set of indicators for monitoring
the fulﬁllment of the business objective received as input. The output is used as input
to Monitoring Pattern corresponding to Artifact 3. Based on the input, a risk cockpit
that facilitates monitoring of the business objective can be constructed.
5.2 Overview of artifacts
5.2.1 Artifact 1: Method for designing indicators to moni-
tor the fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular
focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indi-
cators
The methodology is used for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators.
For a detailed description of the methodology, we refer to Chapter 9.
The focus of the methodology is on designing valid indicators. A set of indicators is
valid with respect to a business objective if it measures the degree to which the business
or relevant part thereof fulﬁlls the business objective. Six main steps are conducted
in order to design valid indicators for a business objective. The ﬁrst main step is all
about understanding what needs to be monitored. More precisely, we need to express
the business objective in a precise manner, and we need to provide a description of the
part of the business that needs to reach the business objective. The second main step
is concerned with conducting a risk analysis to identify risks to the fulﬁllment of the
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business objective. We distinguish between three sub-steps. Risk acceptance criteria
are speciﬁed in the ﬁrst sub-step, while risks are identiﬁed in the second sub-step. In
the third sub-step, the identiﬁed risks are evaluated with respect to the speciﬁed risk
acceptance criteria.
The third main step is concerned with identifying indicators to monitor the un-
acceptable risks identiﬁed in the previous main step. We distinguish between two
sub-steps. Sensors to be deployed in the relevant part of business are identiﬁed in the
ﬁrst sub-step. In the second sub-step we identify indicators to be calculated based on
data gathered by the sensors and we specify requirements to the indicators with respect
to the deployed sensors. The internal validity of the set of indicators is evaluated in
the fourth main step. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the ﬁrst sub-step we
reformulate the precise business objective by expressing it in terms of the identiﬁed
indicators. In the second sub-step we evaluate the internal validity of the set. The set
is internally valid if the precise business objective expressed in terms of the indicators
correctly measures the degree to which the business objective is fulﬁlled. For each
indicator we evaluate whether it is internally valid based on a set of criteria.
In the ﬁfth main step we specify designs for indicators, i.e., how they should be
calculated based on data gathered by the sensors, while in the sixth main step, we
evaluate whether the set of indicators has construct validity with respect to the business
objective. The set has construct validity if the gathering of the sensor measurements
of each indicator is suitable with respect to its requirements. Construct validity is
evaluated based on a set of criteria. To evaluate the diﬀerent criteria, we re-do the
risk analysis from the second main step with the precise business objective replaced
by the reformulated precise business objective. The latter objective is the precise
business objective expressed in terms of indicators. For each indicator we identify risks
towards the correctness of the reformulated precise business objective that are the
result of threats to criteria for construct validity that the indicator needs to fulﬁll. If
the risk analysis does not result in any new unacceptable risks, then we have established
construct validity for each indicator. If the set of indicators is both internally valid and
has construct validity with respect to the business objective, then we have established
that the set is valid.
5.2.2 Artifact 2: Method for capturing and monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on the quality of pro-
vided services
The methodology is used for capturing the impact of service dependencies on risk to the
quality of provided services in interconnected systems, and for setting up monitoring
of selected risks by the use of indicators for the purpose of providing a dynamic risk
picture for the provided services. The methodology is described in detail in Chapter
10.
The client, on whose behalf the methodology is applied, controls some of the inter-
connected systems. These systems depend on other systems, which are controlled by
other parties. In the ﬁrst main step of the methodology, we document the intercon-
nected systems in the form of a target model. The model documents systems, services,
quality requirements to services, service dependencies, and trust relations. The trust
relations are used when analyzing service dependencies involving systems of which we
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have insuﬃcient documentation. Each relation assigns a trust level to a quality re-
quirement. The trust level states the degree to which the client trusts the service to
be delivered according to the quality requirement in question. These trust levels are
used in the second main step.
In the second main step, we conduct a risk analysis to capture the impact of service
dependencies on risk to quality of provided services. For a provided service, its quality
is represented by a number of quality attributes. For each provided service to be
analyzed, we identify in the ﬁrst sub-step one or more quality assets, where each asset
represents a quality attribute of the service. By identifying these assets we restrict the
identiﬁcation of risks caused by service dependencies to only those risks that may harm
the quality of provided services. The next sub-step is to construct high-level risk models
of the impact of service dependencies on the identiﬁed quality assets. The models are
constructed schematically from the target model by following a schematic procedure.
These models establish a high-level understanding of how the failure of services to be
delivered according to their quality requirements may lead to the failure of dependent
services to be delivered according to their quality requirements. In the third sub-step,
these high-level models are further detailed in order to establish a risk picture that
can be monitored. As part of this detailing, we use the trust levels identiﬁed in the
ﬁrst main step to estimate likelihoods of quality requirements not being achieved for
services involving systems of which we have insuﬃcient documentation.
The third main step concerns the identiﬁcation of risks to be monitored, as well as
identiﬁcation of indicators for monitoring their risk values. In the fourth main step we
specify the design and deployment of the identiﬁed indicators. The designs specify how
the indicators should be calculated, while the deployments specify how the indicators
should be embedded in the interconnected systems. More precisely, the deployments
specify how data needed in the calculations should be extracted and transmitted within
the interconnected systems.
5.2.3 Artifact 3: Architectural pattern for constructing en-
terprise level monitoring tools based on indicators
The architectural pattern serves as a basis for implementing monitoring tools, or more
speciﬁcally enterprise level monitoring tools based on indicators. These are tools that:
collect low-level indicators from the ICT infrastructure or similar; aggregate the low-
level indicators into high-level indicators, useful at the enterprise level; and present
the high-level indicators in a way that is understandable to the intended users. In
the following we explain how the pattern is applied for constructing an enterprise level
monitoring tool based on indicators. For a detailed description of the architectural
pattern, we refer to Chapter 11.
The architectural pattern divides an enterprise level monitoring tool into three com-
ponents; MonitorModel which collects low-level indicators from some data source and
aggregate these indicators into high-level indicators; MonitorConsole which presents
results from the monitoring in the form of high-level indicators and results from the
evaluation of these indicators in a speciﬁc way to a speciﬁc group of users; and Moni-
torConﬁg which is used to set up the enterprise level monitoring tool and to conﬁgure
it during run-time.
The MonitorConﬁg makes use of a data conﬁguration ﬁle to conﬁgure the Moni-
torModel. This ﬁle speciﬁes the low-level indicators to be collected and functions for
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aggregating these indicators into high-level indicators. The MonitorConsole is conﬁg-
ured by the use of a presentation model. This model speciﬁes how results from the
monitoring should be presented to a speciﬁc group of users. The presentation model is
parameterized with respect to high-level indicators found in the MonitorModel’s data
conﬁguration ﬁle. The MonitorConsole can therefore easily be updated when high-level
indicators, referred to in its presentation model, change. In the case of risk monitoring,
the presentation model will typically be a risk model. In this risk model, some of the
likelihood and consequence values, used to calculate risk values, have been replaced by
high-level indicators. Likelihood and consequence values will be updated as a result of
high-level indicators being updated, which again results in risk values being updated.
5.3 Overview of industrial case studies
5.3.1 Empirical study on trust-based decisions in intercon-
nected systems
The ﬁrst empirical study was conducted as part of an industrial project focusing on the
use of a UML-based trust analysis method to model and analyze a public eProcurement
system. This system makes use of a Validation Authority (VA) service for validating
electronic IDs (eIDs) and digital signatures. The trust analysis was conducted on
behalf of Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in the autumn of 2008. The goal of the trust
analysis was to obtain a better understanding of the potential usefulness of a VA
service for supporting trust-based decisions in systems which rely on electronically
signed documents. The empirical study and the industrial project are described in
detail in Chapter 12. In the following we provide an overview of the industrial project
and the trust analysis method used, and we describe the main results from the empirical
study.
Public eProcurement is used by public authorities, for instance within the EU, to
award public contracts to economic operators. To apply for public contracts, economic
operators submit electronically signed tenders, containing legal, ﬁnancial, and technical
information, to a public eProcurement system. A public eProcurement system must
be aware of the risk implied by accepting digital signatures. The eProcurement system
does not have information on whether the tender is authentic or not, i.e., whether
the economic operator is willing or not willing to fulﬁll the tender. Thus, a possible
scenario is that an economic operator can refute the validity of the submitted tender,
if awarded the contract. The system can ensure that this risk is acceptable by making
an assessment of the signature quality and accepting only those of a certain quality.
The higher the quality is, the harder it would be for an economic operator to refute
the validity of their tender. The quality of a signature can be decided from the quality
of the eID, which is derived from the certiﬁcate policy of the certiﬁcate authority and
the cryptography used. The eProcurement system can use a VA to assess the quality
of digital signatures with respect to a quality policy set by the system. Based on the
assessments, the VA informs the system whether the signatures are to be trusted or
not.
The trust analysis method used for modeling and analyzing the eProcurement sys-
tem consists of three main steps. In the ﬁrst step we model the target. The models
should only capture the aspects of the system (eProcurement system) and other actors
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(the VA and economic operators) that enhance our understanding of the decisions that
are taken on the basis of trust and the considerations that lie behind these decisions,
as well as the resulting system behavior and outcomes that are relevant. In the second
step we conduct the actual analysis. This involves investigating the current system
behavior and the way in which trust-based decisions are being made, as well as poten-
tial alternative behaviors. The aim is to obtain a good understanding of the risks and
opportunities involved. For an eProcurement system the risks are to accept trusted
tenders that are non-authentic and to reject not trusted tenders that are authentic.
Moreover, the opportunities are to accept trusted tenders that are authentic and to
reject not trusted tenders that are non-authentic. In the third step we use the ob-
tained knowledge to form policies to ensure and enforce the desirable behavior. The
aim here is to select a quality policy that results in an optimal balance between risks
and opportunities.
The empirical study motivates the need for using trust analysis methods when
reasoning about the behavior of systems/actors in cases where the behavior of these
systems/actors may result in risks and/or opportunities. For the particular method
applied, the empirical study gave strong indications that the trust analysis method is
feasible in practice. The empirical study also shows that: this kind of trust analysis can
be carried within the frame of 100 man-hours (not including writing of a ﬁnal report);
there were no instances were the analysts (researchers) were not able to capture the
relevant information in the models; and the models to a large extent were comprehen-
sible for the industrial participant with some experience in UML but no background
in the speciﬁc extensions used by the method.
5.3.2 Empirical study on the design of indicators for monitor-
ing risk
The second empirical study was integrated in a commercial security risk analysis con-
ducted in 2010. In this analysis, indicators were designed for the purpose of validating
likelihood estimates obtained from expert judgments. In the following we provide a
brief overview of the steps of the commercial security risk analysis that were of rel-
evance to the empirical study, and we present the main results from the study. We
refer to Chapter 13 for further details on the commercial security risk analysis and the
empirical study.
The commercial security risk analysis included a six step process that was of rele-
vance to the empirical study. The empirical study builds on data collected during the
analysis and on semi-structured interviews with domain experts that participated on
behalf of the client in the analysis. In Step 1 of the process, the domain experts pro-
vided the analysis team (the researchers) with likelihood estimates for security risks
based on expert judgments. Indicators for validating the likelihood estimates were
identiﬁed in Step 2. The analysis team designed a number of indicators, and these
indicators were revised during a meeting with the domain experts in Step 3. During
this meeting some indicators were rejected, some were subject to minor modiﬁcations,
and some new indicators were identiﬁed. In Step 4 the analysis team formulated valida-
tion criteria for the likelihood estimates in terms of indicators. Each criterion speciﬁes
the expected values of the indicators related to the likelihood estimate in question.
Here, each criterion makes a prediction about the value of a set of indicators under
the assumption that the likelihood estimate in question is correct. Indicator values
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were obtained by the domain experts in Step 5. In Step 6 the validation criteria were
evaluated and some of the initial likelihood estimates were adjusted.
One result from the empirical study was that two out of 28 likelihood estimates
were adjusted, while the main result was the identiﬁcation of a number of challenges
related to design of indicators for monitoring security risks. First, the empirical study
shows that it is challenging to design indicators for which it is feasible to obtain values
within the available time and resources of a security risk analysis. For a number of the
indicators designed, their values were not obtainable within the client’s organization.
By having some knowledge on the kinds of historical data that are available within the
organization and whose responsible for the diﬀerent kinds of data, it should be easier
to both identify indicators and obtain their values. Unfortunately, it may be diﬃcult
to obtain this knowledge since data is often spread across the organization and since
few, if any, have a complete overview of the data available. Second, it is challenging to
relate likelihood estimates to indicators. It is especially diﬃcult to predict how indica-
tor values aﬀect a likelihood estimate when the indicators are only indirectly related to
the estimate in question. This will typically be a problem when formulating validation
criteria for likelihood estimates of incidents that that are not easily observable. Third,
the indicator values obtained from an organization may vary when it comes to correct-
ness. In order to get the most out of indicator-based monitoring, the uncertainty of the
values should be taken into account. Moreover, one should strive to reduce uncertainty





Overview of research papers
The main results of the work presented in this thesis are documented in the papers
presented in Part II of the thesis. In this chapter we provide an overview of these
papers. For each paper we describe its main topics and indicate how much of the work
that is credited to the author of this thesis.
6.1 Paper A: ValidKI: A method for designing in-
dicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and
ICT-supported monitoring of indicators
Authors: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden, Atle Refsdal, and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: Technical report SINTEF A23413, SINTEF ICT, 2012. The
report presented in the thesis is an extended and revised version of the paper pub-
lished in International Journal on Advances in Intelligent Systems (vol. 5, no. 1-2,
2012) [143]. This paper is again an extended and revised version of the paper pub-
lished in proceedings of the First International Conference on Business Intelligence and
Technology (BUSTECH’2011) [144]. The latter paper received a best paper award at
the conference.
My contribution: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The report presents the method ValidKI (Valid Key Indicators), which
is a method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business objectives
with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators. The
main focus of the method is on the design of valid indicators. A set of indicators
is valid with respect to a business objective if it measures the degree to which the
business or relevant part thereof fulﬁlls the business objective. The method is divided
into six main steps. In the report, the method is demonstrated on an example case
focusing on the use of electronic patient records in a hospital environment. The main
output from the method is speciﬁcations that describe the design and deployment of
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the indicators. These speciﬁcations are to be used to implement ICT-based monitoring
of the indicators.
In ValidKI, indicators are designed for monitoring unacceptable risks to the fulﬁll-
ment of business objectives. A business objective is fulﬁlled if all of its unacceptable
risks become acceptable as a result of the monitoring. Acceptable risks to the fulﬁll-
ment of business objectives may be thought of to represent uncertainty we can live
with. In other words, their potential occurrences are not seen to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the fulﬁllment of the business objectives. The validity of the indicators is evaluated
based on validation criteria from the domain of software engineering metrics. The
validation criteria used are general, thus not speciﬁc to software engineering.
6.2 Paper B: Using indicators to monitor risk in
interconnected systems: How to capture and
measure the impact of service dependencies on
the quality of provided services
Authors: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden, Atle Refsdal, and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: Technical report SINTEF A22301, SINTEF ICT, 2012. The
report presented in the thesis is an extended and revised version of the paper published
as chapter in the book “IT Security Governance Innovations: Theory and Research”
(D. Mellado, L. E. Sa´nchez, E. Ferna´ndez-Medina, and M. Piattini (eds.), IGI Global,
2012) [145].
My contribution: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The report presents a method for capturing the impact of service
dependencies on risk to the quality of provided services in interconnected systems, and
for setting up monitoring of selected risks by the use of indicators for the purpose of
providing a dynamic risk picture for the provided services. The method is divided
into four main steps focusing on documenting the interconnected systems and their
service dependencies, establishing the impact of service dependencies on risk to quality
of provided services, identifying measurable indicators for dynamic monitoring, and
specifying their design and deployment, respectively. These design and deployment
speciﬁcations are to be used to implement risk monitoring based on the identiﬁed
indicators. The report describes each of the four main steps as well as their sub-steps
in terms of a detailed guideline. The method is illustrated in an example-driven fashion
based on a case study from the domain of power supply.
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6.3 Paper C: An architectural pattern for enter-
prise level monitoring tools
Authors: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden, Mass Soldal Lund, Atle Refsdal, Fredrik See-
husen, and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: Published in proceedings of the 2011 IEEE International Work-
shop on the Maintenance and Evolution of Service-Oriented and Cloud-Based Systems
(MESOCA’2011) [146].
My contribution: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The paper presents an architectural pattern to serve as a basis for
building enterprise level monitoring tools based on indicators. These are tools that:
collect low-level indicators from the ICT infrastructure or similar; aggregate the low-
level indicators into high-level indicators, useful at the enterprise level; and present
the high-level indicators in a way that is understandable to the intended users. In the
paper we identify the core components of such tools and describe their interactions.
The pattern is the result of generalizing the architecture of a risk monitor that exhibits
a number of features that are not speciﬁc to the monitoring of risks, but general to
a broad class of enterprise level monitoring tools. In the paper, we demonstrate the
pattern by showing the risk monitor as an instance, and we exemplify the use of the
risk monitor in a health care scenario.
Errata: Replace “design pattern” with “architectural pattern” in Section V (Con-
clusion) in Paper C.
6.4 Paper D: Experiences from using a UML-based
method for trust analysis in an industrial project
on electronic procurement
Authors: Tormod Vaksvik H˚avaldsrud, Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden, Per Myrseth,
Atle Refsdal, Ketil Stølen, and Jon Ølnes.
Publication status: Published in Journal of Electronic Commerce Research (vol.
10, no. 3-4, 2010) [147].
My contribution: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden was one of two main authors, respon-
sible for about 45% of the work.
Main topics: The paper reports on experiences from using a UML-based method for
trust analysis in an industrial project. The overall aim of the trust analysis method is to
provide a sound basis for making trust policy decisions. The method makes use of UML
sequence diagrams extended with constructs for probabilistic choice and subjective
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belief, as well as the capture of policy rules. The trust analysis method is evaluated
with respect to a set of criteria. The industrial project focused on the modeling and
analysis of a public electronic procurement (eProcurement) system making use of a
validation authority service for validating electronic certiﬁcates and signatures. The
evaluation of the method gave strong indications that the trust analysis method is
feasible in practice.
6.5 Paper E: Experiences from using indicators to
validate expert judgments in security risk anal-
ysis
Authors: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden, Atle Refsdal, and Ketil Stølen.
Publication status: Technical report SINTEF A21560, SINTEF ICT, 2012. The
report presented in the thesis is an extended version of the paper published in the pro-
ceedings of the Third International Workshop on Security Measurements and Metrics
(MetriSec’2011) [148].
My contribution: Olav Skjelkv˚ale Ligaarden was the main author, responsible for
about 90% of the work.
Main topics: The report presents experiences from a commercial security risk anal-
ysis where indicators were used to validate likelihood estimates obtained from expert
judgments. The experiences build on data collected during the analysis and on semi-
structured interviews with the client experts who participated in the analysis. The





In this chapter, we evaluate and discuss the contributions of this thesis. In Chapter 2
we deﬁned success criteria for the framework and the three artifacts. In Section 7.1 we
evaluate to what extent we have fulﬁlled the diﬀerent success criteria, while in Section
7.2 we discuss how the three artifacts of this thesis relate to and extend the state of
the art presented in Chapter 4.
7.1 Fulﬁllment of the success criteria
In the following three sub-sections we evaluate the success criteria of Artifacts 1–3. The
success criterion of the framework as a whole is evaluated in the fourth sub-section,
since this criterion depends on the evaluation of the other success criteria.
7.1.1 Artifact 1: Method for designing indicators to moni-
tor the fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular
focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indi-
cators
Success criterion 2 The application of the method results in indicators that measure
correctly to what extent the business objectives received as input are fulﬁlled.
As previously explained, the industrial case study described in Paper E (presented
in Chapter 13) focused on the use of indicators to validate likelihood estimates obtained
from expert judgments. The need for indicators that measure correctly to what extent
the business objectives received as input are fulﬁlled is motivated by experiences from
this study. In particular, the study identiﬁed two cases where likelihood estimates
could not be validated because the indicator values were too uncertain.
The method delivers a set of indicators that is valid with respect to a business
objective received as input, where valid is deﬁned as follows: a set of indicators is valid
with respect to a business objective if it is valid in the following two ways:
1. internal validity – the precise business objective expressed in terms of the in-




2. construct validity – the gathering of the sensor measurements of each indicator
is suitable with respect to its requirements speciﬁcation.
We claim that our notion of validity is a good approximation of correctness referred
to in the success criterion. Firstly, the distinction between internal and construct
validity is well-established in the literature. According to Meneely et al. [63], a metric
has internal validity if “the metric measures the attribute it purports to measure.”
Similar deﬁnitions are given in [67,149]. Moreover, [63] presents a systematic literature
review of validation criteria for software metrics. The review ultimately ended up
focusing on 20 papers. Most of the authors of these papers discuss some form of
internal validation.
According to Meneely et al., a metric has construct validity if “the gathering of
a metric’s measurements is suitable for the deﬁnition of the targeted attribute.” This
deﬁnition is based on [150] which refers to construct validity as when “the operational
deﬁnition yields data related to an abstract concept.” In both cases, construct refers
to the implementation of a metric/indicator. As shown by Meneely et al., a number
of the authors of the reviewed papers discuss validation criteria that can be classiﬁed
as construct validity types of criteria, i.e., that they concern the validation of the
implementation of metrics/indicators.
Our deﬁnitions of internal and construct validity follow the deﬁnitions given by
Meneely et al. As can be seen in Section II-B in Paper A (presented in Chapter
9), we use a risk-based approach to evaluate the fulﬁllment of business objectives.
For each business objective, we identify risks towards its fulﬁllment. Indicators are
used to measure risks that represent uncertainty we cannot live with, i.e., that the
potential occurrences of the risks signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the fulﬁllment of the business
objective. More precisely, the indicators are used to measure risk attributes (likelihood
or consequence). Each indicator has internal validity if it measures such an attribute
correctly.
In the case of construct validity, each indicator is associated with a requirements
speciﬁcation which speciﬁes what it means to measure the risk attribute. The indicator
has construct validity if it can be implemented correctly, i.e., if the gathering of the
sensor measurements for which the calculation of the indicator relies is suitable with
respect to the requirements speciﬁcation.
By reviewing the 20 papers, Meneely et al. extracted and categorized 47 unique
validation criteria for software metrics. A number of these criteria are general, thus
not speciﬁc to software engineering. For some of the validation criteria, Meneely et al.
noticed that the criteria are not atomically satisﬁable criteria, but broad categories that
can contain other criteria. The main categories are: internal, external, and construct
validity. According to Meneely et al., a metric has external validity if “it is related
in some way (e.g., by prediction, association, or causality) with an external quality
factor.” An external quality factor is an external attribute that is measured by a metric.
In software engineering, the relationships between internal and external attributes of
software products are often examined [151]. For instance, a metric for the internal
attribute code size has external validity if it is related to the metric for the external
attribute maintainability in some way.
The business objectives that we address focus on quality. The attributes that we
measure by the use of indicators are of course related in some way to the quality
attributes represented by the business objective. However, external validity is not rele-
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vant in our case, since we do not measure to what extent a business objective is fulﬁlled
by relating indicators that measure diﬀerent attributes to indicators that measure qual-
ity attributes. Instead, we measure to what extent a business objective is fulﬁlled by
measuring risk attributes of risks whose potential occurrences may signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence the fulﬁllment of the business objective. This means that none of the validation
criteria that Meneely et al. have classiﬁed as external validity types of criteria are
relevant.
To evaluate internal and construct validity, we have taken a number of the criteria
categorized in the internal and construct validity categories into consideration. In the
following we justify the selection and rejection of diﬀerent criteria. In the case of in-
ternal validity, the criterion “attribute validity” is taken into consideration. According
to Meneely et al., a metric has attribute validity if “if the measurements correctly ex-
hibit the attribute that the metric is intending to measure.” This criterion is relevant
since it helps us to evaluate whether an indicator correctly exhibits the risk attribute
(likelihood or consequence) of the risk that it is measuring.
In [63], the criterion “representation condition” is classiﬁed as a category. Accord-
ing to Meneely et al., a metric satisﬁes the representation condition if “the attribute
is a numerical characterization that preserves properties of both the attribute and the
number system it maps to.” The representation condition is a property from measure-
ment theory. Under the representation condition, any property of the number system
must appropriately map to a property of the attribute being measured and vice versa.
From this category we have selected the following criteria:
• “appropriate continuity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has appropriate
continuity if the metric is deﬁned (or undeﬁned) for all values according to the
attribute being measured”);
• “dimensional consistency” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has dimen-
sional consistency if the formulation of multiple metrics into a composite metric
is performed by a scientiﬁcally well-understood mathematical function”); and
• “unit validity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has unit validity if the
units used are an appropriate means of measuring the attribute”).
The criterion “appropriate continuity” is relevant since it helps us to check whether
the indicator has any unexpected discontinuities. Such discontinuities may for instance
arise from fraction calculation with a zero denominator. On the other hand, the cri-
terion “dimensional consistency” is relevant for evaluating whether information is lost
during the construction of a composite indicator from basic indicators. Loss of infor-
mation may for instance be experienced if diﬀerent scales are used for the basic and
composite indicators. And ﬁnally, the criterion “unit validity” is relevant for evaluating
whether the indicator’s unit is appropriate for measuring the risk attribute.
In the “representation condition” category we also ﬁnd the criterion “scale valid-
ity.” According to Meneely et al., a metric has scale validity if “it is deﬁned on an
explicit, appropriate scale such that all meaningful transformations of the metric are
admissible.” The scales discussed are typically nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio, and
absolute. Each scale type comes with a set of admissible transformations. During the
evaluation of “dimensional consistency” we can check whether appropriate scales are
being used. Thus, it is not necessary to evaluate the criterion “scale validity” sepa-
rately. The category also contains a number of criteria that are not relevant since they
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are speciﬁc to software engineering metrics. This is the case for “appropriate granular-
ity,” “interaction sensitivity,” “monotonicity,” “permutation validity,” and “renaming
insensitivity.” We also do not ﬁnd following criteria in the same category relevant:
• “increasing growth validity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has increas-
ing growth validity if the metric increases when concatenating two entities to-
gether”) and
• “non-uniformity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has “non-uniformity if
it can produce diﬀerent values for at least two diﬀerent entities”).
A metric does not have non-uniformity if it for instance rates all software programs
as equal. Then the metric is not really a measure. With risks being our entities,
neither of the criteria is relevant. In the method in Paper A, risks can be combined
if the pull in the same direction. Since this is done before we identify indicators, the
criterion “increasing growth validity” is not relevant. In our context, an indicator is
used to measure a risk attribute of a risk at diﬀerent points in time. We have only
two requirements to the values produced by an indicator. The ﬁrst requirement is that
the indicator should measure the risk attribute correctly, while the second is that the
indicator should not produce values that always result in the risk being unacceptable
or acceptable. These requirements are checked during the evaluation of the “attribute
validity” criterion. This means that the “non-uniformity” criterion is not relevant.
Besides the software engineering speciﬁc validation criteria already mentioned, we
also ﬁnd the category “content validity,” the criterion “product and process relevance”
contained in this category, and the two criteria “actionability” and “transformation
invariance” most relevant in a software engineering setting. In addition, we do not ﬁnd
the following two criteria relevant:
• “economic productivity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has economic
productivity if using the metric quantiﬁes a relationship between cost and beneﬁt”)
and
• “non-exploitability” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric exhibits non-exploita-
bility if developers cannot manipulate a metric to obtain desired results”).
A metric/indicator does not have “economic productivity” if it does not result in
saving money in the long run. We do not consider this criterion since it more relevant
to consider the cost/beneﬁt of an indicator when taking a decision on whether to
implement it or not. In the case of the “non-exploitability” criterion, Meneely et al.
introduces the term “exploitability” to describe the phenomenon where people can
manipulate a metric’s measurements without changing the attribute being measured.
Contrary to Meneely et al., we consider this criterion during the evaluation of construct
validity rather than during the evaluation of internal validity. We do not evaluate the
criterion directly. Instead, we consider manipulation of an indicator as one of many
threats to construct validity types of criteria.
In addition to the validation criteria already selected, we have also selected the
following two criteria from the internal validity category:
• “internal consistency” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has internal consis-
tency if “all of the elementary measurements of a metric are assessing the same
construct and are inter-related””) and
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• “factor independence” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has factor in-
dependence if the individual measurements used in the metric formulation are
independent of each other”).
The ﬁrst criterion applies especially to indicators that are composed of basic indicators.
If the basic indicators are not conceptually related, then the composite indicators will
not have internal consistency and for that reason be hard to interpret. The second
criterion also applies especially to indicators that are composed of basic indicators. If
the basic indicators use measures that are not independent of each other, then the com-
posite indicator’s ability to measure a risk attribute may be aﬀected. In the category
the “factor independence” criterion belongs to, we also ﬁnd the “causal relationship
validity” criterion. According to Meneely et al., a metric has causal relationship va-
lidity if “it has a causal relationship to an external quality factor.” In our opinion, it
would have been more suitable to categorize the criterion as an external validity type
of criteria than an internal validity type of criteria, since it concerns the relationship
between a metric/indicator and an external quality factor. We have therefore not se-
lected this criterion. It should also be noticed that we have not selected the criterion
“metric reliability.” According to Meneely et al., a metric has metric reliability if “the
measurements are “accurate and repeatable”.” Even though this criterion is relevant,
we have not selected it since it is covered by the “internal consistency” and “attribute
validity” criteria, and by construct validity types of criteria.
In the case of construct validity, we consider the following criteria:
• “instrument validity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has instrument va-
lidity if the underlying measurement instrument is valid and properly calibrated”);
• “stability” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has stability if it produces the
same values “on repeated collections of data under similar circumstances””); and
• “deﬁnition validity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has deﬁnition validity
if the metric deﬁnition is clear and unambiguous such that its collection can be
implemented in a unique, deterministic way”).
The “instrument validity” criterion is relevant for evaluating whether the sensors pro-
vide correct data to the calculations of the indicators, while the “stability” criterion is
relevant for evaluating whether calculations of indicators that involves human decisions
result in correct indicators. Moreover, the “deﬁnition validity” criterion is relevant since
it concerns the implementation of indicators. To implement indicators correctly, their
designs must be given in a clear and unambiguous way.
On the other hand, the following criteria from the construct validity category are
not considered:
• “protocol validity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has protocol validity
if it is measured by a widely accepted measurement protocol”);
• “usability” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has usability if it can be cost-
eﬀectively implemented in a quality assurance program”); and
• “notation validity” (deﬁnition according to [63]: “a metric has notation validity if
the metric is reasoned about “mathematically with precise, consistent notation””).
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We do not consider the “protocol validity” criterion since we will in many cases calculate
indicators based on measures for which there do not exist widely accepted measure-
ment protocols. The “usability” criterion is also not considered since it is similar to
the criterion “economic productivity” discussed earlier. It is more relevant to consider
the “usability” criterion when taking a decision on whether to implement the indicator
or not. In the case of the “notation validity” criterion, it should be noticed that this
criterion is a member of the category “deﬁnition validity.” We do ﬁnd “notation va-
lidity” to be a too strict criterion. In many cases we will design indicators that cannot
be reasoned about “mathematically with precise, consistent notation.” The “deﬁnition
validity” criterion is more general, since it can be used to evaluate the design of all
kinds of indicators. This completes the evaluation of the success criterion.
Success criterion 3 The application of the method results in speciﬁcations of indica-
tors that are well-suited for ICT-based monitoring.
It seems fair to argue that the speciﬁcations are well-suited for ICT-based monitor-
ing if they contain information that makes it easy for developers to correctly implement
the indicators. In our method, as described in Paper A (presented in Chapter 9), each
indicator is speciﬁed in terms of:
• a deployment speciﬁcation for the sensors used by the indicator;
• a requirements speciﬁcation; and
• a design speciﬁcation.
The deployment speciﬁcation pinpoints the locations of the sensors. The require-
ments speciﬁcation is basically a pre-post speciﬁcation formally deﬁning the indicator
function, while the design speciﬁcation, in the form of a UML [94] sequence diagram,
describes its implementation within the target. The decision of using UML sequence
diagrams was not only based on their ability to document the implementation of in-
dicators. It was also based on results from the evaluation of their comprehensibility
in the industrial case study described in Paper D (presented in Chapter 12). The
results from this evaluation indicate that UML sequence diagrams to a large extent
are comprehensible for industrial participants with some knowledge of UML. By being
comprehensible, the sequence diagrams serve as an aid in communication between the
analysts and the industrial participants.
The design speciﬁcations may be used to conﬁgure the sensors to extract the data
needed in the calculations of indicators. Moreover, since the design speciﬁcations de-
scribe the main entities (sensors, components, humans) that need to take part in the
calculation of indicators and their interactions in the form of data exchanges, they
provide a good starting point for implementing monitoring tools, ICT-based work pro-
cesses, and the infrastructure needed for monitoring the indicators. In addition, with
the design speciﬁcations given in the form of UML sequence diagrams, developers can
detail these diagrams further and achieve speciﬁcations that are close to actual imple-
mentations. All of this is very much in line with best-practice software engineering.
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Success criterion 4 The method is applicable in an industrial context within accept-
able eﬀort.
Paper A (presented in Chapter 9) demonstrates the method on a large, realistic
example case focusing on the use of electronic patient records in a hospital environment.
The example case covers in detail all steps of the method. Based on this we may at
least claim that the method is applicable in an industrial context given the following
two assumptions:
a) the client is able to provide the required data; and
b) the analyst is equal to the method designer (and main author of Paper A).
In the following we argue that assumption a) is justiﬁed. In Section II-B in Paper
A, we have described the diﬀerent models/descriptions that are developed when the
method is applied. An overview of the diﬀerent models/descriptions is given in Fig. 2
in Paper A. To develop the diﬀerent models/descriptions, the analyst relies on relevant
data to be provided by the client and its co-operating parties. The business objectives
for which indicators should be designed are central to all the models/descriptions to
be developed. Since these business objectives are central to the success of the client’s
organization, they are easily obtainable by the client.
The speciﬁcation “Speciﬁcation of relevant part of business” documents the ac-
tors/systems that are to comply with the business objectives. It also documents how
these actors/systems interact by exchanging data. To develop this speciﬁcation we
rely on the client to provide data on relevant actors/systems. If the fulﬁllment of the
business objectives also relies on actors/systems of parties that the client co-operates
with, then data on these actors/systems must be provided as well. The speciﬁcation is
to be used to specify the deployment of sensors for monitoring data exchanges between
actors/systems. The data needed for developing the speciﬁcation is available and easily
obtainable both within the client’s and the co-operating partners’ organizations. To
develop the speciﬁcation we only rely on high-level descriptions of the architectures of
the client’s and the co-operating parties’ ICT infrastructures and data on the actors
that rely on these infrastructures.
To develop the other eight models/descriptions described in Section II-B in Paper
A, we rely on information provided by domain experts that act on behalf of the client.
We require domain experts that have knowledge about the business objectives, the
relevant part of business and its threat picture, and the ICT infrastructures of the
client and the co-operating parties. Knowledge about the latter is needed in order to
design indicators for ICT-based monitoring. The client and its co-operating partners
are able to provide us with domain experts with the above mentioned knowledge, since
the knowledge that we require is essential for the operation of both the client’s and the
co-operating partners’ organizations.
In the following we argue that assumption b) may be weaken into the analyst being
an experienced risk analyst. In fact, we claim that most analysts with some experience
in risk analysis and a basic understanding of indicators/metrics would be able to do
equally well as the method designer. An important part of every risk analysis is to
understand the target to be analyzed. An experienced risk analyst is therefore able to
conduct Step 1 of the method, since this step is all about understanding the target to
be analyzed. Moreover, an experienced risk analyst is able to conduct Steps 2 and 6
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of the method, since these steps concern the application of risk analysis. He/she will
also have some knowledge about, and quite possibly experience with, risk monitoring.
Thus, he/she will have a basic understanding of metrics/indicators. The experienced
risk analyst is therefore capable of conducting Step 3 when supported by the domain
experts. By interacting with the domain experts, the experienced risk analyst can
identify and document sensors to be deployed in the ICT infrastructures of the client
and its co-operating partners, as well as specifying requirements to indicators with
respect to the identiﬁed sensors. The experienced risk analyst is also able to conduct
Step 4 when supported by the domain experts. By interacting with the domain experts,
the experienced risk analyst can evaluate to what extent the diﬀerent criteria to internal
validity are fulﬁlled for the diﬀerent indicators. He/she is also capable of specifying
the designs of indicators (Step 5) when supported by the domain experts, since an
experienced risk analyst has experience with UML [94] sequence diagrams or similar
documentation approaches.
The arguments above show that an analyst only needs a basic understanding of
indicators/metrics, since he/she is supported by domain experts during the design of
the indicators.
Regarding the eﬀort, consider Table 7.1 estimating the expected eﬀort for the ex-
ample case in Paper A. We assume that the analyst team consists of two persons; one
analysis leader and one analysis secretary. The ﬁrst leads the meetings with the client,
while the second is responsible for documenting the results of the analysis. Moreover,
we assume that three domain experts participate on behalf of Client H (the client); one
from Client H and one from each of the two co-operating partners Blood test analysis
and X-ray. The three domain experts have knowledge about the business objectives,
the relevant part of business and its threat picture, and the ICT infrastructures of
Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray.
In Table 7.1 we have estimated the expected eﬀort in hours for each step and sub-
step of the method for the Analyst (total for the two analysts) and the Client (total
for the three domain experts). We estimate both time spent in meetings (M) and time
spent between and preparing for meetings (P). Both of the analysts participate in all
the steps and sub-steps of the method. This is also true for all of the domain experts.
Step 1.1 and Step 1.2 are conducted as 2 and 3 hours meetings, respectively. In Step
1.1, the domain expert from Client H presents the business objective and constraints
that should be satisﬁed in order to fulﬁll the objective. Based on this presentation,
the business objective is expressed more precisely. Since only one business objective is
considered in the example case, a 2 hours meeting should be suﬃcient. For the same
reason, a preparation time of 3 hours should be suﬃcient for giving the presentation.
No preparation time is needed for the analysts and the other two domain experts.
In the case of Step 1.2, the domain experts give a presentation of the diﬀerent ac-
tors/systems and their interactions that may be of relevance for describing the relevant
part of business. A preparation time of 5 hours in total should be suﬃcient for the
domain experts. The domain experts will also provide the two analysts with docu-
mentation before the meeting. A preparation time of 5 hours is reasonable for each of
the analysts. Based on the presentation, the participants of the meeting discuss the
relevance of the diﬀerent actors/systems and interactions. The analysts use the results
from this discussion and the documentation provided by the domain experts to develop
a speciﬁcation of the relevant part of business. As can be seen in Fig. 4 in Paper A, this
development results in a high-level description of how diﬀerent actors/systems interact.
58
7.1 Fulﬁllment of the success criteria
Table 7.1: Expected eﬀort (in hours) for the Analyst (total for the two analysts) and
the Client (total for the three domain experts) with respect to the example case in




P M P M
Step 1: Establish target 22 10 11 15
Step 1.1: Express business objectives more precisely 0 4 3 6
Step 1.2: Describe relevant part of business 22 6 8 9
Step 2: Identify risks to fulﬁllment of business objec-
tive
20 18 0 27
Step 2.1: Specify risk acceptance criteria 0 2 0 3
Step 2.2: Risk identiﬁcation and estimation 20 12 0 18
Step 2.3: Risk evaluation 0 4 0 6
Step 3: Identify key indicators to monitor risks 23 12 10 18
Step 3.1: Deploy sensors to monitor risks 11 6 5 9
Step 3.2: Specify requirements to key indicators wrt
deployed sensors
12 6 5 9
Step 4: Evaluate internal validity 3 6 0 9
Step 4.1: Express business objective in terms of key
indicators
1 0 0 0
Step 4.2: Evaluate criteria for internal validity 2 6 0 9
Step 5: Specify key indicator designs 24 6 13 9
Step 6: Evaluate construct validity 20 16 0 24
Total (preparations and meetings)
112 68 34 102
180 136
316
Write the analysis report 40 0





Based on this, we would say that no more than 10 hours are needed for developing the
speciﬁcation. After the speciﬁcation has been developed it needs to be checked by the
domain experts. Each domain expert should not need more than 1 hour to check the
correctness of the speciﬁcation, while the analysts should not need more than 2 hours
to implement changes proposed by the domain experts.
In Step 2.1 we specify the risk acceptance criteria. A 1 hour meeting should be
suﬃcient for specifying the criteria. In Step 2.2 we identify risks towards the fulﬁllment
of the business objective and we estimate their risk values. The results from this step
are documented in Figs. 5–9 in Paper A. Even though it does not seem as much work
to develop the risk models depicted in Figs. 5–9, we expect that it may take as much as
two meetings of 3 hours each and 10 hours spent by the analysts outside the meetings to
develop the risk models. Moreover, we believe that the analysts would require 5 hours
each to prepare for the meetings. No preparation is necessary for the domain experts in
this case. In the case of Step 2.3, we both evaluate risks and accumulate risks that pull
in the same direction. A 2 hours meeting should be suﬃcient for conducting this step.
The risk evaluation mainly consists of plotting the risks according to their likelihoods
and consequences in a risk matrix given by the risk acceptance criteria, while risks are
accumulated by accumulating their likelihood and consequence values.
Steps 3.1 and 3.2 will be conducted in parallel. Fig. 10 in Paper A speciﬁes
the deployment of sensors in the relevant part of business. Based on this ﬁgure, we
would say that it is possible to identify these sensors within a time period of 3 hours.
Moreover, 3 hours should also be suﬃcient for conducting Step 3.2. This means that
a 6 hours meeting is suﬃcient for conducting Steps 3.1 and 3.2. In order to conduct
this meeting within 6 hours, the analysts should come up with proposals to sensor
deployments and requirements to indicators with respect to the deployed sensors before
the meetings. We estimate that each of the analysts would need to spend 10 hours
to prepare the proposals. The domain experts should use these proposals in their
preparation for the meetings. We expect that the three domain expert use a total of
10 hours to prepare for the meeting. In addition to the time spent in the meeting and
for preparations, we estimate that the analysts spend 1 hour in total to develop Fig.
10 in Paper A and 2 hours in total to develop the requirements speciﬁcations in Tables
V–X after the meeting has been concluded.
Not much eﬀort is required to conduct Step 4.1. The business objective can easily
be expressed in terms of indicators by using the results of Steps 2.3 and 3.2. An hour
spent by one of the analysts should be suﬃcient for conducting this step. In the case
of Step 4.2, we estimate that a 3 hour meeting should be suﬃcient. Moreover, an
additional 2 hours would be needed by the analysts to document the results of the
evaluation of internal validity after the meeting has been concluded.
The results of Step 5 are the indicator design speciﬁcations given in Figs. 11–24
in Paper A. To develop these speciﬁcations, the analysts should ﬁrst come up with
some proposals to the design of indicators that can be discussed in a meeting. We
estimate that 10 hours should be suﬃcient for coming up with these proposals, while
the domain experts would need about 10 hours in total to study these proposals before
the meeting. A meeting of 3 hours should be suﬃcient for discussing the proposals.
After the meeting has been conducted, the analysts may need as much as 10 hours to
update the speciﬁcations. The updated speciﬁcations need to be checked by the domain
experts. We estimate that a total of 3 hours are used to check their correctness. An
additional 4 hours may be needed by the analysts to update the speciﬁcations that are
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not correct.
The results of Step 6 are documented in Figs. 25–30 and Table XII in Paper A. The
expected eﬀort for the analysts and the domain experts in Step 6 should be similar to
the expected eﬀort for Steps 2.2 and 2.3, since Step 6 and the two sub-steps concerns
similar tasks, and since the outputs from Step 6 and the two sub-steps are similar with
respect to size.
After all the meetings have been conducted, the analysts document the analysis
and its results in a report. The report will contain the models/descriptions developed
during the analysis, and text explaining these models/descriptions. We estimate that
40 hours should be suﬃcient for writing the report. The domain experts will not spend
any time in relation to the report writing.
As can be seen in Table 7.1, the estimated eﬀort for the analysts and the three
domain experts for the example case in Paper A is 356 hours, when including the
time spent on writing the analysis report. To assess whether this estimated eﬀort is
acceptable, we compare the estimated eﬀort of the example case in Paper A to the
estimated eﬀort of the industrial case study in Paper E (presented in Chapter 13).
The industrial case study is described in Appendix A in Paper E. Even though the two
methods reported on in the two papers diﬀer and the industrial case study in Paper E
requires more eﬀort than the example case in Paper A, the industrial case study has a
number of things in common with the example case:
• Both the industrial case study and the example case focus on the fulﬁllment of
business objectives. In the industrial case study, the client presented us with a
business objective that they need to comply with. To comply with this business
objective, a number of requirements must be fulﬁlled. The main purpose of the
industrial case study was to identify and assess diﬀerent risks to the fulﬁllment
of these requirements.
• Both the industrial case study and the example case rely heavily on risk analysis
by the use of CORAS and the design of indicators.
• Both the industrial case study and the example case involved two analysts and
three domain experts.
Because of the similarities between the industrial case study and the example case,
the industrial case study can be used to some extent to assess whether the estimated
eﬀort of the example case is acceptable. As can be seen in Table II in Paper E, the
estimated eﬀort for the industrial case study was 485 hours. Experiences from other
commercial projects of this kind indicate that this is a reasonable eﬀort. For example,
CORAS [11] has been developed for analyses handling 150–300 man-hours on behalf of
the analyst team alone. The estimate from the industrial case study does not include
the time spent by the domain experts between meetings, because we do not have these
numbers. It does also not include the time spent on writing the analysis report. Since
the eﬀort in the industrial case study was acceptable from the client’s viewpoint and
since the example case is smaller than the industrial case study, we ﬁnd it reasonable
that the client in the example case also would ﬁnd the eﬀort acceptable.
Based on all of the above discussion, we conclude that the method is applicable in
an industrial setting within acceptable eﬀort.
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7.1.2 Artifact 2: Method for capturing and monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on the quality of pro-
vided services
Success criterion 5 The application of the method results in speciﬁcations of indi-
cators that correctly capture and measure the impact of service dependencies on the
quality of provided services.
It seems fair to argue that the ability of the method in Paper B (presented in Chap-
ter 10) to result in speciﬁcations of indicators that correctly capture and measure the
impact of service dependencies on the quality of provided services may be decomposed
into its ability to deliver:
a) a target model that correctly captures the service dependencies of relevance for the
quality of the provided services;
b) a risk model that correctly captures the impact of service dependencies on risk to
the quality of provided services with respect to the target model; and
c) speciﬁcations of indicators that correctly measure to what extent the risks identiﬁed
for monitoring are acceptable.
Regarding a), which is the output of Step 1, it is of course possible to get the
target model wrong. However, we claim that our modeling language has the essential
features needed for capturing the service dependencies of relevance for the quality of
the provided services. Firstly, our approach to capture relations at the system level
is completely general since we use graphs to represent systems (vertices) and services
(edges). Moreover, quality requirements to services are captured by annotating edges
with required service levels. This is also much in line with other approaches as for
example [84–87]. In [84], Holmgren models electric power delivery networks by the
use of graphs. The models are used to calculate values of topological characteristics of
networks and to compare their error and attack tolerance. In [85], the CIMS frame-
work for infrastructure interdependency modeling and analysis is presented. In this
framework, infrastructure entities are modeled by the use of vertices, while edges are
used to represent the ﬂow of a physical quantity, information, or inﬂuence (e.g., geo-
graphical, policy/procedural, etc.). The latter shows that the framework does not only
consider dependencies that are the result of physical linkages between entities. In [86],
Svendsen presents a multigraph model for critical infrastructures. The model uses ver-
tices to represent infrastructure components that act as consumers and/or providers
of diﬀerent commodities, while edges represent exchanges of commodities. In addition,
requirements to the exchanged commodities are speciﬁed by the use of response func-
tions and predicates that represent the maximum capacity of an edge and the lower
threshold of ﬂow through the edge. In [87], an approach to modeling interdependent
infrastructures in the context of vulnerability analysis is presented. Each infrastruc-
ture is represented by both a network model, in the form of a graph, and a functional
model. The network model shows how the infrastructure’s physical components inter-
act, while the functional model captures physical and operational characteristics of the
infrastructure.
Secondly, we also facilitate the capturing of dependencies between services by using
logical gates. It could of course be argued that it should be possible to put weights on
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the dependencies in order to capture the strengths of the dependencies, and this is a
potential generalization of our approach. We have not gone into this issue in this thesis
however, since we know from experience (e.g., [147, 148]) how diﬃcult it is to get this
kind of estimates.
Thirdly, we support the modeling of trust relations in the case of third-party de-
pendencies. These relations are captured in terms of probabilities, which is very much
in line with standard trust deﬁnitions [20, 21]. The third-party dependencies involve
third-party systems for which we have insuﬃcient information. As previously explained
in Section 3.4, the need for reasoning about trust is motivated by the industrial case
study described in Paper D (presented in Chapter 12). In this paper, trust is used to
decide whether tenders submitted by economic operators for which we have insuﬃcient
information should be trusted to be authentic or not.
One issue we have not gone into is the issue of uncertainty. We acknowledge that
getting exact estimates regarding probabilities in particular and quantitative measures
in general is problematic. However, we claim that our methodologies may be general-
ized to work with intervals following the recommendations in [152].
Regarding b), which is the output of Step 2, high-level risk models are schematically
constructed from the target model by following the schematic procedure speciﬁed in
Section 3.2.2 in Paper B. By following this procedure, the high-level impact of service
dependencies on risk to quality of provided services is documented. The high-level
risk models are constructed by the use of the CORAS risk modeling language [11].
This language is part of the CORAS approach, which is based on the ISO 31000 stan-
dard [88] which is preceded by the AS/NZS 4360 standard [90]. To achieve a detailed
understanding of the impact of service dependencies on risk to quality of provided ser-
vices and to establish a risk picture that can be monitored, the high-level risk models
are detailed by using the CORAS risk modeling language. The language has charac-
teristics that support the construction of correct risk models. It has been developed to
facilitate communication and interaction during structured brain-storming sessions in-
volving people of heterogeneous backgrounds [153,154]. Moreover, the language makes
use of graphical symbols that are closely related to the underlying risk concepts, and
that are intended to be easily comprehensible.
Regarding c), which is the output of Steps 3 and 4, then our notion of correctness
corresponds to internal and construct validity. We have already discussed this in detail
in relation to Success criterion 2.
Success criterion 6 The application of the method results in speciﬁcations for the
deployment and design of indicators that are suﬃcient for setting up risk monitoring
based on indicators.
The method in Paper B (presented in Chapter 10) identiﬁes indicators for measuring
likelihood and consequence values that are used in the monitoring of risk values. It
seems fair to argue that the application of the method results in speciﬁcations for the
deployment and design of indicators that are suﬃcient for setting up risk monitoring
based on indicators if the speciﬁcations describe:
a) how indicators for measuring likelihood/consequence values should be calculated;
b) how entities (e.g., sensors, humans, etc.) for extracting the data needed in the
calculation of indicators should be deployed within the interconnected systems, and
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how and where the extracted data should be transmitted; and
c) how risk values should be monitored based on the indicators and other relevant
factors.
Regarding a), the indicators’ design speciﬁcations describe how the diﬀerent indi-
cators for measuring likelihood/consequence values should be calculated. Each design
speciﬁcation is given in the form of an algorithm, where the algorithm speciﬁes the data
needed for calculating an indicator and how the indicator should be calculated based
on the data. For the example case in Paper B, examples of such algorithms are given
in Tables 3, 4, 7–9, 12–14, 17, and 18 in Paper B. By implementing the algorithms, the
indicators needed for measuring likelihood/consequence values can be calculated.
Regarding b), the indicators’ deployment speciﬁcations describe how the data needed
in the calculation of indicators should be extracted and transmitted within the inter-
connected systems. More precisely, the speciﬁcations describe the data to be extracted,
the deployment of entities for extracting the data, when the data should be extracted,
and where and how the extracted data should be transmitted for further processing.
For the example case in Paper B, deployment speciﬁcations are given in Tables 5, 10,
11, 15, 16, 19, and 20 in Paper B. The deployment speciﬁcations serve as a good starting
point for deployment of sensors, humans, etc., and for setting up the monitoring in-
frastructure and the ICT-based work processes needed for extracting and transmitting
the data needed in the calculation of indicators.
Regarding c), we can describe how the likelihood/consequence values measured by
the indicators should be used in the monitoring of risk values. The risk value of a
risk is derived from its likelihood and consequence. Based on likelihoods measured
by indicators, we can calculate other likelihoods, including the likelihood of the risk.
On the other hand, consequences measured by indicators can be used directly in the
calculation of risk values. The rules speciﬁed in Appendix D.1 in Paper B are used
to specify how risk values should be calculated based on indicators and other relevant
factors. Such speciﬁcations are used by a risk monitor to calculate risk values. Appen-
dices D.2–D.5 document the application of these rules on the example case in Paper
B.
Based on the above arguments for a), b), and c), we conclude that the deployment
and design speciﬁcations are suﬃcient for setting up risk monitoring based on indica-
tors.
Success criterion 7 The method is applicable in an industrial context within accept-
able eﬀort.
Paper B (presented in Chapter 10) demonstrates the method on a large, realistic
example case within the domain of power supply. Domain knowledge on systems with
dependencies was used to develop the example case. This knowledge was obtained in
the industrial case study that is described in Paper E (presented in Chapter 13). The
example case covers in detail all steps of the method. Based on this we may at least
claim that the method is applicable in an industrial context given the following two
assumptions:
a) the client is able to provide the required data; and
b) the analyst is equal to the method designer (and main author of Paper B).
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In the following we argue that assumption a) is justiﬁed. In Section 3 in Paper B,
we have described the documentation provided by the client during the development of
the models/speciﬁcations. To develop the target model in Step 1.1, the analyst relies on
documentation from the client on the interconnected systems, their service interactions,
and the requirements to the diﬀerent services in the form of required service levels. As
can be seen in Figure 10 in Paper B, the diﬀerent systems and their services are
documented at a high level of abstraction in the target model. Requirements to the
services may be found in service level agreements or in other relevant documentation.
In the target model, it is only necessary to document systems of other parties that
the client’s systems interact directly with, but other systems in the environment of
the client’s systems may be documented as well if such information is available. The
documentation needed for developing the target model is available and easily obtainable
within the client’s organization, since only high-level documentation is needed.
To annotate the target model with dependency constructs in Step 1.2, the analyst
relies on documentation from the client on how services provided by the client’s systems
depend on other services. Detailed documentation is not needed, since dependencies are
only documented at a high level of abstraction, as can for instance be seen in Figure
11 in Paper B. It is not necessary to document dependencies for systems of parties
that operate in the environment of the client’s systems, but these dependencies may
be documented if the relevant information is available. The documentation needed
for annotating the target model with dependency constructs is available and easily
obtainable within the client’s organization, since only high-level documentation on
service dependencies is needed.
To annotate the target model with trust relations in Step 1.3, the analyst relies on
trust estimates from the client. These estimates will typically be the result of expert
judgments given by domain experts that act on behalf of the client. Each trust estimate
is assigned to a required service level of a service provided by an external system to a
system of the client. The trust estimate states the degree to which the client trusts the
required service level of the service to be delivered. In the client’s organization there
will be employees that have knowledge about the services provided by external parties.
Thus, the knowledge required for specifying the trust estimates is available.
To perform Steps 2–4, we rely on information provided by domain experts that
act on behalf of the client. We require domain experts that have knowledge about
the relevant systems and services, the dependencies between the diﬀerent services, the
threat picture of the systems and services of the client, and the ICT infrastructure
underlying the diﬀerent systems. Knowledge about the latter is needed in order to
design indicators for ICT-based monitoring. The client is able to provide us with
domain experts with the above mentioned knowledge, since the knowledge that we
require is essential for the operation of the client’s systems and services.
In the following we argue that assumption b) may be weaken into the analyst
being an experienced risk analyst. In fact, we claim that most analysts with some
experience in risk analysis and a basic understanding of service dependencies and indi-
cators/metrics would be able to do equally well as the method designer. An important
part of every risk analysis is to understand the target to be analyzed. An experienced
risk analyst is therefore able to conduct Step 1 of the method, since this step is all about
understanding the target to be analyzed. In addition, an experienced risk analyst will
also have a basic understanding of service dependencies, since service dependencies are
found in numerous risk analysis targets. The experienced risk analyst is therefore able
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to document the service dependencies of the target when supported by the domain ex-
perts. Moreover, an experienced risk analyst is able to conduct Step 2 of the method,
since this step concerns the application of risk analysis. He/she will also have some
knowledge about, and quite possibly experience with, risk monitoring. Thus, he/she
will have a basic understanding of metrics/indicators. The experienced risk analyst
is therefore capable of conducting Step 3 when supported by the domain experts. By
interacting with the domain experts, the experienced risk analyst can identify the risks
to be monitored and indicators for monitoring these risks. He/she is also capable of
specifying the designs and deployments of indicators (Step 4) when supported by the
domain experts, since an experienced risk analyst have experience with documentation
approaches suitable for conducting such tasks.
The arguments above show that an analyst only needs a basic understanding of
service dependencies and indicators/metrics, since he/she is supported by domain ex-
perts during the identiﬁcation and documentation of service dependencies and during
the speciﬁcation of designs and deployments for indicators.
Regarding the eﬀort, consider Table 7.2 estimating the expected eﬀort for the ex-
ample case in Paper B. We assume that the analyst team consists of two persons; one
analysis leader and one analysis secretary. The ﬁrst leads the meetings with the client,
while the second is responsible for documenting the results of the analysis. Moreover,
we assume that three domain experts participate on behalf of Client EPP (the client).
The three domain experts have knowledge about the relevant systems and services,
the dependencies between the diﬀerent services, the threat picture of the systems and
services of the client, and the ICT infrastructure underlying the diﬀerent systems.
In Table 7.2 we have estimated the expected eﬀort in hours for each step and sub-
step of the method for the Analyst (total for the two analysts) and the Client (total
for the three domain experts). We estimate both time spent in meetings (M) and time
spent between and preparing for meetings (P). Both of the analysts participate in all
the steps and sub-steps of the method. This is also true for all of the domain experts.
Step 1.1 is conducted as two meetings of 3 and 2 hours. In the ﬁrst meeting,
one of the domain experts presents the diﬀerent systems and services of the electrical
power production infrastructure (EPP), the public telecom infrastructure (PTI), and
the electrical power grid (EPG) that may be of relevance to the analysis. A preparation
time of 5 hours should be suﬃcient for giving this presentation. The domain expert
will also provide the two analysts with relevant documentation before the meeting. A
preparation time of 5 hours is also reasonable for each of the analysts. The two other
domain experts would not need to prepare for the meeting. Based on the presentation,
we identify the diﬀerent systems and services that should be considered in the analysis.
We also decide to capture the impact of service dependencies on risk to the quality of
each service that Client EPP provides to systems of the PTI and the EPG. Based on
this meeting, the analysts develop an initial target model. The two analysts will use 4
hours in total to develop the initial target model. This initial target model is distributed
to the three domain experts. In the second meeting, the domain experts identify errors
and shortcomings in the initial target model. We also specify the required service levels
for the diﬀerent services documented in the initial target model based on information
provided by the domain experts. The result of this meeting is the target model in
Figure 10 in Paper B. Based on the size of the complete target model in Figure 10,
we expect that each of the domain experts will need 2 hours each to prepare for the
meeting. A preparation time of 2 hours is also reasonable for each of the analysts.
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Table 7.2: Expected eﬀort (in hours) for the Analyst (total for the two analysts) and
the Client (total for the three domain experts) with respect to the example case in




P M P M
Step 1: Document interconnected systems 26 18 17 27
Step 1.1: Model interconnected systems 20 10 11 15
Step 1.2: Capture service dependencies 3 4 3 6
Step 1.3: Capture trust relations 3 4 3 6
Step 2: Analyze the impact of service dependencies
on risk to quality of provided services
58 32 0 48
Step 2.1: Identify quality assets 2 0 0 0
Step 2.2: Construct high-level threat diagrams of the
impact of service dependencies on identiﬁed
quality assets
10 0 0 0
Step 2.3: Construct detailed threat diagrams of the
impact of service dependencies on identiﬁed
quality assets
46 32 0 48
Step 3: Identify indicators for interconnected sys-
tems
30 16 16 24
Step 3.1: Identify risks to be monitored 0 4 6 6
Step 3.2: Identify relevant indicators for the risks to be
monitored
30 12 10 18
Step 4: Specify design and deployment of identiﬁed
indicators for interconnected systems
25 12 10 18
Step 4.1: Specify design of indicators for risk monitor-
ing
12.5 6 5 9
Step 4.2: Specify deployment of indicators for risk
monitoring
12.5 6 5 9
Total (preparations and meetings)
139 78 43 117
217 160
377
Write the analysis report 40 0





After the meeting has been conducted, we estimate that the analysts will use 2 hours
to update the target model.
We conduct both Step 1.2 and Step 1.3 during a 4 hours meeting. For each step,
we spend 2 hours. The target model in Figure 10 is distributed to the domain experts
before the meeting. The domain experts are asked to identify service dependencies and
to come up with trust estimates. Based on the size of the target model in Figure 10, a
preparation time of 2 hours is reasonable for each of the domain experts. A preparation
time of 2 hours is also reasonable for each of the analysts. For both the analysts and
the domain experts, we divide the preparation time between the two steps. During
the meeting, we discuss the ﬁndings of the domain experts and we annotate the target
model with dependency constructs and trust relations. After the meeting has been
conducted, we estimate that the analysts use about 2 hours in total to update the
target model based on the results from the meeting. The 2 hours are divided between
the two steps.
The two analysts conduct Steps 2.1 and 2.2 without the involvement of the domain
experts. In Step 2.1, a quality asset is identiﬁed for each of the required service levels
of the ﬁve provided services for which service dependencies’ impact on risk to quality
should be captured. We estimate that 2 hours in total are suﬃcient for identifying and
documenting these assets. The results of conducting Step 2.2 are the high-level threat
diagrams in Figures 13 and 23–26 in Paper B. Each diagram provides a high-level
overview of the impact of service dependencies on risk to quality of a provided service.
Moreover, each diagram has been schematically constructed from the target model in
Figure 12 by following the procedure described in Section 3.2.2 in Paper B. With the
exception of the diagram in Figure 26, it should be straight-forward to schematically
construct all of these diagrams from the target model. We estimate that 10 hours, in
average 2 hours for each diagram, should be suﬃcient.
A number of meetings are required for conducting Step 2.3. In the ﬁrst meeting,
the analysts present the results of Steps 2.1 and 2.2 to the domain experts. In this
meeting, we also create the likelihood scale in Table 1 in Paper B and the consequence
scales in Tables 2 and 6, as well as the risk evaluation criteria in Equations 1 and 2
and in Equations 5–7. We estimate that the ﬁrst meeting can be conducted within
3 hours. A total preparation time of 2 hours is estimated for the two analysts. The
domain experts do not need to prepare for this meeting.
In the other meetings, we detail the high-level threat diagrams in Figures 13 and
23–26 in Paper B. The high-level threat diagrams in Figures 13, 24, and 25 are detailed
during the same meeting, since all of these diagrams focus on services provided by the
same system. Thus, some of the diagrams resulting from the detailing of these high-
level threat diagrams have a lot in common. It should also be noticed that most of
the diagrams resulting from the detailing of the high-level threat diagram in Figure
24 also represent a detailing of the high-level threat diagram in Figure 25. To detail
the high-level threat diagrams in Figures 13, 24, and 25, we estimate that a six hours
meeting should be suﬃcient. Before the meeting, the analysts create the ﬁrst version of
all the diagrams that should result from the detailing of the high-level threat diagrams.
Most of these diagrams will not contain much information. By creating them before
the meeting, the time that would otherwise be used for modeling during the meeting
can be used for more important tasks. We estimate that the analysts will use 4 hours
in total to create the ﬁrst version of the diagrams in Figures 14–20, 36–42, 45, and 46
in Paper B. After the meeting has been conducted, we estimate that the analysts will
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use about 16 hours in total to complete the diagrams that were developed during the
meeting.
A meeting of 3 hours should be suﬃcient for detailing the high-level threat diagram
in Figure 23. We estimate that the analysts will use about 2 hours in total to create the
ﬁrst version of the diagrams in Figures 27–33 before the meeting. After the meeting
has been conducted, we estimate that the analysts will use about 8 hours in total to
complete the diagrams that were developed during the meeting.
For the high-level threat diagram in Figure 26, we estimate that a meeting of 4
hours should be suﬃcient for detailing it. We estimate that the analysts will use about
2 hours in total to create the ﬁrst version of the diagrams in Figures 47–52, 57, and 58.
The diagrams in Figures 53–56 will be created from scratch during the meeting, since
these diagrams are the result of detailing the diagram in Figure 52. After the meeting
has been conducted, we estimate that the analysts will use about 12 hours in total to
complete the diagrams that were developed during the meeting.
We estimate that Step 3.1 can be conducted during a 2 hours meeting. The do-
main experts should use some time to prepare before this meeting, in order to make
correct decisions regarding the risks that should be monitored. A preparation time
of 6 hours in total should be suﬃcient. Two meetings of 3 hours each are necessary
for conducting Step 3.2. The ﬁrst meeting is used for brain-storming ideas on how
to monitor the identiﬁed risks by the use of indicators. Based on the ideas from the
meeting, the analysts create proposals for indicators. These proposals are distributed
to the domain experts. In the second meeting, the proposals are discussed and we
identify the indicators that should be used for monitoring the risks. To prepare for the
two meetings, we estimate that the domain experts will need 10 hours for preparations
in total, while the two analysts will need about 15 hours in total to prepare for the
meetings and to create the proposals. The diagrams in Figures 21, 34, 35, 43, 44, and
59 in Paper B will be created during and between these meetings. These diagrams
are created based on diagrams developed during Step 2.3. As part of this step, the
analysts also need to specify how the risk values of the risks should be monitored based
on the identiﬁed indicators. For the example case in Paper B, this is documented in
Appendices D.2–D.5. We estimate that the analysts need to use 15 hours in total to
specify how risk values should monitored.
Steps 4.1 and 4.2 will be conducted in parallel. Two meetings of 3 hours each are
necessary for conducting the two steps. The ﬁrst meeting is used for brain-storming
ideas on how the indicators should be calculated and how they should be deployed
within the ICT-infrastructure of Client EPP. Based on the ideas from the meeting,
the analysts develop design and deployment speciﬁcations for the diﬀerent indicators.
These speciﬁcations are distributed to the domain experts. In the second meeting, the
speciﬁcations are discussed. Based on the discussion during this meeting, the analysts
will correct errors and shortcomings in the speciﬁcations after the meeting has been
concluded. To prepare for the two meetings, we estimate that the domain experts will
need 10 hours for preparations in total, while the two analysts will need about 25 hours
in total to prepare for the meetings and to create and update the speciﬁcations. The
speciﬁcations in Tables 3–5 and 7–20 in Paper B will be created during and between
these meetings. In total, the estimated time spent by the analysts on Steps 4.1 and
4.2 is 37 hours, while the estimated time spent by the domain experts is 28 hours. In
Table 7.2 we have divided the estimated time spent by the analysts and the domain
experts equally between Steps 4.1 and 4.2.
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After all the meetings have been conducted, the analysts document the analysis
and its results in a report. The report will contain the diﬀerent models/speciﬁcations
developed during the analysis, and text explaining these models/speciﬁcations. We
estimate that 40 hours should be suﬃcient for writing the report. The domain experts
will not spend any time in relation to the report writing.
As can be seen in Table 7.2, the estimated eﬀort for the analysts and the three
domain experts for the example case in Paper B is 417 hours. To assess whether this
estimated eﬀort is acceptable, we compare it with the estimated eﬀort of the industrial
case study in Paper E in the same way as we did in relation to Success criterion 4.
The industrial case study and the example case have the following things in common:
• Both the industrial case study and the example case address systems that depend
on other systems.
• Both the industrial case study and the example case rely heavily on risk analysis
by the use of CORAS and the design of indicators.
• Both the industrial case study and the example case involved two analysts and
three domain experts.
By using the same arguments as the ones given in relation to Success criterion 4,
we come to the conclusion that the estimated eﬀort of the example case in Paper B
is acceptable. Based on all of the above discussion, we conclude that the method is
applicable in an industrial setting within acceptable eﬀort.
7.1.3 Artifact 3: Architectural pattern for constructing en-
terprise level monitoring tools based on indicators
Success criterion 8 The architectural pattern serves as a basis for building monitor-
ing tools based on indicators within a wide range of domains and enterprises.
It seems fair to argue that the architectural pattern in Paper C (presented in Chap-
ter 11) serves as a basis for building monitoring tools based on indicators within a wide
range of domains and enterprises if:
a) it is documented in such a way that it is easy to learn, compare, and use;
b) the capabilities that we consider to be core features of enterprise level monitoring
tools are general; and
c) the architectural pattern captures all of the core features.
Regarding a) it may of course be discussed what classiﬁes as a good description of a
pattern, but in general the description must capture the essence of solving the recurring
problem in such a way that the pattern is easy to learn, compare, and use. In [23,
24], pattern templates have been used to achieve such descriptions. The architectural
pattern is presented in Paper C by the use of the template described in [24]. This
template is very similar to the pattern template by Gamma et al. [23], which is one of
the best-known pattern templates.
According to the template in [24], a pattern is described by the use of 14 diﬀerent
categories. Table 7.3 provide a summary of these categories. We have not used all of
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Table 7.3: Summary of the pattern template in [24]
Category Short description
Name The name and a short summary of the pattern.
Also Known As Other names for the pattern, if applicable.
Example A real-world example that demonstrates the existence of the
problem and the need for the pattern. The example is used
throughout the description to illustrate solution and imple-
mentation aspects where this is necessary or useful.
Context The situations in which the pattern may apply.
Problem The problem that the pattern addresses.
Solution The fundamental solution principle underlying the pattern.
Structure A detailed speciﬁcation of the structural aspects of the pat-
tern.
Dynamics Typical scenarios describing the run-time behavior of the pat-
tern.
Implementation Guidelines for implementing the pattern in form of example
code. Notice that the guidelines only serve as a suggestion.
Example Resolved Discussion of any important aspects for resolving the real-
world example that have not been covered in the Solution,
Structure, Dynamics, and Implementation categories.
Variants A brief description of variants or specializations of the pattern.
Known Uses Examples of the pattern in use, taken from existing systems.
Consequences The beneﬁts that the pattern provide and any potential lia-
bilities.
See Also References to patterns that solve similar problems and to pat-
terns that help us to reﬁne the pattern we are describing.
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these categories, since not all of them are relevant for describing our pattern. In the
following we describe how we applied the template in Paper C, and we argue for the
exclusion of certain categories.
We cover most of the template categories in Section II (Architectural Pattern) of
Paper C. For some categories, however, we found it more suitable to cover them in
other sections. For instance, the two categories “Context” and “Problem” are covered
as part of Section I (Introduction), while the category “Example” is covered as part
of Section III (Demonstration of Architectural Pattern). In the case of the “Example”
category, it was not necessary to illustrate diﬀerent aspects of the pattern during its
presentation in Section II. This also means that we found the category “Example
Resolved” redundant. Moreover, we also found the categories “Also Known As” and
“Variants” redundant, since the pattern is not known by any other names and since
there are no other variants or specializations of the pattern. It should also be noticed
that we do not explicitly document the “Known Uses” category in the paper. On the
other hand, we refer several times to the risk monitor that the architectural pattern is
a generalization of. For instance, in Section III we show that the risk monitor is an
instance of the pattern.
All of the other categories are covered in Section II. In the case of the categories
“Name” and “See Also,” we used the names “Name and short summary” and “Related
patterns” instead. We found these names to be more descriptive than the category
names given in [24]. In the case of the “Structure” category, Buschmann et al. [24]
recommends the use of Class-Responsibility-Collaborator (CRC) cards [155] and OMT
class diagrams [156] to describe the structural aspects of the pattern. On the other
hand, in case of the “Dynamics” category, the authors of [24] recommend the use of
Object Message Sequence Charts1 to describe the run-time behavior of the pattern. To
document relations between the components of the pattern we have used a UML [94]
class diagram instead of an OMT class diagram, while CRC cards have been used
to document the responsibilities of each component of the pattern. Moreover, we
have used UML sequence diagrams instead of Object Message Sequence Charts to
document typical scenarios that describes the run-time behavior of the pattern, while
in the case of the “Implementation” category, we have used Java for the example code.
These modeling/programming languages, and especially UML and Java, are well-known
to software developers, and therefore suitable for describing diﬀerent aspects of the
pattern.
Regarding b) as previously explained, the architectural pattern is a generalization
of the architecture of the CORAS risk monitor [36] that was developed in the MASTER
[37] research project. The risk monitor has a number of features that makes it well
suited for dynamic risk monitoring in the context of MASTER [36]. In particular,
likelihoods and consequences in the CORAS threat diagrams (the risk picture) can
be expressed by indicators that are dynamically updated during run-time. In the
MASTER framework, the CORAS risk monitor has been successfully integrated in
the part of the framework that provides functionality for monitoring the execution of
business and control processes, as well as indicator values and risk levels. The risk
monitor exhibits a number of features that are not speciﬁc to the monitoring of risks,
but general to a broad class of enterprise level monitoring tools. The features are as
follows:
1The authors of [24] own adaption of Message Sequence Charts [157].
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1. Collect low-level data from the ICT infrastructure or similar.
2. Aggregate the collected low-level data.
3. Evaluate the aggregated data.
4. Present the aggregated data and the evaluation results to diﬀerent types of en-
terprise users.
5. Present the most recent aggregated data and evaluation results.
6. Conﬁgure the tool with respect to:
a. The low-level data that should be collected.
b. How the low-level data should be aggregated into information that is relevant
and useful.
c. How aggregated data should be evaluated.
d. The kind of aggregated data and evaluation results that should be presented
and how this should be made comprehensible to diﬀerent types of enterprise
users.
In the following we argue that these features are general. We consider monitoring
tools that operate based on an ICT infrastructure or other types of ICT-based systems.
When designing such a tool we need to take into consideration the speciﬁc character-
istics of the infrastructure/system on which the tool is based. The data generated
at the ICT infrastructure level is typically of a low-level nature, e.g., events such as
service calls or responses. At the enterprise level, an individual event has often little
signiﬁcance when considered in isolation. In order to make sense of the events, they
need to be collected and aggregated into high-level information that is both useful and
relevant at the enterprise level.
In an enterprise setting, monitoring is typically used for evaluation. An enterprise
may want to evaluate whether it complies with requirements from laws and regulations,
whether risks are at an acceptable level, or whether it fulﬁlls business objectives. Thus,
an enterprise level monitoring tool needs to evaluate the aggregated data. Moreover,
the various enterprise users have diﬀerent information needs and diﬀerent preferences
for how information should be presented. For instance, the chief security oﬃcer may
want a high-level assessment of the information security risk to which the company is
exposed, while a security engineer may want to know how often a port in a ﬁrewall is
open.
It is almost needless to say, but when users of an enterprise level monitoring tool are
presented with updates of aggregated data and evaluation results, they should always
be presented with the most recent aggregated data and evaluation results. Moreover,
an enterprise level monitoring tool will often experience changes with respect to the
collection of low-level data, the aggregation of low-level data, the evaluation of aggre-
gated data, and the presentation of aggregated data and evaluation results during its
life-time. Thus, it must be possible to conﬁgure the tool.
Regarding c), the architectural pattern divides an enterprise level monitoring tool
into three components: MonitorModel, which contains the core monitoring functional-
ity and data; MonitorConsole, which presents aggregated data and evaluation results
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in a speciﬁc way to a group of users; and MonitorConﬁg, which is used to set up the
enterprise level monitoring tool and to conﬁgure it during run-time. If the enterprise
level monitoring tool needs to present aggregated data and evaluation results to more
than one group of users, then the tool will have more than one MonitorConsole.
The MonitorModel collects relevant low-level data in the form of basic indicators
from a component referred to as DataSource in Paper C. This component is part
of the pattern’s environment. The actual collection of low-level data from the ICT
infrastructure or similar, for instance by the use of sensors, is outside the scope of the
pattern. The MonitorModel aggregates the basic indicators into composite indicators.
Thus, MonitorModel captures features 1 and 2. Moreover, the MonitorConsoles retrieve
the most recent updated composite indicators from MonitorModel, evaluate them if
needed, and update the displays used by their users based on the composite indicators
and evaluation results. Thus, the MonitorConsoles capture features 3, 4, and 5. The
MonitorModel and the MonitorConsoles are conﬁgured by the MonitorConﬁg before
run-time and during run-time. The MonitorModel is conﬁgured with respect to 6a
and 6b, while the MonitorConsoles are conﬁgured with respect to 6c and 6d. Thus,
MonitorConﬁg captures features 6 a–d.
Based on the above arguments for a), b), and c), we conclude that the architectural
pattern can be used as a starting point for building specialized monitoring tools within
various kinds of domains and enterprises.
Success criterion 9 The architectural pattern facilitates modularity and reuse.
ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765 [17] deﬁnes modularity as “the degree to which a system or
computer program is composed of discrete components such that a change to one com-
ponent has minimal impact on other components,” while it deﬁnes reuse as “building
a software system at least partly from existing pieces to perform a new application.”
Moreover, it deﬁnes reusable as “pertaining to a software module or other work product
that can be used in more than one computer program or software system.”
It seems fair to argue that the architectural pattern in Paper C (presented in Chap-
ter 11) facilitates modularity and reuse if:
• changes to a MonitorModel, MonitorConsole, or MonitorConﬁg has minimal im-
pact on the other components in the enterprise level monitoring tool; and
• the MonitorModel, MonitorConsoles, and MonitorConﬁg developed for one en-
terprise level monitoring tool can at least be partly reused in another enterprise
level monitoring tool.
Regarding a), our architectural pattern is closely related to the Model-View-Controller
(MVC) pattern [24, 120], since this pattern was used as inspiration when we designed
our pattern. As previously explained in Section 4.4.3, MVC divides an interactive
application into three main components: model, view, and controller. The model en-
capsulates core data and functionality, while views and controllers together comprise
the user interface of the application. The model is independent of the user interface.
The same is also true for our pattern. As described in Section II in Paper C, the pattern
separates user interfaces (MonitorConsoles) from the component handling core moni-
toring data and functionality (MonitorModel). Thus, changes to the implementations
74
7.1 Fulﬁllment of the success criteria
of MonitorConsoles will not require changes to the implementation of the Monitor-
Model. Also, the introduction of new MonitorConsoles during run-time has no eﬀect
on the implementation of the MonitorModel.
The MonitorConﬁg is used to conﬁgure the MonitorModel and the MonitorCon-
soles with a data conﬁguration ﬁle and presentation models, respectively. There is a
close coupling of MonitorModel to MonitorConﬁg. The MonitorModel depends on the
speciﬁc language in which its data conﬁguration ﬁle is expressed. Change of language
may most likely require changes to the implementation of MonitorModel. Similar, a
MonitorConsole may depend on the speciﬁc language in which its presentation model
is expressed. Changes to this language may require changes to the implementation of
the MonitorConsole. However, changes to the language are considered to be quite rare
in both cases.
Both the MonitorConsoles and the MonitorConﬁg make direct calls to the Monitor-
Model. In addition, the MonitorConﬁg makes direct calls to the MonitorConsoles. This
means that changes to the interface of MonitorModel will break the code of both the
MonitorConsoles and the MonitorConﬁg, while changes to the interfaces of Monitor-
Consoles will break the code of the MonitorConﬁg. Such changes to the interfaces will
however be quite rare. It should be noticed that MonitorModel does not make direct
calls to MonitorConsoles or MonitorConﬁg. The interaction between MonitorConﬁg
and MonitorModel is one-way only, while it interacts with MonitorConsoles through
Observer objects. The latter is due to the use of a change-propagation mechanism,
which is implemented by the use of the Publisher-Subscriber design pattern [24].
A MonitorConsole depends on a number of the MonitorModel’s composite indica-
tors. A re-conﬁguration of the MonitorModel may result in the removal of composite
indicators that one or more MonitorConsoles depend on. If this happens, then the Mon-
itorConﬁg needs to re-conﬁgure the aﬀected MonitorConsoles. If a MonitorConsole is
re-conﬁgured with a presentation model that is parameterized with new composite in-
dicators, then the MonitorConsole needs to notify the MonitorModel that it wants to
receive updates for the new ones.
Regarding b), if the same language is used to create all the data conﬁguration ﬁles,
then it is possible to implement a generic MonitorModel, which becomes specialized
when conﬁgured. Two MonitorModels that are based on the same generic Monitor-
Model will only be diﬀerent with respect to: the data sources that they retrieve basic
indicators from; the basic indicators that they retrieve; the composite indicators that
result from the aggregation of their basic indicators; the MonitorConsoles that depend
on their composite indicators; and the MonitorConﬁgs that conﬁgure them. In the case
of diﬀerent languages, the majority of the code base of one MonitorModel can be used
in the implementation of another.
A MonitorConﬁg has functionality for creating and updating data conﬁguration ﬁles
and presentation models, and for conﬁguring MonitorModels and MonitorConsoles.
The data conﬁguration ﬁles are created and updated by the use of some text-based
editor, while each presentation model is created and updated either by the use of a
text-based editor or a graphical modeling tool. Both a text-based editor and a graphical
modeling tool can often be extended to handle new languages. Thus, it may be possible
to use a MonitorConﬁg in another monitoring tool where support for other languages
is required. If it is not possible to extend the MonitorConﬁg, then at least some of its
code base may be reused.
The reuse of a MonitorConsole depends on how tightly integrated its presentation
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model is with the rest of the component. If the component only updates the composite
indicators that the presentation model is parameterized with, then it may be the case
that the presentation model is easily replaceable by another. On the other hand, if
the component performs other types of updates of the model or is heavily involved in
the evaluation of the composite indicators, then it may be more diﬃcult to reuse the
component. If it is not possible to reuse the MonitorConsole, then at least some of its
code base may be reused.
Based on the above arguments for a) and b), we conclude that the architectural
pattern facilitates modularity and reuse.
7.1.4 Framework for analyzing and monitoring the impact of
dependencies on quality
Success criterion 1 The framework fulﬁlls its intended purpose.
As explained in Section 2.2.1, the purpose of the framework is to: (1) analyze the
impact of service dependencies on quality of services; and (2) support the set-up of
monitoring of the impact of service dependencies on quality of services.
In Section 5.1 we have described the integration of the three artifacts. The frame-
work takes as input a business objective that focus on the achievement of service
quality. With the relevant part of business being interconnected systems that depend
on each other through service interactions, some of the steps of the method of Artifact
1 are replaced by steps of the method of Artifact 2 in order to document the inter-
connected systems and to capture the impact of service dependencies on the relevant
service quality.
Artifact 2 can be used to analyze and capture the impact of service dependencies
on risk to the fulﬁllment of the business objective that focus on the achievement of
service quality. The artifact is therefore an answer to (1). By using Artifact 2, we can
also identify indicators for monitoring all risks that are unacceptable with respect to
the business objective.
Artifact 1 is used to specify deployments of sensors within the interconnected sys-
tems, where the sensors are needed for gathering the data necessary for calculating
the indicators. It is also used to specify requirements to the indicators with respect
to the sensor deployments. By using Artifacts 1 and 2, we can specify how the indi-
cators should be calculated and how the calculations should be embedded within the
interconnected systems. Artifact 1 is also used to evaluate the validity of the designed
indicators with respect to the relevant service quality.
The output from the integration of Artifacts 1 and 2 is a set of indicators that
is valid with respect to the relevant service quality. These indicators can be used to
monitor risks to the fulﬁllment of the business objective. By using Artifact 3, we
can implement a risk monitor based on the designed indicators. With respect to (2),
Artifact 2 is partly an answer, while Artifacts 1 and 3 are the main answer.
The integration as described in Section 5.1 is feasible. Moreover, the evaluation
of the fulﬁllment of the success criteria for Artifacts 1–3 in Sections 7.1.1–7.1.3 shows
that the three artifacts fulﬁll their intended purposes. Based on the above discussion
and the results from the evaluation of Artifacts 1–3, we conclude that the framework
also fulﬁlls its intended purpose.
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7.2 How the artifacts relate to and extend the state
of the art
In this section we discuss how the three artifacts relate to and extend the state of the
art presented in Chapter 4. We structure the discussion into three sub-sections; one
for each of the artifacts. The reason why such an discussion was not conducted already
in Chapter 4 is that the diﬀerent artifacts were ﬁrst presented in detail in Chapter 5.
For further comparison of our artifacts to the state of the art, the reader is referred to
the related work sections of the papers presented in Part II of this thesis.
7.2.1 Artifact 1: Method for designing indicators to moni-
tor the fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular
focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indi-
cators
Section 4.1 presents diﬀerent approaches related to the use, design and deployment,
and validation of indicators. GQM [54,55] and GQ(I)M [56,57] are two approaches that
are that are closely related to our method. What makes GQM and GQ(I)M diﬀerent
from our method is that they do not put the same emphasis on the validation of
metrics/indicators. For both GQM and GQ(I)M, no speciﬁc method, beyond reviews,
is speciﬁed for validating the metrics/indicators. Our method and the two approaches
have in common that all three specify the design and deployment of metrics/indicators.
In [55], Solingen and Berghout provide instructions for how to document metrics when
using the GQM approach, while in [57], Goethert and Siviy provide a template that
can be use to document the construction and use of indicators when using GQ(I)M.
The frameworks presented in [58,59] by Popova and Sharpanskykh are also related
to our method. In [58,59], the relationships between goals and performance indicators
are made explicit. Moreover, the frameworks use a formal approach to model organi-
zational goals based on performance indicators. The frameworks also use mechanisms
for establishing goal satisfaction and for checking consistency of and correspondence
between the goal and the performance indicator structures. Popova and Sharpanskykh
do not evaluate the validity of the performance indicators. What can be said, how-
ever, is that the modeling results in a hierarchical goal structure that can be used
during the evaluation of internal validity. Based on [58,59], we have not identiﬁed any
speciﬁcations/models that can be used during the evaluation of construct validity.
Our research on how to validate indicators has been inspired by research on the
validation of software engineering metrics. This research has resulted in many criteria
for evaluating metrics, where many of them are not speciﬁc to software engineering.
Based on the systematic literature review of Meneely et al. [63] of papers focusing
on validation of software engineering metrics, we selected a number of criteria for
evaluating the validity of the indicators that our method designs.
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7.2.2 Artifact 2: Method for capturing and monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on the quality of pro-
vided services
Artifact 2 is a specialization of the approach presented in [105] by Refsdal and Stølen.
The approach in [105] is general in the sense that it only restricts the risk identiﬁca-
tion to the identiﬁed assets and nothing else. In our approach, the risk identiﬁcation
focuses entirely on risk to quality of provided services that have been caused by service
dependencies. The approach in [105] can of course be used to identify indicators for the
purpose of measuring the impact of service dependencies on risk to quality of provided
services, because of its generality. Compared to our approach, however, it is inferior.
The approach in [105] does not oﬀer any support for dealing with service dependencies.
In addition, it focuses to a much lesser extent on the calculations of indicators, and
it cannot be used to specify how the indicator calculations should be deployed in the
systems to be monitored.
Section 4.2.2 presents approaches for the modeling and analysis of service dependen-
cies. Our graph-based approach to the modeling of service dependencies is similar to
other approaches within critical infrastructure protection (see e.g., [84–87]). Our mod-
eling approach also supports the modeling of trust relations in the case of third-party
service dependencies. These relations are captured in terms of probabilities. In our
method, trust is used to estimate likelihoods of third-party services failing to be deliv-
ered according to their requirements. The trust approaches presented in [131–133,135]
can be used to address a similar problem. All these approaches can be used to assess
service providers’ ability to provide services with the expected quality. The main diﬀer-
ence between our approach to trust and the trust approaches presented in [131–133,135]
is that the latter approaches focus on dynamic aspects of trust. These dynamic trust
approaches also diﬀer from our approach in that they are primarily used for selecting
appropriate interaction partners, for instance in a peer-to-peer network.
Section 4.3.2 presents approaches for analysis of risk in the context of dependencies.
In [92, 93], Giese et al. present a method for compositional hazard analysis of compo-
nents by the use fault trees [95]. For each component, incoming, outgoing, and internal
failures are described, as well as the dependencies between the diﬀerent failures. The
dependency information is used to capture the propagation of failures by combining
failure information of the diﬀerent components. This method diﬀers from our method
in many respects. First, fault trees cannot be used to address mutual dependencies.
Second, the method of Giese et al. is limited to failures caused by software and/or
hardware. Thus, human failures, either accidental or deliberate, cannot be addressed.
Both mutual dependencies and human failures can be addressed by the use of our
method. In [96] and [99], other approaches to component-based hazard analysis are
presented. These approaches do also apply fault trees. Thus, they lack the ability to
address mutual dependencies.
7.2.3 Artifact 3: Architectural pattern for constructing en-
terprise level monitoring tools based on indicators
Section 4.4.3 presents state of the art on patterns and the implementation of monitor-
ing tools. The Model-View-Controller (MVC) pattern [24,120] was used as inspiration
when we designed our pattern. Both patterns separate the core data and functional-
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ity from the user interfaces. In addition, both patterns use the same mechanism for
reﬂecting changes in the core data in the user interfaces. More precisely, the Publisher-
Subscriber design pattern [24] is used to implement this change-propagation mecha-
nism. One of the main diﬀerences between our pattern and MVC is that all the user
interfaces in MVC display the same core data, while in our pattern the MonitorCon-
soles can display diﬀerent core monitoring data, which means that they need to be
updated diﬀerently. Another diﬀerence is that we have replaced the controller com-
ponent in MVC with the MonitorConﬁg component. In MVC, each controller is used
for handling user input for a view. The MonitorConﬁg component on the other hand
is used for conﬁguring the MonitorModel and the MonitorConsoles before and during
run-time by the use of conﬁguration ﬁles.
Approaches like [121] and [123] diﬀer from our architectural pattern in that they
address speciﬁc monitoring problems within speciﬁc domains. Our architectural pat-
tern, on the other hand, may be used to build monitoring tools within a wide range of
domains and enterprises. The pattern presented in [121] do also diﬀer from our pattern
in that it focus on the sensors collecting the information needed in the monitoring. The
construction of the sensor infrastructure is outside the scope of our pattern.
The tool framework called Mozart [122] uses a model driven approach to create
monitoring applications that uses key performance indicators (KPIs). Mozart diﬀers
from our pattern in that it focuses both on the aggregation of already existing indicators
and on the transformation of these indicators into a monitoring application. This means
that Mozart both design and deploy indicators. Our pattern, on the other hand, is







This chapter concludes Part I of the thesis by summarizing the achievements and by
outlining directions for future work.
8.1 What has been achieved
The main contributions of this thesis are three new artifacts
1. a method for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business objectives
with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators;
2. a method for capturing and monitoring the impact of service dependencies on
the quality of provided services; and
3. an architectural pattern for constructing enterprise level monitoring tools based
on indicators.
These artifacts may be integrated into a framework for analyzing and monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on quality of services. We have argued that the frame-
work is
1. well-suited to analyze the impact of service dependencies on quality of services;
2. well-suited to support the set-up of monitoring of the impact of service depen-
dencies on quality of services; and
3. applicable in an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort.
Artifact 2 can be used to analyze the impact of service dependencies on quality of
services. The artifact is therefore an answer to part 1 of the overall objective (presented
above). We are not aware of any other approaches that have the same capabilities as
Artifact 2.
In the framework, Artifacts 1 and 2 are used to design indicators for monitoring the
impact of service dependencies on quality of services. Artifact 1 is also used evaluate
the validity of the designed indicators with respect to the relevant service quality.
Moreover, Artifact 3 can be used to implement a monitoring tool that deploys the
indicators designed by Artifacts 1 and 2. Artifact 2 is partly an answer to part 2 of
the overall objective, while Artifacts 1 and 3 are the main answer. We are not aware
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of any other approaches that have the same capabilities as Artifact 1. The same may
also be said about Artifact 3.
The evaluation of the success criteria in Section 7.1 shows that Artifacts 1 and 2 are
applicable in an industrial context within acceptable eﬀort. Based on this, Artifacts 1
and 2 are the answer to part 3 of the overall objective.
This thesis also contributes in terms of
1. an empirical study on trust-based decisions in interconnected systems; and
2. an empirical study on the design of indicators for monitoring risk.
These industrial case studies were mainly carried out to support the development of
the artifacts, but since they also provide insight into issues of a more general nature,
they may be seen as contributions on their own.
8.2 Directions for future work
There are a number of directions for future work. An obvious direction for future work
is to apply the framework and the artifacts in an industrial setting to gather more
empirical evidence on their applicability and to assess their performance in a practical
setting.
As already mentioned during the evaluation of Success criterion 5 in Section 7.1.2,
the method in Paper B (presented in Chapter 10) does not take into account the
strengths of service dependencies. A potential generalization of our method is therefore
to put weights on the service dependencies in order to capture their strengths. By
taking this into account we will get a more correct risk picture of the impact of service
dependencies on the quality of provided services. Moreover, one way to improve the
correctness of estimates, e.g., likelihood estimates, is to measure the same thing in
diﬀerent ways. This is especially relevant when it comes to monitoring by the use
indicators. We can for instance use several independent indicators to monitor the
same likelihood value. The possibilities and challenges with respect to using several
independent indicators are something that we want to investigate further.
Another direction for future work is to provide tool support for Step 1 and Step 2.2
of the method in Paper B. Step 1 concerns the creation of the target model, i.e., the
modeling of interconnected systems, services, service dependencies, etc., while Step 2.2
concerns the schematic construction of high-level risk models of the impact of service
dependencies on risk to the quality of provided services from the target model. A tool
should be able to construct these high-level risk models automatically from the target
model by following the schematic procedure speciﬁed in Section 3.2.2 in Paper B.
An interesting direction for future work is to combine the framework with ap-
proaches from the critical infrastructure domain that have simulation capabilities. By
using an approach such as [86] we can for instance run simulations on a graph-based
model of interconnected systems and investigate how the functionality of systems and
services changes when nodes are removed. In this way, the most critical systems of
the graph can be identiﬁed. The framework can then be applied for these systems to
analyze and monitor the impact of service dependencies on the quality of the critical
services they provide.
Another interesting direction for future work is the use of a dynamic trust approach
for reasoning about third-party service dependencies. In the method in Paper B, trust
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is used to estimate likelihoods of third-party services failing to be delivered according
to their requirements. Dynamic trust approaches (e.g., [131–133, 135]) can be used to
capture the change in trust over time. By using a dynamic trust approach we can
update the initial trust estimates based on past behavior of third-party services and
other factors. The likelihoods estimated based on trust estimates can be expressed by
the use of indicators. The likelihoods can then be monitored, and changes in trust can
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Abstract
In this report we present our method ValidKI for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of business
objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators. A set of indicators is valid
with respect to a business objective if it measures the degree to which the business or relevant part thereof fulﬁlls
the business objective. ValidKI consists of six main steps. We demonstrate the method on an example case focusing
on the use of electronic patient records in a hospital environment.
Keywords
Indicator, key indicator, business objective, quality, ICT-supported monitoring, electronic patient record
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s companies beneﬁt greatly from ICT-supported business processes, as well as business intelligence and
business process intelligence applications monitoring and analyzing different aspects of a business and its processes.
The output from these applications may be indicators which summarize large amounts of data into single numbers.
Indicators can be used to evaluate how successful a company is with respect to speciﬁc business objectives. For
this to be possible it is important that the indicators are valid. A set of indicators is valid with respect to a business
objective if it measures the degree to which the business or relevant part thereof fulﬁlls the business objective. Valid
indicators facilitate decision making, while invalid indicators may lead to bad business decisions, which again may
greatly harm the company.
In today’s business environment, companies cooperate across company borders. Such co-operations often result
in sharing or outsourcing of ICT-supported business processes. One example is the interconnected electronic patient
record (EPR) infrastructure. The common goal for this infrastructure is the exchange of EPRs facilitating the
treatment of the same patient at more than one hospital. In such an infrastructure, it is important to monitor the
use of EPRs in order to detect and avoid misuse. This may be achieved through the use of indicators. It may be
challenging to identify and compute good indicators that are valid with respect to business objectives that focus
on quality in general and security in particular. Furthermore, in an infrastructure or system stretching across many
companies we often have different degrees of visibility into how the cooperating parties perform their part of the
business relationship, making the calculation of indicators particularly hard.
In [1] we presented the method ValidKI (Valid Key Indicators) for designing indicators to monitor the fulﬁllment of
business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of indicators. ValidKI facilitates
the design of a set of indicators that is valid with respect to a business objective. In this report we present an
improved version of the method.
We demonstrate ValidKI by applying it on an example case targeting the use of EPRs. We have developed
ValidKI with the aim of fulﬁlling the following characteristics:
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Fig. 1. The artifacts addressed by ValidKI
• Business focus: The method should facilitate the design and assessment of indicators for the purpose of
measuring the fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring
of indicators.
• Efﬁciency: The method should be time and resource efﬁcient.
• Generality: The method should be able to support the design and assessment of indicators based on data from
systems that are controlled and operated by different companies or organizations.
• Heterogeneity: The method should not place restrictions on how indicators are designed.
The rest of the report is structured as follows: in Section II we introduce our basic terminology and deﬁnitions.
In Section III we give an overview of ValidKI and its six main steps. In Sections IV – IX we demonstrate our
six-step method on an example case addressing the use of EPRs in a hospital environment. In Section X we present
related work, while in Section XI we conclude by characterizing our contribution and discussing the suitability of
our method.
II. BASIC TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS
Hammond et al. deﬁnes indicator as “something that provides a clue to a matter of larger signiﬁcance or makes
perceptible a trend or phenomenon that is not immediately detectable” [2]. For example, a drop in barometric
pressure may signal a coming storm, while an unexpected rise in the trafﬁc load of a web server may signal a
denial of service attack in progress. Thus, the signiﬁcance of an indicator extends beyond what is actually measured
to a larger phenomenon of interest.
Indicators are closely related to metrics. ISO/IEC/IEEE 24765 [3] deﬁnes metric as “a quantitative measure
of the degree to which a system, component, or process possesses a given attribute,” while it deﬁnes attribute as
“the speciﬁc characteristic of the entity being measured.” For the web server mentioned above, an example of an
attribute may be availability. An availability metric may again act as an indicator for denial of service attacks, if
we compare the metric with a baseline or expected result [4]. As we can see, metrics are not that different from
indicators. For that reason, indicators and metrics are often used interchangeably in the literature.
Many companies proﬁt considerably from the use of indicators [5] resulting from business process intelligence
applications that monitor and analyze different aspects of a business and its processes. Indicators can be used
to measure to what degree a company fulﬁlls its business objectives and we then speak of key indicators. Some
business objectives may focus on business performance, while others may focus on risk or compliance with laws
and regulations. We will in the remainder of the report refer to indicators as key indicators, since we focus on
indicators in the context of business objectives.
A. The artifacts addressed by ValidKI
The UML [6] class diagram in Fig. 1 relates the main artifacts addressed by ValidKI. The associations between
the different concepts have cardinalities that specify how many instances of one concept that may be associated to
an instance of the other concept.
As characterized by the diagram, one or more key indicators are used to measure to what extent a business
objective is fulﬁlled with respect to a relevant part of the business. Each key indicator is calculated based on data
provided by one or more sensors. The sensors gather data from the relevant part of the business. A sensor may
gather data for more than one key indicator.
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Key indicator
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Relevant part of business
Artifacts Models/Descriptions
Precise business objective
Sensor Sensor deployment specification
Key indicator requirements specification
Key indicator design specification
Risk acceptance criteria
Model capturing risk to fulfillment of precise business objective
Reformulated precise business objective
Model capturing risk to correctness of reformulated precise business objective
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B. The models/descriptions developed by ValidKI
As illustrated by Fig. 2, performing the steps of ValidKI results in nine different models/descriptions each of
which describes one of the artifacts of Fig. 1 from a certain perspective.
A speciﬁcation, at a suitable level of abstraction, documents the relevant part of the business in question.
Business objectives are typically expressed at an enterprise level and in such a way that they can easily be
understood by for example shareholders, board members, partners, etc. It is therefore often not completely clear
what it means to fulﬁll them. This motivates the need to capture each business objective more precisely.
The fulﬁllment of a precise business objective may be affected by a number of risks. We therefore conduct a
risk analysis to capture risk to the fulﬁllment of the precise business objective. To evaluate which risks that are
acceptable and not acceptable with respect to the fulﬁllment of the precise business objective, we use risk acceptance
criteria. It is the risks that are not acceptable that we need to monitor. The acceptable risks may be thought of
to represent uncertainty we can live with. In other words, their potential occurrences are not seen to signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the fulﬁllment of the business objective.
The degree of fulﬁllment of a precise business objective is measured by a set of key indicators. To measure
its degree of fulﬁllment there is a need to express each precise business objective in terms of key indicators.
We refer to this reformulation as the reformulated precise business objective. Moreover, the correctness of key
indicators will be affected if they are not implemented correctly. This may again lead to new unacceptable risks
that affect the fulﬁllment of the precise business objective. Since the reformulated precise business objective is the
precise business objective expressed in terms of key indicators, we need to analyze risks to the correctness of the
reformulated precise business objective.
The computation of key indicators relies on different kinds of data. To collect the data, sensors need to be
deployed in the relevant part of business. Thus, there is a need to specify the deployment of different sensors.
For each key indicator we distinguish between two speciﬁcations: the key indicator requirements speciﬁcation
and the key indicator design speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst captures requirements to a key indicator with respect to the
sensor deployment speciﬁcations, while the second deﬁnes how the key indicator should be calculated.
C. Validity
ISO/IEC 9126 deﬁnes validation as “conﬁrmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the require-
ments for a speciﬁc intended use or application have been fulﬁlled” [7]. Since an indicator is basically a metric that
can be compared to a baseline/expected result, the ﬁeld of metric validation is highly relevant. There is however no
agreement upon what constitutes a valid metric [8]. In [8], Meneely et al. present a systematic literature review of
papers focusing on validation of software engineering metrics. The literature review began with 2288 papers, which
were later reduced to 20 papers. From these 20 papers, the authors extracted and categorized 47 unique validation
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criteria. The authors argue that metric researchers and developers should select criteria based on the intended usage
of the metric. Even though the focus in [8] is on validation of software engineering metrics, a number of the
validation criteria presented are general, thus not speciﬁc to software engineering. In particular, following [8] we
deﬁne a set of key indicators to be valid with respect to a business objective if it is valid in the following two
ways:
1) internal validity – the precise business objective expressed in terms of the key indicators correctly measures
the degree to which the business objective is fulﬁlled; and
2) construct validity – the gathering of the sensor measurements of each key indicator is suitable with respect
to its requirements speciﬁcation.
III. OVERVIEW OF VALIDKI
Fig. 3 provides an overview of the ValidKI method. It takes as input a business objective and delivers a set
of key indicators and a report arguing its validity with respect to the business objective received as input. When
using ValidKI in practice we will typically develop key indicators for a set of business objectives, and not just
one which we restrict our attention to here. It should be noticed that when developing key indicators for a set of
business objectives, we need to take into account that key indicators (i.e., software or infrastructure) developed for
one business objective may affect the validity of key indicators developed for another.
In the following we offer additional explanations for each of the six main steps of the ValidKI method.
A. Establish target
The ﬁrst main step of ValidKI is all about understanding the target, i.e., understanding exactly what the business
objective means and acquiring the necessary understanding of the relevant part of business for which the business
objective has been formulated. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the ﬁrst sub-step we characterize the
business objective more precisely by formulating constraints that need to be fulﬁlled. In the second sub-step we
specify the relevant part of the business.
B. Identify risks to fulﬁllment of business objective
The second main step of ValidKI is concerned with conducting a risk analysis to identify risks to the fulﬁllment
of the business objective. We distinguish between three sub-steps. In the ﬁrst sub-step the risk acceptance criteria are
8speciﬁed. The criteria classify a risk as either acceptable or unacceptable based on its likelihood and consequence. In
the second sub-step we identify how threats may initiate risks. We also identify vulnerabilities and threat scenarios
leading up to the risks, and we estimate likelihood and consequence. During the risk analysis we may identify
risks that pull in the same direction. Such risks should be combined into one risk. The individual risks may be
acceptable when considered in isolation, while the combined risk may be unacceptable. In the third sub-step we
evaluate the identiﬁed risks with respect to the speciﬁed risk acceptance criteria.
C. Identify key indicators to monitor risks
The third main step of ValidKI is concerned with identifying key indicators to monitor the unacceptable risks
identiﬁed in the previous step. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the ﬁrst sub-step we specify how sensors
should be deployed in the relevant part of business. The key indicators that we identify are to be calculated based
on data gathered by the sensors. In the second sub-step we specify our requirements to the key indicators with
respect to the deployed sensors. The two sub-steps are typically conducted in parallel.
D. Evaluate internal validity
The fourth main step of ValidKI is concerned with evaluating whether the set of key indicators is internally valid
with respect to the business objective. We distinguish between two sub-steps. In the ﬁrst sub-step we reformulate
the precise business objective by expressing it in terms of the identiﬁed key indicators. This step serves as an
introductory step in the evaluation of internal validity. In the second sub-step we evaluate whether the set of key
indicators is internally valid by showing that the reformulated precise business objective from Step 4.1 correctly
measures the fulﬁllment of the precise business objective from Step 1.1.
Internal validity may be decomposed into a broad category of criteria [8]. In the following we list the criteria
that we take into consideration. For each criterion, we ﬁrst provide the deﬁnition as given in [8], before we list the
papers on which the deﬁnition is based.
• Attribute validity: “A metric has attribute validity if the measurements correctly exhibit the attribute that
the metric is intending to measure” [9][10]. In our case, the key indicator needs to correctly exhibit the risk
attribute (likelihood or consequence) of the risk that it is measuring. In addition, the key indicator is of little
value if it can only produce values that always result in the risk being acceptable or unacceptable.
• Factor independence: “A metric has factor independence if the individual measurements used in the metric
formulation are independent of each other” [11]. This criterion applies especially to composite key indicators
that are composed of basic key indicators. A composite key indicator has factor independence if the basic key
indicators are independent of each other, i.e., if they do not rely on the same measurements.
• Internal consistency: “A metric has internal consistency if “all of the elementary measurements of a metric are
assessing the same construct and are inter-related”” [12]. This criterion also applies especially to composite
key indicators that are composed of basic key indicators. If the basic key indicators measure things that are
not conceptually related, then the composite key indicator will not have internal consistency. For instance,
let us say that we have a composite key indicator that is composed of two basic key indicators. The ﬁrst
basic key indicator measures the code complexity of a software product, while the second measures the cost
of shipping the software product to the customers. In this case, the composite key indicator does not have
internal consistency, since the two basic key indicators are not conceptually related.
• Appropriate continuity: “A metric has appropriate continuity if the metric is deﬁned (or undeﬁned) for all
values according to the attribute being measured” [10]. An example of a discontinuity is fraction calculations
when the denominator is zero. To avoid discontinuity, the key indicator should be deﬁned for that case.
• Dimensional consistency: “A metric has dimensional consistency if the formulation of multiple metrics into
a composite metric is performed by a scientiﬁcally well-understood mathematical function” [10][13]. Under
dimensional consistency, no information should be lost during the construction of composite key indicators.
Loss of information may be experienced if different scales are used for the basic and composite key indicators.
• Unit validity: “A metric has unit validity if the units used are an appropriate means of measuring the attribute”
[10][14]. For instance, the unit fault rate may be used to measure the attribute program correctness [10].
If the set is not internally valid, then we iterate by re-doing Step 3.
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In the ﬁfth main step of ValidKI we specify the designs of the identiﬁed key indicators. Each design speciﬁes
how the key indicator should be calculated. The design also shows how sensors, actors, and different components
interact.
F. Evaluate construct validity
In the sixth main step of ValidKI we evaluate whether the set of key indicators has construct validity with respect
to the business objective. As with internal validity, construct validity may be decomposed into a broad category of
criteria [8]. In the following we list the criteria that we take into consideration. For each criterion, we ﬁrst provide
the deﬁnition as given in [8], before we list the papers on which the deﬁnition is based.
• Stability: “A metric has stability if it produces the same values “on repeated collections of data under similar
circumstances”” [12][15][16]. A key indicator whose calculation involves decisions made by humans, may
for example result in different values and thus lack of stability.
• Instrument validity: “A metric has instrument validity if the underlying measurement instrument is valid and
properly calibrated” [10]. In our case, this criterion concerns the sensors that perform the measurements that
the key indicator calculations rely on.
• Deﬁnition validity: “A metric has deﬁnition validity if the metric deﬁnition is clear and unambiguous such
that its collection can be implemented in a unique, deterministic way” [11][15][16][17][18]. This criterion
concerns the implementation of the key indicators. To implement a key indicator correctly, the key indicator’s
design speciﬁcation needs to be clear and unambiguous.
To evaluate the different criteria, we re-do the risk analysis from Step 2.2 with the precise business objective
replaced by the reformulated precise business objective, which is the precise business objective expressed in terms
of key indicators. For each key indicator we identify risks towards the correctness of the reformulated precise
business objective that are the result of threats to criteria for construct validity that the key indicator needs to fulﬁll.
If the risk analysis does not result in any new unacceptable risks, then we have established construct validity for
each key indicator. If the set does not have construct validity, then we iterate. We will most likely be re-doing Step
5, but it may also be the case that we need to come up with new key indicators and new sensors. In that case,
we re-do Step 3. If the set of key indicators is both internally valid and has construct validity with respect to the
business objective, then we have established that the set is valid.
IV. ESTABLISH TARGET
In the following we assume that we have been hired to help the public hospital Client H design key indicators
to monitor their compliance with Article 8 in the European Convention on Human Rights [19]. The article states
the following:
Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public
safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Client H needs to comply with Article 8 since it is a public authority. The consequence for Client H of not
complying with Article 8 may be economic loss and damaged reputation. One example [20] of violation of Article
8 is from Finland. A Finnish woman was ﬁrst treated for HIV at a hospital, before she later started working there
as a nurse. While working there she suspected that her co-workers had unlawfully gained access to her medical
data. She brought the case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg which unanimously held that
the district health authority responsible for the hospital had violated Article 8 by not protecting the medical data
of the woman properly. The district health authority was held liable to pay damages to the woman. Client H has
therefore established the following business objective:
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Business objective BO-A8: Client H complies with Article 8 in the European Convention on Human Rights.
Client H wants to make use of key indicators to monitor the degree of fulﬁllment of BO-A8, and now they have
hired us to use ValidKI to design them. In the rest of this section we conduct Step 1 of ValidKI on behalf of Client
H with respect to BO-A8.
A. Express business objectives more precisely (Step 1.1 of ValidKI)
Article 8 states under which circumstances a public authority can interfere with someone’s right to privacy. One
of these circumstances is “for the protection of health,” which is what Client H wants us to focus on. In the context
of Client H this means to provide medical assistance to patients. The ones who provide this assistance are the
health-care professionals of Client H.
The medical history of a patient is regarded as both sensitive and private. At Client H, the medical history of a
patient is stored in an electronic patient record (EPR). An EPR is “an electronically managed and stored collection
or collocation of recorded/registered information on a patient in connection with medical assistance” [21]. The
main purpose of an EPR is to communicate information between health-care professionals that provide medical
care to a patient. To protect the privacy of its patients, Client H restricts the use of EPRs. In order to comply with
Article 8, Client H allows a health-care professional to interfere with the privacy of a patient only when providing
medical assistance to this patient. Hence, the dealing with EPRs within the realms of Client H is essential.
For Client H it is important that every access to information in an EPR is in accordance with Article 8. A health-
care professional should only access a patient’s EPR if he/she provides medical assistance to that patient, and he/she
should only access information that is necessary for providing the medical assistance. The information accessed
can not be used for any other purpose than providing medical assistance to patients. Accesses to information in
EPRs not needed for providing medical assistance would not be in accordance with Article 8. Also, employees
that are not health-care professionals and work within the jurisdiction of Client H are not allowed to access EPRs.
Based on the constraints provided by Client H, we decide to express BO-A8 more precisely as follows:
Precise business objective PBO-A8: C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3
• Constraint C1: Health-care professionals acting on behalf of Client H access:
– a patient’s EPR only when providing medical assistance to that patient
– only the information in a patient’s EPR that is necessary for providing medical assistance to that patient
• Constraint C2: Health-care professionals acting on behalf of Client H do not use the information obtained
from a patient’s EPR for any other purpose than providing medical assistance to that patient.
• Constraint C3: Employees that are not health-care professionals and that work within the jurisdiction of Client
H do not access EPRs.
As indicated by PBO-A8’s deﬁnition, all three constraints must be fulﬁlled in order for PBO-A8 to be fulﬁlled.
B. Describe relevant part of business (Step 1.2 of ValidKI)
To design key indicators to monitor BO-A8 we need to understand the part of business that is to comply with
BO-A8 and therefore is to be monitored. “Public hospital Client H” has outsourced some of its medical services
to two private hospitals. These two are referred to as “Private hospital X-ray” and “Private hospital Blood test
analysis” in Fig. 4. The ﬁrst hospital does all the X-ray work for Client H, while the second hospital does all
the blood test analyses. Client H is not only responsible for its own handling of EPRs, but also the outsourcing
partners’ handling of EPRs, when they act on behalf of Client H.
In Fig. 4, the rectangles inside and outside the gray containers represent systems/actors, while the arrows in
the ﬁgure represent the exchange of data between different systems/actors. In the ﬁgure, we only show some of
the rectangles and arrows that should be part of the gray containers of “Public hospital Client H” and “Private
hospital Blood test analysis.” All the rectangles and arrows with names in italic that are part of the gray container
of “Private hospital X-ray” should also be part of the gray containers of “Public hospital Client H” and “Private
hospital Blood test analysis.”
As can be seen in Fig. 4, Client H outsources medical tasks to the two private hospitals, and gets in return
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Fig. 4. Speciﬁcation of relevant part of business
handling the EPRs. An EPR system is “an electronic system with the necessary functionality to record, retrieve,
present, communicate, edit, correct, and delete information in electronic patient records” [21]. These systems use
EPRs provided by different health-care institutions. As shown in Fig. 4, these systems are only of interest when
they handle EPRs where Client H is responsible for their handling.
At the three health-care institutions, most of the medical tasks that a health-care professional conducts during
a working day are known in advance. It is known which patients the professional will treat and what kind of
information the professional will need access to in order to treat the different patients. Client H and the two
outsourcing partners maintain for each health-care professional an authorization list documenting which patients
the professional is treating and what kind of information the professional needs for this purpose. These lists are
used by the EPR systems and they are updated on a daily basis by the medical task management systems. Many
of these updates are automatic. For instance, when Client H is assigned a new patient, then this patient is added to
the lists of the health-care professionals who will be treating this patient.
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Each EPR is owned by a patient, which is natural since the information stored in the EPR is about the patient in
question. As already mentioned, the content of a patient’s EPR is both considered sensitive and private. Moreover,
some of the EPRs may contain information that is considered highly sensitive and private. Such information may
for instance describe medical treatment received by a patient in relation to:
• the patient being the victim of a crime (e.g., rape, violence, etc.);
• sexual transferable diseases or abortion; and
• mortal or infectious mortal diseases.
Information classiﬁed as highly sensitive and private is handled with even more care than information that is just
classiﬁed as sensitive and private. To raise awareness of the criticality of such information and to enable monitoring
of its use, the EPR systems at the three health-care institutions tag highly sensitive and private information in EPRs
based on predeﬁned rules.
Accesses to information in EPRs can be classiﬁed as authorized or unauthorized based on the authorization lists
of health-care professionals. An access is classiﬁed as authorized if the professional needs the information to do a
planned task. Otherwise, the access is classiﬁed as unauthorized. If an access is classiﬁed as unauthorized then it
is possible to check in retrospect whether the access was necessary. In an emergency situation, for instance when a
patient is having a heart attack, a health-care professional often needs access to information in an EPR that he/she
was not supposed to access. By checking in retrospect whether unauthorized accesses were necessary it is possible
to classify the unauthorized accesses into two groups; one for accesses that were necessary, and one for those that
were not. The ﬁrst group is called approved unauthorized accesses, while the second group is called not approved
unauthorized accesses. All accesses that are classiﬁed as not approved unauthorized accesses are considered as
illegal accesses.
At Client H and the two outsourcing partners, health-care professionals use smart cards for accessing information
in EPRs. If a card is lost or stolen, the owner must report it as missing, since missing cards may be used by other
health-care professionals or others to access EPRs illegally. When the card has been registered as missing it can
no longer be used. When reporting it as missing, the last time the card owner used it before noticing that it was
missing is recorded. All accesses to EPRs that have occurred between this time and the time it was registered as
missing are considered as illegal accesses.
At the three hospitals, the doors into the different areas are ﬁtted with smart card locks. In order to open a door,
an employee needs to insert his/hers smart card into the lock. A security system is used by each hospital to allow
or deny an employee access to a speciﬁc area based on the employee’s access credentials. Moreover, health-care
professionals often need to print information in EPRs. Each hospital relies on a printing system to achieve this.
This system issues the different print jobs to printers located in rooms with doors ﬁtted with smart card locks.
Since each printer is used by a number of employees, the three hospitals run the risk of printed information being
disclosed to other employees if the employee responsible for the print job forgets to collect his/hers printout. To
minimize this risk, each hospital has security employees that collect uncollected printouts of information from EPRs
at the different printers on a regular basis. Each printer at the three hospitals annotates each printout with the date
and time it was printed, as well as an ID for the employee that issued the print job. A security employee removes
a printout of sensitive and private information from an EPR if it has been laying on the printer for 30 minutes
or more, while he/she removes a printout of highly sensitive and private information if it has been laying on the
printer for 15 minutes or more. For each removed printout, the health-care professional that issued the print job is
notiﬁed about the removal and asked to collect the printout at the security ofﬁce at the hospital in question.
A health-care professional relies from time to time on information obtained from patients’ EPRs for other purposes
than providing medical assistance to the patients in question. The information may be needed for the purpose of
providing medical assistance to another patient, or it may be needed in research projects. To support these tasks, the
three hospitals have made it possible for health-care professionals to obtain anonymized information from EPRs,
i.e., information that cannot be linked to speciﬁc patients. It should be noticed that health-care professionals need
to obtain speciﬁc permissions to obtain and use anonymized information from EPRs.
At each of the three hospitals, a media retriever service is used to collect relevant information from the traditional
media (newspapers, TV, radio, etc.) and the Internet media (Internet newspapers, etc.). The three hospitals also
encourage the general public to provide feedback on how satisﬁed they are with the hospitals’ services. The general
public also serves another purpose for the three hospitals. The media retriever services can only to a limited extent
retrieve information from social media (Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and Internet forums. The three hospitals therefore
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TABLE I
CONSEQUENCE SCALE FOR THE ASSET “FULFILLMENT OF PBO-A8” (TOP) AND LIKELIHOOD SCALE (BOTTOM)
Consequence Description
Catastrophic Law enforcement agencies penalize Client H after having been notiﬁed about the incident
Major Health authorities penalize Client H after having been notiﬁed about the incident
Moderate Health authorities are notiﬁed about the incident
Minor Head of hospital is notiﬁed about the incident
Insigniﬁcant Head of department is notiﬁed about the incident
Likelihood Description
Certain Five times or more per year [50,∞〉 : 10 years
Likely Two to ﬁve times per year [20, 49] : 10 years
Possible Once a year [6, 19] : 10 years
Unlikely Less than once per year [2, 5] : 10 years
Rare Less than once per ten years [0, 1] : 10 years
TABLE II
RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FOR THE ASSET “FULFILLMENT OF PBO-A8”
Likelihood






encourage the general public to notify them about information found in social media or on Internet forums that
may be of relevance. A person of the general public is awarded if the information is very relevant. The information
provided by the media retriever services and the general public is ﬁrst and foremost used by the hospitals to assess
how they are perceived by the public. Sometimes, however, the collected information may indicate or reveal that
information from EPRs have been leaked to the public.
V. IDENTIFY RISKS TO FULFILLMENT OF BUSINESS OBJECTIVE
A. Specify risk acceptance criteria (Step 2.1 of ValidKI)
Before we specify the risk acceptance criteria, we need to establish scales for measuring likelihood and conse-
quence. Table I presents these scales. We view “Fulﬁllment of PBO-A8” as the asset to be protected. In Table II the
risk acceptance criteria for the asset “Fulﬁllment of PBO-A8” are expressed in terms of a risk evaluation matrix.
Risks whose values belong to the white area of the matrix are acceptable, while risks whose values belong to the
gray area are unacceptable.
B. Risk identiﬁcation and estimation (Step 2.2 of ValidKI)
Based on the information provided by the representatives of Client H, we identify and estimate risk. For this
purpose we use the CORAS methodology [22]. However, other approaches to risk analysis may be used instead.
Using CORAS we identify how threats may initiate risks that harm the asset “Fulﬁllment of PBO-A8” if they occur.
The CORAS threat diagram in Fig. 5 provides a high-level overview of how the fulﬁllment of the precise
business objective PBO-A8 may be harmed. The threat diagram contains four referring threat scenarios that refer to
the referenced threat scenarios in Figs. 6 – 9. We refer to ix and oy of the referring threat scenarios as in-gate and
out-gate, respectively. Relations to an element inside a referenced threat scenario must go through an in-gate, while
relations to an element outside the referenced threat scenario must go through an out-gate. The likelihood value
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Fig. 5. CORAS threat diagram providing a high-level overview of the results from the risk identiﬁcation and estimation
likelihood of an element inside the referenced threat scenario, while the likelihood of the out-gate oy documents
the contribution of the likelihood of an element inside the referenced threat scenario via gate oy to the likelihood
of an element outside the referenced threat scenario.
The CORAS threat diagram in Fig. 5 contains three human threats; one accidental (the white one) and two
deliberate (the black ones). The accidental human threat “Health-care professional” may initiate the threat scenario
“Unauthorized access to information in a patient’s EPR” in the referenced threat scenario “A health-care professional
performs a not approved unauthorized access to information in an EPR” in Fig. 7 via the in-gate i3 with likelihood
“Likely” by exploiting the vulnerability “No restrictions on what EPRs a health-care professional can access.” We
can also see that the deliberate human threat “Health-care professional” may initiate this threat scenario via the
in-gate i4 with likelihood “Possible” by exploiting the same vulnerability, and that the threat scenario occurs with
likelihood “Certain.” If the threat scenario in Fig. 7 occurs then it leads to the threat scenario “Unauthorized access
to sensitive and private information” in the same ﬁgure with conditional likelihood “0.7.” This threat scenario leads
to the risk “R5: Not approved unauthorized access to sensitive and private information in an EPR, where the owner
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Fig. 6. The referenced threat scenario “EPR information printed by a health-care professional is found by another health-care professional
or an employee that is not a health-care professional on the printer,” referred to in Fig. 5
of the EPR is a patient of the accessor” with conditional likelihood “0.6” if it occurs. The risk occurs with likelihood
“Likely.” As can be seen in Figs. 5 and 7, the risk impacts the asset “Fulﬁllment of PBO-A8” via the out-gate o7
with consequence “Insigniﬁcant” if it occurs.
The referenced threat scenarios in Figs. 6 – 9 document risks that affect the fulﬁllment of the constraints referred
to in the precise business objective PBO-A8. The risks R2, R4, R5 – R8, R15, and R16 affect the fulﬁllment
of constraint C1, while the risks R9 – R14 affect the fulﬁllment of constraint C2. Moreover, the risks R1, R3,
R17, and R18 affect the fulﬁllment of constraint C3. Notice that in the referenced threat scenario in Fig. 7, we
distinguish between not approved unauthorized accesses to information in EPRs where the owner of the EPR is a
patient and not a patient of the accessor. Client H ﬁnds it most serious if the owner of the EPR is not a patient of
the accessor. We also distinguish between not approved unauthorized accesses to sensitive and private information
and not approved unauthorized accesses to highly sensitive and private information. Naturally, Client H ﬁnds not
approved unauthorized accesses to the latter type of information the most serious.
16












access to highly 











R5: Not approved 
unauthorized access to 
sensitive and private 
information in an EPR, where 
the owner of the EPR is a 
patient of the accessor
[Likely]
R6: Not approved unauthorized access to sensitive 
and private information in an EPR, where the owner of 
the EPR is not a patient of the accessor
[Possible]
R7: Not approved unauthorized access to highly 
sensitive and private information in an EPR, where the 
owner of the EPR is a patient of the accessor
[Possible]
R8: Not approved 
unauthorized access to highly 
sensitive and private 
information in an EPR, where 
the owner of the EPR is not a 








Fig. 7. The referenced threat scenario “A health-care professional performs a not approved unauthorized access to information in an EPR,”
referred to in Fig. 5
TABLE III
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FROM TABLE II WITH THE ACCEPTABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE RISKS INSERTED
Likelihood
Consequence Insigniﬁcant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic
Rare R15, R17 R18
Unlikely R3 R12, R16
Possible R6, R7 R1, R4, R9,
R11
R8, R10
Likely R5, R13 R2, R14
Certain
C. Risk evaluation (Step 2.3 of ValidKI)
The risk evaluation consists in plotting the risks into the risk evaluation matrix according to their likelihoods and
consequences. As indicated in Table III, four out of the 18 risks namely R8, R10, R12, and R16 are unacceptable
with respect to the fulﬁllment of the precise business objective PBO-A8.
During the risk evaluation, we also decide that some of the risks need to be accumulated since they pull in the
same direction. We decide to accumulate the following risks: R1 and R2; R3 and R4; R15 and R17; and R16
and R18. All of these risks, with the exception of R18, are acceptable when considered in isolation. Risks are
accumulated by accumulating their likelihood and consequence values. We accumulate the risks as follows:
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Fig. 8. The referenced threat scenario “Information obtained from a patient’s EPR is used for other purposes than providing medical
assistance to the patient in question,” referred to in Fig. 5
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Fig. 9. The referenced threat scenario “A health-care professional or an employee that is not a health-care professional uses a lost/stolen
smart card to access information in an EPR,” referred to in Fig. 5
• The accumulated risk “R1&R2: Another health-care professional or employee that is not a health-care profes-
sional ﬁnds a printout of sensitive and private information on the printer.” It occurs with likelihood “Likely”
and it impacts the asset with consequence “Moderate.” The accumulated risk is based on:
– The risk R1 which occurs with likelihood “Possible,” while it impacts the asset with consequence
“Moderate.”
– The risk R2 which occurs with likelihood “Likely,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Minor.”
• The accumulated risk “R3&R4: Another health-care professional or employee that is not a health-care pro-
fessional ﬁnds a printout of highly sensitive and private information on the printer.” It occurs with likelihood
“Possible” and it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.” The accumulated risk is based on:
– The risk R3 which occurs with likelihood “Unlikely,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.”
– The risk R4 which occurs with likelihood “Possible,” while it impacts the asset with consequence
“Moderate.”
• The accumulated risk “R15&R17: Access by a health-care professional or an employee that is not a health-
care professional to sensitive and private information in an EPR from a lost/stolen smart card.” It occurs with
likelihood “Rare” and it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.” The accumulated risk is based on:
– The risk R15 which occurs with likelihood “Rare,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.”
– The risk R17 which occurs with likelihood “Rare,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Major.”
• The accumulated risk “R16&R18: Access by a health-care professional or an employee that is not a health-care
professional to highly sensitive and private information in an EPR from a lost/stolen smart card.” It occurs
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TABLE IV
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FROM TABLE III AFTER RISKS HAVE BEEN ACCUMULATED
Likelihood




Possible R6, R7 R9, R11 R3&R4, R8,
R10
Likely R13 R5, R14 R1&R2
Certain
with likelihood “Unlikely” and it impacts the asset with consequence “Catastrophic.” The accumulated risk is
based on:
– The risk R16 which occurs with likelihood “Unlikely,” while it impacts the asset with consequence
“Catastrophic.”
– The risk R18 which occurs with likelihood “Rare,” while it impacts the asset with consequence “Catas-
trophic.”
Since we are operating with a coarse-grained likelihood scale with intervals, we ﬁnd it sufﬁcient to do a rough
aggregation of the likelihoods in order to determine to which likelihood interval the different accumulated risks
belong. For the accumulated risk R15&R17 we end up with the likelihood “Rare,” while for each of the other
accumulated risks, we end up with an aggregated likelihood that gravitates towards the highest of the two likelihoods.
We therefore decide to use the highest likelihood to represent the accumulated likelihood in each of these cases.
Moreover, we accumulate consequences by taking the average. In all of the cases where the two consequence
values differ, we end up with an average that gravitates towards the highest consequence value. We therefore ﬁnd
it suitable to use the highest consequence value to represent the accumulated consequence in each of these cases.
In Table IV we have plotted the accumulated risks according to their likelihoods and consequences. As we can
see from the table, all the accumulated risks with the exception of R15&R17 are unacceptable. Table IV shows
that the risks R1&R2, R3&R4, R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18 are unacceptable with respect to the fulﬁllment of
the precise business objective PBO-A8.
VI. IDENTIFY KEY INDICATORS TO MONITOR RISKS
A. Deploy sensors to monitor risks (Step 3.1 of ValidKI)
Fig. 10, which is a detailing of the target description in Fig. 4, speciﬁes the deployment of sensors in the
relevant part of business. This speciﬁcation corresponds to the sensor deployment speciﬁcation referred to in Fig. 2.
An antenna-like symbol is used to represent each sensor in Fig. 10. The different sensors monitor data messages
exchanged within the relevant part of business. The results from the monitoring are to be used in the calculation
of key indicators.
In Fig. 10, sensor deployments are only shown for “Private hospital X-ray.” It should be noticed that “Public
hospital Client H” and “Private hospital Blood test analysis” will have the same sensors as “Private hospital X-ray.”
The following sensors are deployed in the relevant part of business:
• SCH-REG-MIS-SC, SBTA-REG-MIS-SC, and SXR-REG-MIS-SC monitor data messages related to the registration of missing
smart cards at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-AUTH-LIST, SBTA-AUTH-LIST, and SXR-AUTH-LIST monitor data messages related to the authorization lists em-
ployed by the EPR systems at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, and SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR monitor data messages where each message is a
request issued by health-care professional to access information in an EPR at Client H, Blood test analysis, and
X-ray, respectively. It is not necessary to monitor the actual information received, since health-care professionals
will always get the information they request.
• SCH-INFO-GP, SBTA-INFO-GP, and SXR-INFO-GP monitor data messages where each message contains info/feedback
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Fig. 10. Deployment of sensors in the relevant part of business
• SCH-INFO-MRS, SBTA-INFO-MRS, and SXR-INFO-MRS monitor data messages where each message contains relevant
information collected by media retriever services from the traditional media or the Internet for Client H, Blood
test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-PR-REQS, SBTA-PR-REQS, and SXR-PR-REQS monitor data messages related to printing of information in EPRs
by health-care professionals at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-ACC-REQS-HCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-HCP, and SXR-ACC-REQS-HCP monitor data messages related to area access re-
quests issued by health-care professionals at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray, respectively.
• SCH-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-NHCP, and SXR-ACC-REQS-NHCP monitor data messages related to area access
requests issued by employees that are not health-care professionals at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray,
respectively.
• SCH-INFO-UNC-PO, SBTA-INFO-UNC-PO, and SXR-INFO-UNC-PO monitor data messages related to registrations of uncol-
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TABLE V
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KPR-SP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO, KBTA-PR-SP-EPR-INFO, AND KXR-PR-SP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-PR-SP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SX-ACC-REQS-HCP, SX-PR-REQS, SX-INFO-UNC-PO : M∗
Out: KX-PR-SP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KX-PR-SP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that health-care professionals or employees
that are not health-care professionals have found printouts of sensitive and private information from EPRs on printers
at X”
Requirements for KPR-SP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-NHCP : M∗
SCH-ACC-REQS-HCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-HCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-HCP : M
∗
SCH-PR-REQS, SBTA-PR-REQS, SXR-PR-REQS : M
∗
SCH-INFO-UNC-PO, SBTA-INFO-UNC-PO, SXR-INFO-UNC-PO : M
∗
Out: KPR-SP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KPR-SP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-SP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
TABLE VI
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO, KBTA-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO, AND KXR-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SX-ACC-REQS-HCP, SX-PR-REQS, SX-INFO-UNC-PO : M∗
Out: KX-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KX-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that health-care professionals or employees
that are not health-care professionals have found printouts of highly sensitive and private information from EPRs on
printers at X”
Requirements for KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-NHCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-NHCP : M∗
SCH-ACC-REQS-HCP, SBTA-ACC-REQS-HCP, SXR-ACC-REQS-HCP : M
∗
SCH-PR-REQS, SBTA-PR-REQS, SXR-PR-REQS : M
∗
SCH-INFO-UNC-PO, SBTA-INFO-UNC-PO, SXR-INFO-UNC-PO : M
∗
Out: KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
lected printouts of information from EPRs by security employees at Client H, Blood test analysis, and X-ray,
respectively.
B. Specify requirements to key indicators wrt deployed sensors (Step 3.2 of ValidKI)
Two key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO are identiﬁed to monitor the likelihood values of the two
unacceptable risks R1&R2 and R3&R4, respectively. In Tables V and VI their requirements are given. The two
key indicators calculate likelihoods with respect to a ten year period, because the likelihoods in the likelihood scale
in Table I are deﬁned with respect to a ten year period. Both key indicators are composed of basic key indicators.
Table V presents the requirements to the basic key indicators that KPR-SP-EPR-INFO is composed of, while Table VI
presents the requirements to the basic key indicators that KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO is composed of.
For each key indicator we specify required sensor data. All of the key indicators rely on sequences of data
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TABLE VII
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, KBTA-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, AND KXR-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
Requirements for KX-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-AUTH-LIST, SX-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
Out: KX-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC : N
Description: KX-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC = “The number of not approved unauthorized accesses at X since the monitoring started to
highly sensitive and private information in EPRs, where the owners of the EPRs are not patients of the accessors”
Requirements for KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
In: SCH-AUTH-LIST, SBTA-AUTH-LIST, SXR-AUTH-LIST : M∗
SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M
∗
Out: KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC : R
Description: KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC =
10 · (KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + KBTA-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + KXR-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC)
Number of years since the monitoring started
TABLE VIII
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KSP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY INDICATORS
KCH-SP-EPR-INFO, KBTA-SP-EPR-INFO, AND KXR-SP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-SP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-INFO-EPR, SX-INFO-GP, SX-INFO-MRS : M∗
Out: KX-SP-EPR-INFO : N
Description: KX-SP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that sensitive and private information from
patients’ EPRs have been shared by health-care professionals with others and where this information have ended up
in the traditional media or on the Internet”
Requirements for KSP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
SCH-INFO-GP, SBTA-INFO-GP, SXR-INFO-GP : M
∗
SCH-INFO-MRS, SBTA-INFO-MRS, SXR-INFO-MRS : M
∗
Out: KSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KSP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-SP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-SP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
messages (M∗) gathered by the different sensors. We also specify the output type and requirements to output. For
a key indicator K we refer to its requirement description as Req(K).
Key indicators have also been identiﬁed for monitoring the unacceptable risks R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18.
Tables VII, VIII, IX, and X specify requirements to key indicators for monitoring the likelihood values of the risks
R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18, respectively.
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TABLE IX
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KHSP-EPR-INFO AND THE BASIC KEY
INDICATORS KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO, KBTA-HSP-EPR-INFO, AND KXR-HSP-EPR-INFO
Requirements for KX-HSP-EPR-INFO, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-ACC-INFO-EPR, SX-INFO-GP, SX-INFO-MRS : M∗
Out: KX-HSP-EPR-INFO : N
Description: KX-HSP-EPR-INFO = “The number of times since the monitoring started that highly sensitive and private information
from patients’ EPRs have been shared by health-care professionals with others and where this information have
ended up in the traditional media or on the Internet”
Requirements for KHSP-EPR-INFO
In: SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
SCH-INFO-GP, SBTA-INFO-GP, SXR-INFO-GP : M
∗
SCH-INFO-MRS, SBTA-INFO-MRS, SXR-INFO-MRS : M
∗
Out: KHSP-EPR-INFO : R
Description: KHSP-EPR-INFO =
10 · (KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO + KBTA-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-HSP-EPR-INFO)
Number of years since the monitoring started
TABLE X
KEY INDICATOR REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COMPOSITE KEY INDICATOR KILL-ACC-SC AND THE BASIC KEY INDICATORS
KCH-ILL-ACC-SC , KBTA-ILL-ACC-SC , AND KXR-ILL-ACC-SC
Requirements for KX-ILL-ACC-SC, where X ∈ {CH,BTA,XR}
In: SX-REG-MIS-SC, SX-ACC-INFO-EPR : M∗
Out: KX-ILL-ACC-SC : N
Description: KX-ILL-ACC-SC = “The number of illegal accesses at X since the monitoring started to highly sensitive and private
information in EPRs from lost/stolen smart cards”
Requirements for KILL-ACC-SC
In: SCH-REG-MIS-SC, SBTA-REG-MIS-SC, SXR-REG-MIS-SC : M∗
SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR, SBTA-ACC-INFO-EPR, SXR-ACC-INFO-EPR : M
∗
Out: KILL-ACC-SC : R
Description: KILL-ACC-SC =
10 · (KCH-ILL-ACC-SC + KBTA-ILL-ACC-SC + KXR-ILL-ACC-SC)
Number of years since the monitoring started
VII. EVALUATE INTERNAL VALIDITY
A. Express business objective in terms of key indicators (Step 4.1 of ValidKI)
The precise business objective PBO-A8’ is a reformulation of the precise business objective PBO-A8 expressed
in terms of key indicators.
PBO-A8’ = KPR-SP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 19] ∧ Req(KSP-PR-EPR-INFO) ∧
KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 5] ∧ Req(KHSP-PR-EPR-INFO) ∧
KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC ∈ [0, 5] ∧ Req(KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC) ∧
KSP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 5] ∧ Req(KSP-EPR-INFO) ∧
KHSP-EPR-INFO ∈ [0, 1] ∧ Req(KHSP-EPR-INFO) ∧
KILL-ACC-SC ∈ [0, 1] ∧ Req(KILL-ACC-SC)
The precise business objective PBO-A8 is fulﬁlled if the likelihood values of the six unacceptable risks R1&R2,
R3&R4, R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18 change in such a way that the six risks become acceptable. The risks
become acceptable if their likelihood values change in the following way:
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TABLE XI
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX WHEN THE PRECISE BUSINESS OBJECTIVE PBO-A8 IS FULFILLED
Likelihood








Possible R6, R7 R1&R2′′′,
R9, R11
Likely R13 R5, R14
Certain
• The risk R1&R2 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Likely” to “Possible,” “Unlikely,” or
“Rare.” The likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KPR-SP-EPR-INFO, monitoring
the likelihood, is contained in the interval [0, 19] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years,” “Unlikely:
[2, 5] : 10 years,” and “Possible: [6, 19] : 10 years”).
• The risk R3&R4 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Possible” to “Unlikely” or “Rare.” The
likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO, monitoring the likelihood,
is contained in the interval [0, 5] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years” and “Unlikely: [2, 5] : 10
years”).
• The risk R8 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Possible” to “Unlikely” or “Rare.” The
likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, monitoring the
likelihood, is contained in the interval [0, 5] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years” and “Unlikely:
[2, 5] : 10 years”).
• The risk R10 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Possible” to “Unlikely” or “Rare.” The
likelihood will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO, monitoring the likelihood,
is contained in the interval [0, 5] (interval capturing both “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years” and “Unlikely: [2, 5] : 10
years”).
• The risk R12 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Unlikely” to “Rare.” The likelihood will
change in such a way if the composite key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO, monitoring the likelihood, is contained in
the interval [0, 1] (interval capturing “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years”).
• The risk R16&R18 becomes acceptable if the likelihood changes from “Unlikely” to “Rare.” The likelihood
will change in such a way if the composite key indicator KILL-ACC-SC, monitoring the likelihood, is contained
in the interval [0, 1] (interval capturing “Rare: [0, 1] : 10 years”).
Moreover, the different composite key indicators need to measure the likelihoods correctly in order to measure the
fulﬁllment of PBO-A8. This can be determined based on the requirements to the different composite key indicators.
These requirements are captured by Req(KPR-SP-EPR-INFO), Req(KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO), etc.
The reformulated precise business objective can also be used to determine to what degree the precise business
objective is fulﬁlled. For instance, if KPR-SP-EPR-INFO equals 20 while the other composite key indicators equal 0,
then PBO-A8 is close to being fulﬁlled. On the other hand, if KPR-SP-EPR-INFO equals 25 instead, then PBO-A8 is
far from being fulﬁlled.
B. Evaluate criteria for internal validity (Step 4.2 of ValidKI)
To evaluate the internal validity of the set of key indicators, we need to show that the reformulated precise
business objective PBO-A8’ measures the fulﬁllment of the precise business objective PBO-A8. We evaluate the
internal validity of each composite key indicator based on the criteria given in Section III-D.
To evaluate attribute validity we need to compare the deﬁnitions of the six risks with the requirements to the
composite key indicators. The deﬁnitions of the risks R8, R10, and R12 are given in Figs. 7 and 8, while the
deﬁnitions of the accumulated risks R1&R2, R3&R4, and R16&R18 are given in Section V-C. Moreover, the
25
requirements to the composite key indicators are given by Req(KPR-SP-EPR-INFO), Req(KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO), etc. In all
six cases there is a match between the deﬁnition of the risk and the requirements to the composite key indicator.
We therefore conclude that the composite key indicators correctly exhibit the likelihood attributes of the six risks
that the composite key indicators intend to measure. In addition, based on the requirements speciﬁed for the six
composite key indicators it is clear that the six composite key indicators are not restricted to only producing values
that are always contained or not contained in the intervals mentioned above. Thus, both acceptable and unacceptable
risks can be detected.
Moreover, all the composite key indicators have factor independence. Each composite key indicator is calculated
based on three basic key indicators. These are independent of each other, since they are computed by three different
health-care institutions. The six composite key indicators do also have internal consistency, since the three basic
key indicators employed by each composite key indicator measure the same thing, but at different health-care
institutions. The three basic key indicators are therefore conceptually related.
We continue the evaluation of internal validity by evaluating whether the composite key indicators have appropriate
continuity. All are discontinuous if “Number of years since the monitoring started” equals zero. Client H does
not consider this to be a problem, since the denominator will in all six cases be a real number that is never zero.
We also show that the six composite key indicators have dimensional consistency. Each composite key indicator
adds three likelihoods, where each is for the period of “Number of years since the monitoring started” years, and
transforms the resulting likelihood into a likelihood which is for a period of ten years. Thus, no information is
lost when constructing the composite key indicators from their respective basic key indicators. The six composite
key indicators do also have unit validity. All six use the unit “likelihood per ten years,” which is appropriate for
measuring the six likelihood attributes of the risks.
Based on the evaluation of the different internal validity types of criteria above, we conclude that the set of key
indicators is internally valid. When the precise business objective PBO-A8 is fulﬁlled, we get the risk evaluation
matrix in Table XI. In this situation, all of the risks R1&R2, R3&R4, R8, R10, R12, and R16&R18 are acceptable.
Moreover, the risks will have the following likelihood values when acceptable:
• The risk R1&R2 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R1&R2′), “Unlikely” (R1&R2′′), or “Possible”
(R1&R2′′′).
• The risk R3&R4 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R3&R4′) or “Unlikely” (R3&R4′′).
• The risk R8 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R8′) or “Unlikely” (R8′′).
• The risk R10 will either have the likelihood “Rare” (R10′) or “Unlikely” (R10′′).
• The risk R12 will have the likelihood “Rare”.
• The risk R16&R18 will have the likelihood “Rare”.
VIII. SPECIFY KEY INDICATOR DESIGNS
We use the UML [6] sequence diagram notation for the key indicator design speciﬁcations, but one may of
course also use other languages depending on the problem in question. In the following sub-sections, we specify
the designs of the six composite key indicators and their respective basic key indicators.
A. Key indicator designs for KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 11 speciﬁes how the key indicator KPR-SP-EPR-INFO is calculated. Each entity in the
sequence diagram is either a component, a sensor, or an employee at Client H, and it is represented by a dashed,
vertical line called a lifeline, where the box at its top speciﬁes which entity the lifeline represents. The entities
interact with each other through the transmission and reception of messages, which are shown as horizontal arrows
from the transmitting lifeline to the receiving lifeline. We can also see that a lifeline can be both the sender and
receiver of a message.
The sequence diagram contains one reference (ref) to another sequence diagram. This reference can be replaced
by the content of the sequence diagram that it refers to. The reference refers to the sequence diagram given in Fig.
12, which describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We do not present
sequence diagrams describing the calculations of the two other basic key indicators, since these calculations are
performed in the same way as the calculation of KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO, and since these calculations involve the same
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KPR-SP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-PR-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-SP-EPR-INFO))    













Fig. 11. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KPR-SP-EPR-INFO”
types of lifelines as the ones described in Fig. 12. For the two other basic key indicators we only show that they are
sent to “Component for calculating KPR-SP-EPR-INFO,” and that they are used in the calculation of KPR-SP-EPR-INFO.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 12 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO is updated each week. The
ﬁrst thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO” retrieves the value that was computed
for the basic key indicator in the previous week. Afterwards, the component counts for each printout the number
of health-care professionals and employees that are not health-care professionals that accessed the printer room
between TIME 1 (the time the print job was completed) and TIME 2 (the time when the health-care professional
collected his/hers printout or the time when the printout was collected by a security employee). The number NUM
is the number of other health-care professionals and employees that are not health-care professionals that may have
seen the printout of sensitive and private information.
Client H is of the opinion that between 10% and 30% of the other health-care professionals and employees
that are not health-care professionals that accessed the printer rooms between TIME 1 and TIME 2 have seen the
printouts of sensitive and private information from patients’ EPRs. Thus, the number TOTAL NUM is multiplied by
[0.1, 0.3]. In the end, the component stores the basic key indicator before sending it to “Component for calculating
KPR-SP-EPR-INFO,” as illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 11.
B. Key indicator designs for KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 13 speciﬁes how the key indicator KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 14 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We use the
same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic
key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 14 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO is updated each week.
This sequence diagram is almost identical to the one in Fig. 12. Thus, we do not give any further explanations for
the sequence diagram.
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ACC_PRINT_AREAS_NHCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by employees that are 
not health-care professionals in the period of one week 
backwards
SP_PRINT_LIST: All requests to print 
sensitive and private info in EPRs 
issued by health-care professionals at 
Client H in the period of one week 
backwards
TOTAL_NUM = 0
KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the monitoring up to the end of the 
previous week that health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
have found printouts of sensitive and private information from EPRs on printers at Client H”
loop ( PRINT_REQ = 0, number of elements in SP_PRINT_LIST )
Store KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO
Get the room number ROOM_NO for where the printer handling PRINT_REQ is located
Get the number of health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
NUM that accessed ROOM_NO between TIME_1 and TIME_2
Get the time TIME_1 for when PRINT_REQ was printed and get the time TIME_2 for when 
the health-care professional accessed ROOM_NO to collect PRINT_REQ
opt [TIME_2 is undefined]
TIME_2 = TIME_REM
TOTAL_NUM = TOTAL_NUM + NUM 
ACC_PRINT_AREAS_HCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by health-care 
professionals in the period of one week backwards




REG_UNC_PO: All registrations of uncollected printouts of 
sensitive and private information that have been removed by 
security employees at Client H in the period of one week backwards
Get the time TIME_REM from REG_UNC_PO for when the uncollected printout 
resulting from PRINT_REQ was removed by a security employee
Fig. 12. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-PR-SP-EPR-INFO”
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KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO))    













Fig. 13. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO”
C. Key indicator designs for KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 15 speciﬁes how the key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is calculated, while the
sequence diagram in Fig. 16 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC at Client
H. We use the same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two
other basic key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 16 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is updated each
week. The ﬁrst thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC” sends the value
that was computed for the basic key indicator in the previous week to “Employee at Client H.” Afterwards, the
component identiﬁes “All unauthorized accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to highly sensitive
and private information in EPRs, where the owners of the EPRs are not patients of the accessors” based on input
from the entities representing the sensors. The “Employee at Client H” performs a manual inspection of each of
these unauthorized accesses, and classiﬁes each as approved or not approved. If the unauthorized access is classiﬁed
as not approved, then the basic key indicator is incremented by one. After all the unauthorized accesses have been
inspected and classiﬁed, “Employee at Client H” sends the basic key indicator to the component which stores it.
Afterwards, the component sends the basic key indicator to “Component for calculating KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC,” as
illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 15.
D. Key indicator designs for KSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 17 speciﬁes how the key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 18 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-SP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We use the
same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic
key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 18 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-SP-EPR-INFO is updated each week. The
ﬁrst thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-SP-EPR-INFO” sends the value that was computed
for the basic key indicator in the previous week to “Employee at Client H”. Afterwards, the component receives
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ACC_PRINT_AREAS_NHCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by employees that are 
not health-care professionals in the period of one week 
backwards
HSP_PRINT_LIST: All requests to print 
highly sensitive and private info in EPRs 
issued by health-care professionals at 
Client H in the period of one week 
backwards
TOTAL_NUM = 0
KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the monitoring up to the end of the 
previous week that health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
have found printouts of highly sensitive and private information from EPRs on printers at Client H”
loop ( PRINT_REQ = 0, number of elements in HSP_PRINT_LIST )
Store KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO
Get the room number ROOM_NO for where the printer handling PRINT_REQ is located
Get the number of health-care professionals or employees that are not health-care professionals 
NUM that accessed ROOM_NO between TIME_1 and TIME_2
Get the time TIME_1 for when PRINT_REQ was printed and get the time TIME_2 for when 
the health-care professional accessed ROOM_NO to collect PRINT_REQ
opt [TIME_2 is undefined]
TIME_2 = TIME_REM
TOTAL_NUM = TOTAL_NUM + NUM 
ACC_PRINT_AREAS_HCP: All requests to access 
printer rooms at Client H issued by health-care 
professionals in the period of one week backwards




REG_UNC_PO: All registrations of uncollected printouts of 
highly sensitive and private information that have been removed by 
security employees at Client H in the period of one week backwards
Get the time TIME_REM from REG_UNC_PO for when the uncollected printout 
resulting from PRINT_REQ was removed by a security employee
Fig. 14. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-PR-HSP-EPR-INFO”
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(10 · (KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + 
KBTA-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + 
KXR-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC))    
Number of years since the monitoring started
Fig. 15. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC”
different kinds of data from the three sensors, where this data is used in the sequence diagram “Comparison of
data” in Fig. 19 for updating KCH-SP-EPR-INFO.
In the sequence diagram in Fig. 19, “Component for calculating KCH-SP-EPR-INFO” extracts all accesses to sensitive
and private information in EPRs that have occurred in the period of one week backwards. The component also
extracts all information items from INFO LIST 1 and INFO LIST 2 that both refer to Client H and the medical
history of a person. Since information retrieved from the traditional media or the Internet will refer to patients by
name, the different accesses are grouped with respect to patient names. In addition, duplicate accesses are removed,
since we are not interested in how many times some information has been accessed, but rather whether it has been
accessed or not. As can be seen in the sequence diagram, the different items of information retrieved from the
traditional media or the Internet are grouped in the same way as for accesses to information in EPRs.
After having grouped the different data, we check for the different information items whether they match
information that is retrieved when performing different accesses to information in EPRs. We use software to
identify potential matches, while an employee at Client H performs a manual check of the potential matches to
determine whether the sensitive and private information obtained from performing an access to information in an
EPR is really the source of the information that has been retrieved from the traditional media or the Internet.
When evaluating the potential matches, the employee needs to consider other potential sources for the information
leakage, such as the patient itself. The employee also needs to consider whether the information retrieved from the
traditional media or the Internet really refers to the same patient as the information obtained from an EPR does. If the
employee is conﬁdent that the information from the EPR is the source, then the basic key indicator KCH-SP-EPR-INFO
is incremented by one. In the end, the employee sends the updated basic key indicator to “Component for calculating
KCH-SP-EPR-INFO,” as illustrated in Fig. 18. The component stores the updated basic key indicator before sending it
to “Component for calculating KSP-EPR-INFO,” as illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 17.
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ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to information in EPRs
AUTH_LISTS: All authorization lists used at Client H in the period of one week backwards
Perform manual inspection of 
UNAUTH_ACC and classify 
it as approved or not approved 
UNAUTH_ACC_LIST: All unauthorized accesses at Client H in 
the period of one week backwards to highly sensitive and private 
information in EPRs, where the owners of the EPRs are not 
patients of the accessors
loop ( UNAUTH_ACC = 0, number of items in UNAUTH_ACC_LIST )
opt
[UNAUTH_ACC is classifed as not approved]
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC = 
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC + 1
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC = ”The number of not approved 
unauthorized accesses at Client H since the start of the 
monitoring up to the end of the previous week to highly 
sensitive and private information in EPRs, where the 
owners of the EPRs are not patients of the accessors”
KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
Store KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
Fig. 16. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-NOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC”
E. Key indicator designs for KHSP-EPR-INFO and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 20 speciﬁes how the key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 21 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO at Client H. We use the
same argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic
key indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 21 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO is updated each week. This
sequence diagram is almost identical to the one in Fig. 18, while the sequence diagram “Comparison of data” in
Fig. 22, which is referred to in Fig. 21, is almost identical to the one in Fig. 19. Thus, we do not give any further
explanations for the two sequence diagrams.
F. Key indicator designs for KILL-ACC-SC and its basic key indicators
The sequence diagram in Fig. 23 speciﬁes how the key indicator KILL-ACC-SC is calculated, while the sequence
diagram in Fig. 24 describes the calculation of the basic key indicator KCH-ILL-ACC-SC at Client H. We use the same
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KSP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-SP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-SP-EPR-INFO + KXR-SP-EPR-INFO))    






Fig. 17. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KSP-EPR-INFO”













KCH-SP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the 
monitoring up to the end of the previous week that sensitive 
and private information about patients have been shared by 
health-care professionals with others and where this information 
have ended up in the traditional media or on the Internet”
ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to information in EPRs
INFO_LIST_1: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where each item has 











INFO_LIST_2: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where 
each item is feedback from someone in the general public or information that he/she has 
collected from the Internet in the period of one week backwards
Fig. 18. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-SP-EPR-INFO”
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SP_ACC_LIST: Extract all accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards 
to sensitive and private information in EPRs based on ACC_LIST
SP_ACC_GROUPS: Remove duplicate accesses in SP_ACC_LIST (accesses to the same information) 
and group accesses wrt patient names (all patients with the same name is put in the same group)
INFO_GROUPS: Extract all information items from INFO_LIST_1 and INFO_LIST_2 that both refers to Client H 
and the medical history of people, and remove duplicate items before grouping information items wrt the names 
of the people (all people with the same name is put in the same group)
EPR 
system
loop ( INFO_GROUP = 0, number of elements in INFO_GROUPS )
opt
[Name of INFO_GROUP == Name of SP_ACC_GROUP]
loop ( SP_ACC_GROUP = 0, number of elements in SP_ACC_GROUPS )
loop ( X = 0, number of items in INFO_GROUP )
Perform access Y
Info from EPR for access Y
opt
[Match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X]
loop ( Y = 0, number of items in SP_ACC_GROUP )
Info item X and info from EPR for 
access Y
Perform manual check to decide whether info from EPR for access Y is the source of info item X. 
Other possible sources are also considered during the check
opt [Info from EPR for access Y 
is the source of info item X]
KCH-SP-EPR-INFO = KCH-SP-EPR-INFO + 1
Check whether there is a match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X
Fig. 19. The sequence diagram “Comparison of data”
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KHSP-EPR-INFO = (10 · (KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO + 
KBTA-HSP-EPR-INFO + KXR-HSP-EPR-INFO))    






Fig. 20. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KHSP-EPR-INFO”













KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO = ”The number of times since the start of the 
monitoring up to the end of the previous week that highly sensitive 
and private information about patients have been shared by 
health-care professionals with others and where this information 
have ended up in the traditional media or on the Internet”
ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards to information in EPRs
INFO_LIST_1: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where each item has 











INFO_LIST_2: Items of information, where each item is of relevance to Client H and where 
each item is feedback from someone in the general public or information that he/she has 
collected from the Internet in the period of one week backwards
Fig. 21. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO”
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HSP_ACC_LIST: Extract all accesses at Client H in the period of one week backwards 
to highly sensitive and private information in EPRs based on ACC_LIST
HSP_ACC_GROUPS: Remove duplicate accesses in HSP_ACC_LIST (accesses to the same information) 
and group accesses wrt patient names (all patients with the same name is put in the same group)
INFO_GROUPS: Extract all information items from INFO_LIST_1 and INFO_LIST_2 that both refers to Client H 
and the medical history of people, and remove duplicate items before grouping information items wrt the names 
of the people (all people with the same name is put in the same group)
EPR 
system
loop ( INFO_GROUP = 0, number of elements in INFO_GROUPS )
opt
[Name of INFO_GROUP == Name of HSP_ACC_GROUP]
loop ( HSP_ACC_GROUP = 0, number of elements in HSP_ACC_GROUPS )
loop ( X = 0, number of items in INFO_GROUP )
Perform access Y
Info from EPR for access Y
opt
[Match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X]
loop ( Y = 0, number of items in HSP_ACC_GROUP )
Info item X and info from EPR for 
access Y
opt [Info from EPR for access Y 
is the source of info item X]
KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO = KCH-HSP-EPR-INFO + 1
Perform manual check to decide whether info from EPR for access Y is the source of info item X. 
Other possible sources are also considered during the check
Check whether there is a match between info from EPR for access Y and info item X
Fig. 22. The sequence diagram “Comparison of data”
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KILL-ACC-SC = (10 · (KCH-ILL-ACC-SC + 
KBTA-ILL-ACC-SC + KXR-ILL-ACC-SC))    
Number of years since the monitoring started
Sensor
SCH-REG-MIS-SC
Fig. 23. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KILL-ACC-SC”
argument as the one given in Section VIII-A for not presenting sequence diagrams for the two other basic key
indicators.
The sequence diagram in Fig. 24 shows that the basic key indicator KCH-ILL-ACC-SC is updated each week. The
ﬁrst thing that happens is that “Component for calculating KCH-ILL-ACC” retrieves the value that was computed for
the basic key indicator in the previous week. Afterwards, the component counts for each of the lost/stolen smart
cards the number of accesses that have occurred between TIME 1 (the time the smart card’s owner used it the last
time before noticing that it was missing) and TIME 2 (the time when the smart card was registered as missing). In
the end, the component stores the basic key indicator KCH-ILL-ACC-SC, and sends it to “Component for calculating
KILL-ACC-SC,” as illustrated in the sequence diagram in Fig. 23.
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MIS_SC_LIST: All smart cards at Client H that were registered as 
missing in the period of one week backwards
ACC_LIST: All accesses at Client H in the period of one 
week backwards to information in EPRs
Store KCH-ILL-ACC-SC
KCH-ILL-ACC-SC = ”The number of illegal accesses at Client H since the start of the monitoring up to the end 
of the previous week to highly sensitive and private information in EPRs from lost/stolen smart cards”
loop ( MIS_SC = 0, number of elements in MIS_SC_LIST )
Get the time TIME_1 for when the missing smart card MIS_SC was 
used the last time before its owner noticed that it was missing
Get the time TIME_2 for when the missing smart card MIS_SC was registered as missing and made unusable 
From ACC_LIST create ILL_ACC_HSP_LIST which is a list of all illegal accesses to highly sensitive and private info 
in EPRs that occurred between TIME_1 and TIME_2 from MIS_SC
loop ( ILL_ACC_HSP = 0, number of elements in ILL_ACC_HSP_LIST ) 
TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = 0
NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = 0
NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP + 1
TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP = TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP + NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP
KCH-ILL-ACC-SC = KCH-ILL-ACC-SC + TOTAL_NUM_ILL_ACC_HSP
Fig. 24. The sequence diagram “Calculation of KCH-ILL-ACC-SC”
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The key indicator 
KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC
is lower or higher than it 
should be
Moderate
The key indicator 
KILL-ACC-SC
is lower or higher than it 
should be
The key indicator 
KHSP-EPR-INFO
is lower or higher than it 
should be
The key indicator 
KSP-EPR-INFO


















Insufficient competence in classifying 
unauthorized accesses as approved 
or not approved
Media retriever 


























Fig. 25. CORAS threat diagram providing a high-level overview of the impact of the proposed implementation of the monitoring infrastructure
for the different composite key indicators on the correctness of PBO-A8’
IX. EVALUATE CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
To evaluate whether the composite key indicators have construct validity, we re-do the risk analysis from Step
2.2 with the asset “Fulﬁllment of PBO-A8” replaced by the asset “Correctness of PBO-A8’.” We have established
that the monitoring infrastructure described in Step 2–4 is suitable for monitoring the relevant part of business.
With the designs of the key indicators speciﬁed in the previous step, we want to identify in this step whether the
proposed implementation of the monitoring infrastructure results in any new unacceptable risks. More precisely,
we want to identify unacceptable risks towards the correctness of the reformulated precise business objective that
are the result of threats to criteria for construct validity that the different composite key indicators need to fulﬁll.
We evaluate the construct validity of the composite key indicators based on the criteria given in Section III-F.
A high-level overview of the result of the risk analysis is given in the CORAS threat diagram in Fig. 25. In the
referenced threat scenarios in Figs. 26 – 30, risk to the correctness of the different composite key indicators have
been documented. For the key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO, Client H is of the opinion that their
39
The key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO are lower or higher than they should be
o1 [Possible]
The interval 
[0.1,0.3] used to 
calculate the key 
indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO
and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO is 
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Fig. 26. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicators KPR-SP-EPR-INFO and KPR-HSP-EPR-INFO are lower or higher than they should be,”
referred to in Fig. 25
correctness may be affected if the interval [0.1, 0.3] used to calculate the two key indicators is either too low or
too high. This is an example of violation of the stability criterion, since the selection of the interval is the result
of human decisions, i.e., expert judgments. For the two composite key indicators, no threats towards the deﬁnition
and instrument validity of the composite key indicators are identiﬁed.
In the case of the key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC, Client H is of the opinion that its correctness may be
affected if the employees who classify unauthorized accesses as approved or not approved at X-ray and Blood test
analysis are incompetent and fraudulent, respectively. Both these cases are examples of violation of the stability
criterion, since the classiﬁcation of unauthorized accesses as approved or not approved involves human decisions.
Moreover, Client H is worried that the sensor SCH-ACC-INFO-EPR (represented as a non-human threat in Fig. 27) may
be unstable with respect to logging of accesses to information in EPRs. This is an example of violation of the
instrument validity criterion. Besides the stability and instrument validity criteria, deﬁnition validity should also be
evaluated. In our case, we say that a key indicator has deﬁnition validity if its design is clear and unambiguous
so that the key indicator can be implemented correctly. The only thing that is not clear and unambiguous with
respect to the design of KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is how unauthorized accesses should be classiﬁed as approved or not
approved. Since this has already been covered during the evaluation of the stability criterion, we do not pursue this
issue further.
In the case of the key indicators KSP-EPR-INFO and KHSP-EPR-INFO, Client H is worried that the correctness of
KSP-EPR-INFO may be affected if employees at Blood test analysis either fail to identify data leakages of sensitive
and private information from EPRs or incorrectly classify sensitive and private information obtained from EPRs
as the sources of data leakages, when no such data leakages have occurred. Moreover, Client H is worried that
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The key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 27. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KNOT-APP-UNAUTH-ACC is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
the correctness of KHSP-EPR-INFO may be affected if employees at X-ray commit the same errors when it comes
to highly sensitive and private information in EPRs. Both these cases are examples of violation of the stability
criterion. In the case of instrument validity, Client H is worried that the media retriever services employed by Blood
test analysis and X-ray are not able to collect the information necessary for detecting data leakages. Client H is also
worried that the two composite key indicators may violate the deﬁnition validity criterion. The design speciﬁcations
of the two composite key indicators are not clear and unambiguous with respect to how data leakages should be
identiﬁed. In both speciﬁcations, it is up to the employees investigating potential data leakages to decide. Since
this has already been covered during the evaluation of the stability criterion, we do not pursue this issue further.
In the case of the key indicator KILL-ACC-SC, Client H is worried that its correctness may be affected by health-
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The key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 28. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KHSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
care professionals not having a perfect recollection of when they used their smart cards the last time before losing
it. By not having a perfect recollection, accesses to information in EPRs may incorrectly be classiﬁed as legal or
illegal accesses. This is an example of violation of the stability criterion. For the composite key indicator, no threats
towards the deﬁnition and instrument validity of the composite key indicator are identiﬁed.
In Table XII the risks R19 – R30 have been plotted according to their likelihoods and consequences. As we can
see from the table, the two risks R26 and R28 are unacceptable. This means that all the composite key indicators
with the exceptions of KSP-EPR-INFO and KHSP-EPR-INFO have construct validity. As a ﬁrst step to making these two
risks acceptable, Client H ﬁnds it necessary to gain more knowledge on the suitability of the two media retriever
services. If the two risks do not become acceptable as a result of this, further treatment will be necessary in order
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The key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than it should be
The employee 
at Blood test analysis fails 
to classify sensitive and private 
information from a patient’s EPR 
as the source of infomation 
retrieved from the traditional 
media or the Internet
[Unlikely]
R28: The key indicator 
KSP-EPR-INFO





at Blood test analysis 
incorrectly classifies sensitive 
and private information from a 
patient’s EPR as the source 
infomation retrieved from the 
traditional media 
or the Internet 
[Rare]
A data leakage of 
sensitive and private 
information that has not 
occurred at Blood test 
analysis is identified 
[Rare]
The media retriever 
service of Blood test analysis 
fails to collect information 
relevant for identifying data 
leakages of sensitive and private 
information
[Possible]
R27: The key indicator 
KSP-EPR-INFO
is higher than it should be
[Rare]
0.2
The media retriever 
service of X-ray fails to 
collect information relevant for 
identifying data leakages of 




A data leakage 
of sensitive and private 
information that has 
occurred at Blood test 
analysis is not identified 
[Unlikely]
A data leakage 
of sensitive and private 
information that has 


















Fig. 29. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KSP-EPR-INFO is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
for the two key indicators KSP-EPR-INFO and KHSP-EPR-INFO to achieve construct validity. Such treatments may involve
replacing the media retriever services of Blood test analysis and X-ray, or introducing an additional media retriever
service for each of the two hospitals. In the latter case this means that Blood test analysis and X-ray will each
identify data leakages based on information which combines results from two media retriever services.
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The key indicator KILL-ACC-SC is lower or higher than it should be
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Fig. 30. The referenced threat scenario “The key indicator KILL-ACC-SC is lower or higher than is should be,” referred to in Fig. 25
TABLE XII
THE RISK EVALUATION MATRIX FROM TABLE XI WITH THE RISKS R19 – R30 INSERTED
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To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other method for the design of valid key indicators to monitor the
fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of key indicators.
There is a tool-framework called Mozart [23] that uses a model-driven approach to create monitoring applications
that employs key performance indicators. We do not focus on the implementation of key indicators, but we specify
what is needed for implementing them. The work in [23] also differs from our work by not designing indicators
from scratch, but by mining them from a data repository during the design cycle.
An important part of our method is the assessment of the validity of the key indicators we design. Our approach
to assessing validity is inspired by research conducted within the software engineering domain. As previously
explained, there is however no agreement upon what constitutes a valid software metric [8]. A number of the
software metrics validation approaches advocate the use of measurement theory [24][25][26] in the validation (see
e.g., [9][27][28]). Measurement theory is a branch of applied mathematics that is useful in measurement and data
analysis. The fundamental idea of this theory is that there is a difference between measurements and the attribute
being measured. Thus, in order to draw conclusions about the attribute, there is a need to understand the nature of the
correspondence between the attribute and the measurements. In [29], an approach that relies on measurement theory
for the validation of indicators is presented. This approach uses measurement theory to validate the meaningfulness
of IT security risk indicators.
Measurement theory has been criticized of being too rigid and restrictive in a practical measurement setting.
Briand et al. [27] advocate a pragmatic approach to measurement theory in software engineering. The authors
show that even if their approach may lead to violations of the strict prescriptions and proscriptions of measurement
theory, the consequences are small compared to the beneﬁts. Another approach that takes a pragmatic approach to
measurement theory is [28]. Here, the authors propose a framework for evaluating software metrics. The applicability
of the framework is demonstrated by applying it on a bug count metric.
There exist also approaches that assess the validity of speciﬁc sets of key indicators. For instance, in [30] the
validity of indicators of ﬁrm technological capability is assessed, while the validity of indicators of patent value is
assessed in [31].
There are several approaches that focus on measuring the achievement of goals. One example is COBIT [32],
which is a framework for IT management and IT governance. The framework provides an IT governance model that
helps in delivering value from IT and understanding and managing the risks associated with IT. In the governance
model, business goals are aligned with IT goals, while metrics, in the form of leading and lagging indicators [33],
and maturity models are used to measure the achievement of the IT goals. In our approach we do not focus on the
value that the use of IT has with respect to the business objectives. On the other hand, the risk that the use of IT
has with respect to the business objectives is important. In our context, IT is relevant in the sense of providing the
infrastructure necessary for monitoring the part of business that needs to fulﬁll the business objectives. In Step 6
of our method we identify risks that may result from the use of the monitoring infrastructure with respect to the
business objectives.
Another way to measure the achievement of goals is by the use of the Goal-Question-Metric [34][35] (GQM)
approach. Even though GQM originated as an approach for measuring achievement in software development, it can
also be used in other contexts where the purpose is to measure achievement of goals. In GQM, business goals are
used to drive the identiﬁcation of measurement goals. These goals do not necessarily measure the fulﬁllment of the
business goals, but they should always measure something that is of interest to the business. Each measurement
goal is reﬁned into questions, while metrics are deﬁned for answering each question. No speciﬁc method, beyond
reviews, is speciﬁed for validating whether the correct questions and metrics have been identiﬁed. The data provided
by the metrics are interpreted and analyzed with respect to the measurement goal in order to conclude whether it
is achieved or not. One of the main differences between our method and GQM is that we characterize precisely
what it means to achieve a goal/objective. In GQM, however, this may be a question of interpretation.
In the literature, key indicators are mostly referred to in the context of measuring business performance. There
exist numerous approaches to performance measurement. Some of these are presented in [36]. Regardless of the
approach being used, the organization must translate their business objectives/goals into a set of key performance
indicators in order to measure performance. An approach that is widely used [37] is balanced scorecard [5]. This
approach translates the company’s vision into four ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial perspectives. For each perspective a set
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of business objectives (strategic goals) and their corresponding key performance indicators are identiﬁed. However,
the implementation of a balanced scorecard is not necessarily straight forward. In [38], Neely and Bourne identify
several reasons for the failure of measurement initiatives such as balanced scorecards. One problem is that the
identiﬁed measures do not measure fulﬁllment of the business objectives, while another problem is that measures
are identiﬁed without putting much thought into how the data must be extracted in order to compute the measures.
The ﬁrst problem can be addressed in Step 4 of our method, while the second problem can be addressed in Step
3 and Step 5 of our method. In Step 3 we identify the sensors to be deployed in the relevant part of business,
while in Step 5 we present the kinds of data that needs to be extracted from these sensors in order to compute the
measures.
Much research has been done in the ﬁeld of data quality. The problem of data quality is also recognized within the
ﬁeld of key indicators [39][40]. In [41] a survey on how data quality initiatives are linked with organizational key
performance indicators in Australian organizations is presented. This survey shows that a number of organizations
do not have data quality initiatives linked to their key indicators. Data quality should be taken into account when
designing key indicators, since the use of key indicators based on poor quality data may lead to bad business
decisions, which again may greatly harm the organization.
In [42][43] the problem of key indicators computed from uncertain events is investigated. The motivation for this
work is to understand the uncertainty of individual key indicators used in business intelligence. The authors use key
indicators based on data from multiple domains as examples. In these papers a model for expressing uncertainty is
proposed, and a tool for visualizing the uncertain key indicators is presented.
XI. CONCLUSION
In [1] we presented the method ValidKI (Valid Key Indicators) for designing key indicators to monitor the
fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of key indicators.
ValidKI facilitates the design of a set of key indicators that is valid with respect to a business objective. In this
report we have presented the improved and consolidated version of the method.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no other method for the design of valid key indicators to monitor the
fulﬁllment of business objectives with particular focus on quality and ICT-supported monitoring of key indicators.
The applicability of our method has been demonstrated on a large, realistic example case addressing the use of
electronic patient records in a hospital environment.
Even though ValidKI has been demonstrated on a large, realistic example case there is still a need to apply
ValidKI in a real-world industrial setting in order to evaluate properly to what extent it has the characteristics
speciﬁed in the introduction. By applying ValidKI in such a setting we will for instance gain more knowledge
regarding whether it is time and resource efﬁcient.
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making use of a validation authority service for validating electronic certiﬁcates and
signatures.
Keywords Trust management · Modeling · Electronic certiﬁcates · Electronic
procurement
1 Introduction
Trust is often linked to the notion of subjective probability. For example, inspired by
[5, 10], [11] deﬁnes trust as the subjective probability by which an actor, the trustor,
expects that another entity, the trustee, performs a given transaction on which its
welfare depends. Unless you are a psychologist, subjective probabilities (or beliefs)
are not very interesting as long as they are studied in isolation. In computer science
we are interested in trust or the more general notion of belief only as long as it has an
impact on the factual (or objective) behavior of a computer system or computer-based
facility. Moreover, within computer science we are often more interested in the trust
of an organization than the individual trust of a human being.
In order to analyze something we need a clear understanding of this “something”
(or target) to be analyzed. This target is often captured in the form of a model. Unfor-
tunately, modeling approaches of industrial maturity targeting the computer industry
(like UML [13]) do not have the expressiveness required to fully cover the aspects of
relevance for a trust analysis. This motivated us to develop a method for trust analysis
based on UML sequence diagrams extended with constructs for capturing
1. beliefs of agents (humans or organizations) in the form of subjective probabilities;
2. factual (or objective) probabilities of systems which may contain agents whose
behavior is described in terms of subjective probabilities;
3. trust decisions in terms of policy rules with the deontic modalities obligation,
prohibition and permission.
This paper reports on experiences from using this method for trust analysis (ﬁrst
proposed in [17]) in an industrial project focusing on the modeling and analysis of a
public electronic (eProcurement) system making use of a validation authority service
for validating electronic certiﬁcates and signatures. The trust analysis was conducted
on behalf of Det Norske Veritas (DNV) in the autumn of 2008. DNV’s goal was to
obtain a better understanding of the potential usefulness of a service they offered
for supporting trust-based decisions in systems which rely on electronically signed
documents. The performance of the trust analysis is evaluated with respect to a set of
evaluation criteria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 introduces our modeling ap-
proach which is UML sequence diagrams extended with constructs for probabilistic
choice and belief. It also gives a brief introduction on how to specify trust policies to
ensure and enforce the desirable behavior of a system. Section 3 presents the method
for trust analysis, that builds on the modeling and policy speciﬁcation approaches in-
troduced in Sect. 2. Section 4 outlines the industrial case we used to test the feasibil-
ity of the trust analysis method. It also presents a set of evaluation criteria. Section 5
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presents the use of the trust analysis method in the industrial case. Section 6 presents
the results from the evaluation based on the criteria identiﬁed in Sect. 4. And ﬁnally,
in Sect. 7 we draw the main conclusion and present related work.
2 Modeling approach
UML 2.1 sequence diagrams [13] are widely used for the modeling and speciﬁca-
tion of information systems; in particular to capture communication or interaction
between system entities.
In this section we give a brief introduction to UML 2.1 sequence diagrams and the
constructs for probabilistic choice and belief proposed in [18]. We also explain how
sequence diagrams can be enriched to capture policy rules with deontic modalities.
We use a running example: Alice purchases items on the Internet. For many of the
purchases, Alice needs to send advance payment to the seller of the item. In these
cases Alice runs a risk of not receiving the item after paying for it. The challenge
is to model the trust considerations made by Alice, as well as their impact on the
observable behavior.
2.1 Basic constructs as in the UML standard
The diagram purchase in Fig. 1 address the situation where Alice has found an item,
with an acceptable price, that she might be interested in purchasing. The keyword sd
(sequence diagram) in front of the diagram name marks the diagram as a sequence
diagram. Each entity modeled by the diagram is represented by a dashed, vertical line
called a lifeline, where the box at its top speciﬁes which entity the lifeline represents,
its name as well as its type separated by a colon. If one lifeline represents several
entities with different names but of the same type, we only specify the type. Entities
interact with each other through the transmission and reception of messages, which
are shown as horizontal arrows from the transmitting lifeline to the receiving lifeline.
For each message we distinguish between two events; a transmission event, repre-
sented by the arrow tail, and a reception event, represented by the arrow head. The
transmission events occur, of course, before the corresponding receive events. The
events on each single lifeline are ordered in time from top to bottom.
According to Fig. 1, Alice starts by requesting a tender from the seller. The seller
sends in response a tender, signed with his electronic ID (eID) to Alice. Based on this
signed tender, Alice decides whether she trusts the seller to send the item after she has
sent the advance payment. Alice may behave in two alternative ways, with respect
to this decision. She can either send the advance payment, or she can cancel the
deal. This is represented by the outermost alt operator, which speciﬁes alternative
behavior. A dashed horizontal line separates the alternative behaviors. If Alice trusts
the seller and sends the advance payment, the scenario continues in two alternative
ways. This is represented by the innermost alt operator. Either the seller sends the
item to Alice, or the seller does not. In the latter case Alice is forced to write off the
money she paid for the item.
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Fig. 1 The sequence diagram
purchase
Fig. 2 The probabilistic
sequence diagram purchase2
2.2 Construct for probabilistic choice
The diagram purchase in Fig. 1 speciﬁes behaviors that may occur, but not how
often or with what probability. Alice interacts with several sellers, and the scenario in
Fig. 1 will therefore be repeated several times. We want to model how Alice behaves
with respect to all these sellers. For this purpose we introduce the palt construct for
probabilistic choice. By using the palt construct we can say something about the
probability of a speciﬁc behavior.
The diagram purchase2 in Fig. 2 is a probabilistic version of purchase in Fig. 1.
The numbers occurring after palt in the upper corner of the operator frame specify
the probabilities of the various alternatives. In the outermost palt the ﬁrst number
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Fig. 3 The subjective sequence
diagram trust
states that the scenario of the ﬁrst operand occurs with a probability of 0.7, which
means that this behavior occurs in 70% of the cases, while the second number states
that the scenario of the second operand occurs with a probability of 0.3, which means
that this behavior occurs in 30% of the cases. Furthermore, for the innermost palt
operator the ﬁrst operand has a probability of 0.8 of occurring, while the second
operand has a probability of 0.2 of occurring. The probabilities in this diagram are
factual in the sense that they are meant to reﬂect observable probabilistic behavior of
the system.
2.3 Belief construct
It is clear that Alice behaves based on how much she trusts the seller of the item,
but this notion of trust is not really reﬂected in the diagrams we have seen so far.
They capture that she makes a choice, but not whether this choice is based on trust or
something else. We want to model explicitly to what degree she needs to trust a seller
before she sends advance payment.
Trust is the belief of a trustor that a trustee will perform a speciﬁc transaction on
which the welfare of the trustor depends. Often the trustor will only expect the trustee
to perform the transaction if another event has already occurred. In our example this
event would be the sending of advance payment from Alice to the seller. Here, Alice
is the trustor, while the seller is the trustee. Alice believes that there is a certain
probability that the seller will send the item.
To model trust considerations we use so-called subjective sequence diagrams. Sub-
jective sequence diagrams captures the subjective belief of an actor. Syntactically,
subjective sequence diagrams differ from the ordinary sequence diagrams in two re-
spects. Firstly, ssd (subjective sequence diagram) is used instead of sd to mark the
diagram. Secondly, we annotate exactly one lifeline head with the keyword subj.
This identiﬁes the annotated entity as the subject, meaning that the diagram is used to
capture this entity’s subjective belief. According to the subjective sequence diagram
trust in Fig. 3 Alice believes that the probability of receiving the item after sending
the payment to the seller Bob is 0.8, and that the probability of not receiving the item
is 0.2.
Semantically, a subjective sequence diagram aims to capture the belief of some
entity like a person, an organization, or even a computer to the extent a computer may
be said to believe. An ordinary sequence diagram, on the other hand, aims to capture
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Fig. 4 The objective sequence diagram purchase3 and the subjective sequence diagram trust
the factual reality, i.e. how things really are, independent of subjective beliefs, and
such diagrams are in the following often referred to as objective sequence diagrams.
2.4 Combining objective and subjective diagrams
In the previous section we showed how we can model Alice’s trust in a seller using
subjective sequence diagrams. In this section we explain how subjective diagrams
relate to the objective ones. Alice will only send payment if her trust in the seller is
sufﬁciently high, i.e. if it reaches a certain threshold. The threshold says how much
trust Alice needs to have in the seller in order to send him advance payment. In the
diagram purchase3 in Fig. 4, the threshold is represented as guards. A guard is a
Boolean expression within square brackets. It constrains the choice of operand. An
operand can only be chosen if its guard evaluates to true. We can see that the two
guards refer to the variable trust.p. Here, trust refers to the subjective diagram
trust in Fig. 4. Unlike the diagram in Fig. 3, which captures the trust with respect to
one speciﬁc seller, this diagram uses the variable p for the probability of the palt
operands. This variable can be referred to in the objective diagram, since it is an
out parameter of the subjective diagram. The trust.p expression in the objective
diagram refers to this output value. The guards in the objective diagram specify that
Alice sends advance payment if she believes that the probability of receiving the item
is greater than or equal to 0.5. This will happen in 70% of the cases, since the operand
where this guard holds has the probability of 0.7.
2.5 Policy speciﬁcation
A policy is a set of rules that determines choices in the behavior of a system [19],
and is used in policy based management. Each rule determines a system choice of
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Fig. 5 Example of a policy rule
behavior, where a given trust level is a decisive factor for each choice. Enforcement
of the given rules aims to ensure the optimal balance of the risks and opportunities
that are imposed by trust based decisions within the system.
To formalize the policy the trust analysis method, proposed in [17], uses Deon-
tic STAIRS [21], which is a language for expressing policies, and based on UML
sequence diagrams. Deontic STAIRS has the expressiveness to specify constraints
in the form of obligations, prohibitions, and permissions, corresponding to the ex-
pressiveness of standard deontic logic [12]. Such constraints are normative rules that
describe the desired system behavior. This reﬂects a key feature of policies, namely
that they “deﬁne choices in behavior in terms of the conditions under which prede-
ﬁned operations or actions can be invoked rather than changing the functionality of
the actual operations themselves” [20]. Furthermore, Deontic STAIRS supports the
speciﬁcation of triggers that deﬁne the circumstances under which the various rules
apply. In particular, the policy triggers can specify the required trust levels for a par-
ticular choice of behavior to be constrained.
Figure 5 shows an example of a policy rule in Deontic STAIRS for the scenario
described in this section. The keyword rule in the upper left corner indicates that
the diagram speciﬁes a policy rule, while obligedToPay is the name of the rule. The
diagram consists of two parts, a trigger and an interaction that is the operand of a
deontic modality.
The ﬁrst operator with keyword trigger speciﬁes the circumstances under which
the rule applies and consists of an interaction and a condition. The former refers
to a scenario such that when it occurs, the rule applies. In this case the scenario
is the reception by Alice of a signed tender. The condition of the trigger limits the
applicability of the rule to a set of system states. In this case it refers to the states in
which the relevant trust level is 0.5 or higher.
The second operator with keyword obligation shows the modality of the rule,
while its operand speciﬁes the behavior that is constrained by the rule. In this case,
the relevant behavior is that Alice sends payment to the seller. According to oblig-
edToPay, she is obliged to do so, given that the trigger is fulﬁlled. On the other
hand, if the keyword had been prohibition then Alice would have been prohibited
from sending payment, while if the keyword had been permission then Alice could
choose whether or not to send payment.
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Fig. 6 Overview of the method
proposed in [17]. The right-hand
side of the ﬁgure shows the
sub-steps of the second step
3 The trust analysis method
In this section we give a brief overview of the trust analysis method that was intro-
duced in [17]. For further details we refer to [17] and of course Sect. 5 of this paper
which describes how the method was used in the industrial project on which this
paper reports.
Figure 6 shows an overview of the method. There are three major steps. The ﬁrst
step is to model the target, the second step is to analyze the target and the third step
is to capture policies to optimize the behavior of the target based on the knowledge
acquired in the ﬁrst two steps.
Step 1. Modeling of target. In order to analyze a system, we ﬁrst need to understand
the system under analysis, including the behavior of its users. A major goal of the ﬁrst
step and the resulting models is to provide such an understanding. However, as most
systems are highly complex, it is neither feasible nor desirable to take every detail
into account. Therefore the target should be modeled at a level of abstraction suitable
for the analysis to come. Thus, the models should only capture the aspects of the
system that enhances our understanding of the decisions that are taken on the basis
of trust and the considerations that lie behind these decisions, as well as the resulting
system behavior and outcomes that are relevant.
As explained in Sect. 2, the modeling approach is based on UML sequence dia-
grams. The reason is that trust is mainly of relevance in the context of interactions
between different entities, and sequence diagrams are well suited for modeling in-
teractions. Moreover, UML sequence diagrams are fairly easy to understand at an
intuitive level. This is important, as the models developed in the ﬁrst step should
serve as a point of focus for discussions and as an aid in communication between the
analysts and participants throughout the analysis. The extensions of UML sequence
diagrams provided by subjective STAIRS [18] ensures that the trust considerations
behind decisions can be captured in the models, as well as the resulting system be-
havior.
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Step 2. Analysis of target. After a suitable model of the target has been established,
the next step is to conduct the actual analysis. This involves investigating the current
system behavior and the way in which trust-based decisions are being made, as well
as potential alternative behaviors. The aim is to obtain a good understanding of the
risks and opportunities involved. The analysis is divided into four sub-steps.
Step 2.1. Identify critical decision points. In this sub-step critical decision points
that will be further investigated are identiﬁed. This will typically be points where
actors in the system make trust-based decisions. But it may also be points where one
could beneﬁt from introducing new trust-based decisions. For example, if time is a
critical factor, it may be more important to make a quick decision than to make the
optimal decision. In such cases, it may be better to allow actors to make decisions
based on trust than to insist on more time-consuming decision procedures.
Step 2.2. Evaluate well-foundedness of trust. Trust involves a subjective estimate
of the potential behavior of another entity. The second sub-step of Step 2 consists
of evaluating to what degree the subjective estimates reﬂect reality. In the industrial
project on which this paper reports this step was not relevant since our task was not
to evaluate an existing trust solution, but rather to develop a policy from scratch.
Step 2.3. Estimate impact of alternative behavior. In this sub-step the impact of
various alternative behaviors that the system may potentially perform is investigated
with respect to risks and opportunities. The goal is to get an understanding not only of
the current “as-is” system behavior, which may not be optimal, but also of potential
alternatives. Typically, this involves asking “what if” questions about the system, and
capturing the answers in models. For example: what would be the overall effect on the
system behavior if a certain actor was more (or less) willing to engage in interactions
with other entities? What happens if a different policy is applied when making a
certain decision?
Step 2.4. Evaluate and compare alternative behavior. In the ﬁnal sub-step, the
different alternative behaviors that were identiﬁed and investigated in the previous
step are evaluated and compared. The purpose is to identify behaviors that should be
sought or avoided.
Step 3. Capturing a policy to optimize target. The ﬁnal step of the method proposed
in [17] consists of using the obtained knowledge about preferred behavior to form
policies to ensure and enforce the desirable behavior.
4 The industrial project on electronic procurement
We now present the industrial project in which the trust analysis method outlined in
Sect. 3 was applied. The trust analysis method was used to model and analyze a pub-
lic eProcurement system, which makes use of a Validation Authority (VA) service
for validating electronic certiﬁcates and signatures. We ﬁrst present the public ePro-
curement system, before describing how this system can make use of the VA service.
Then we present criteria for evaluating the trust analysis method.
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4.1 Public electronic procurement
Public eProcurement is used by public authorities within the EU to award public work
contracts, public supply contracts, and public service contracts to economic operators
[16]. We consider only the open procedure for individual contracts as speciﬁed in
[3]. In the open procedure, any interested economic operator may submit a tender.
The procedure consists of three phases: eNotiﬁcation, eTendering, and eAwarding.
In the eNotiﬁcation phase a procurement ofﬁcer1 creates a call for tenders. This call
speciﬁes the requirements of the contracting authority for the goods/services/works
to be procured. In the eTendering phase, interested economic operators will create
tenders containing legal, ﬁnancial, and technical information. Before submitting the
tender electronically, one or more persons representing the economic operator need
to sign the tender with their electronic IDs (eIDs), issued by Certiﬁcate Authorities
(CAs). When received by the system, the system will examine whether the tender
is compliant with the requirements deﬁned in the call, including examining whether
the digital signatures in the tender are valid. The eAwarding phase begins after the
deadline for submission has expired. In this phase the contract is awarded based on
an evaluation of the received tenders.
4.2 The validation authority service
For the eProcurement system it is important to be able to accept electronically signed
tenders from electronic operators from all over Europe, regardless of the eID used by
the operator. Due to the potential large number of CAs, the technical validation of
eIDs and digital signatures has some challenges with respect to scaling [14], but the
real problem is the assessment of the risk implied by accepting a digital signature.
Here, one particular concern is that an economic operator can refute the validity of
the offer stated in the submitted tender, if awarded the contract. The eProcurement
system can ensure that this risk is acceptable by making an assessment of the signa-
ture quality and accepting only those of a certain quality. The higher the quality is,
the harder it would be for an economic operator to refute the validity of a submitted
tender. The quality of a signature [15] can be decided from the quality of the eID,
which is derived from the certiﬁcate policy of the CA, and the cryptography used.
A certiﬁcate policy may be written in a foreign language and may refer to a foreign
legislation, so with a large number of CAs, the contracting authorities will have a
hard time determining the quality of digital signatures. Thus, it will be hard if not im-
possible for the contracting authorities to have agreements with all the CAs on which
it may want to rely, which again limits the number of economic operators that can
submit tenders. A solution to this, as proposed in [15], is to use a VA as the single
trust anchor, as shown in Fig. 7. In the ﬁgure we can see that the VA supports a num-
ber of CAs. For each CA that it supports, the VA is able to assess the quality of the
eIDs issued by this CA and the signatures produced with those eIDs. A relying party,
in this case the eProcurement system, can then validate and assess the quality of the
1Representative for the contracting authorities.
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Fig. 7 Figure from [15]. The ﬁgure shows how a relying party (in this case a public eProcurement system)
may use a VA service to validate and assess the quality of signatures in signed documents (in this case
signed tenders)
signature2 in a signed tender by issuing a request to the VA. If the eID used to create
the signature has been issued by a supported CA, the VA will use the CA to validate
the eID, while the quality of the signature is computed by the VA by applying the
formula
Signature Quality = eID Quality + Hash Quality
+ Public Key Crypto Key Length Quality,
which will assign a Signature Quality value from 0 to 20 according to criteria fur-
ther speciﬁed in [15]. This value is then compared to the minimum required quality
level requested by the eProcurement system. If the signature is valid, meaning that
the technical validation of the eID and the signature was successful, and the signature
has sufﬁcient quality, the VA will give the tender a trusted verdict. Otherwise, the VA
will give the tender a not trusted verdict.3 By trusting the VA and its assessments, the
eProcurement system is able to trust any CA that the VA handles. Hence, the ePro-
curement system can support a large number of CAs and it gets a one-stop shopping
service for veriﬁcation of digital signatures and eIDs and quality assessment of digital
signatures.
2It is possible to sign a tender with more than one signature. The VA is able to make an overall quality
assessment of all these signatures.
3The VA can also give an inconclusive verdict. This will happen in the cases when the VA cannot validate
the eID and/or signature and/or cannot assess the quality of the signature.
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4.3 Evaluation criteria
A major objective with applying the trust analysis method in the industrial project
was to get an idea of how well the method performs in a practical setting. To do
so we need a set of evaluation criteria and they are characterized and motivated in
the following. The criteria are general in the sense that they do not target the ePro-
curement system or VA service speciﬁcally; they are equally valid for other kinds of
trust-related infrastructures on which the trust analysis method may be applied.
When evaluating a method for trust analysis there are of course many concerns.
To make sure that we covered the most important concerns we started by identifying
groups of stakeholders of relevance for the method. What is important for one group
may of course be less so for another group. We identiﬁed three main groups of stake-
holders, and the evaluation criteria are based on the point of view for each of these
groups. First, the customers are those who pay for the analysis. Typically, this will
be managers and decision makers. They do not necessarily take part in the analysis
process themselves, but will use the results of the analysis as a basis for making policy
decisions. Second, the analysts are those who will conduct the analysis (process) and
document results. They know the analysis method, but cannot be assumed to know
the particular target system at the start of the analysis. Third, the participants are
people such as decision makers, system users, developers, or engineers with whom
the analysts interact during the analysis process. We now present evaluation criteria
classiﬁed according to the stakeholder group for which they are most relevant.
For the customer of a trust analysis, the overall goal is to make the right trust policy
decisions. This requires a good understanding of the outcome of potential alternative
trust policies. Hence:
EC1: The trust analysis should provide the customers with a good basis for making
trust policy decisions. This means that sufﬁcient information about the impact of
the potential alternatives must be provided.
Clearly, the cost of the analysis needs to be justiﬁed with respect to the beneﬁt for the
customer. Hence:
EC2: The trust analysis should be cost effective.
The task of the analyst is to conduct the trust analysis and to document the ﬁnd-
ings within the allotted time and cost frame. This means that the trust analysis method
should be sufﬁciently simple to be carried out within a reasonable time frame. How-
ever, as this is implied by the requirement expressed in EC2, we do not include this
as a separate criterion. On the other hand, the analyst would like to document the
ﬁndings, and in particular all assumptions and constraints on which their validity
depends, to cover him/herself as much as possible. Hence:
EC3: The modeling approach should be sufﬁciently expressive to capture the in-
formation, assumptions, and constraints of relevance.
The participant is supposed to communicate her or his knowledge in such a way
that the analysis will result in correct models of the target, and the models should
serve as a means of communication between the analysts and participants. It is there-
fore important that the models are comprehensible for the participants when properly
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assisted by an analyst. Otherwise, it will be hard for them to identify shortcomings
and errors. Hence:
EC4: The models should be comprehensible for the participants of the analysis.
5 Trust analysis in the industrial project
In this section we present how the trust analysis method as described in Sect. 3 was
applied in the industrial case outlined in Sect. 4.
5.1 Step 1. Modeling the target
The trust analysis focused on the scenarios where the eProcurement system makes
decisions based on trust, i.e. where it is decided whether a received tender should be
trusted to be authentic or not. On the one hand, it was an objective to minimize the
risk that non-authentic tenders were accepted for further evaluation in the eAwarding
phase, as contracts should not be awarded based on non-authentic tenders. On the
other hand, it was also an objective to avoid authentic tenders being rejected without
further evaluation.
There was some discussion on whether non-authentic tenders actually represent a
real problem. Although this may not be the case today, it was agreed that this may
easily become a problem in the future, as the use of eProcurement increases. It is
easy to imagine cases where economic operators submit false tenders in a competi-
tor’s name. The motivation for this could be, for example, to ensure that minimum
requirements on the number of received tenders to enable eAwarding are fulﬁlled,
or to bind the competitor to unfavorable obligations, or to make the operator’s own
tender appear more attractive compared to a false costly tender.
The decision on whether to trust the authenticity of a tender is made in the eTender-
ing phase, while the selection of the best tender based on price, quality, and so on
from the tenders judged to be authentic is made in the eAwarding phase. Thus, for
the purpose of the trust analysis we are only interested in the behavior related to sub-
mission of tenders in the eTendering phase. The task in Step 1 is therefore to model
this behavior. Figure 8 shows the resulting overview diagram.
First the eProcurement system needs to ﬁnd the minimum quality level the sig-
natures have to comply with to be accepted to the eAwarding phase. This particular
process is described in more detail in the diagram chooseQualityPolicy in Fig. 9.4
Choosing the quality policy and communicating the choice to the VA is typically done
even before the eNotiﬁcation phase, since the economic operators must be informed
about the requirements for the submission. Note that the eNotiﬁcation phase is not
captured in the models, as it is of little relevance for the trust analysis.
After the quality policy has been set an economic operator may submit a tender t
to the eProcurement system. This is represented by the message submitTender(t)
in the diagram. The eProcurement system will validate the signatures of this tender by
4Theref construct is a reference to another diagram. Its meaning is the same as we would get by inserting
the contents of the referred diagram at the place of the reference.
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Fig. 8 A simpliﬁed description
of how submitted tenders are
handled by the eProcurement
system
using the VA service validateSignatures(t). The VA will then use the required
minimum quality level to decide whether the signature should be trusted or not.
The ﬁrst operand of the outermost alt operator describes the case where the ten-
der is reported trusted by the VA, and therefore is accepted for further evaluation
by the eProcurement system. The second operand describes the case where the ten-
der is reported as notTrusted or as inconclusive, and therefore rejected by the
eProcurement system.
We now explain how the choice of quality policy level performed by the eProcure-
ment system is captured in the models. Intuitively, the process of choosing one of the
215 quality policy levels can be described as follows: the eProcurement system uses a
threshold value that speciﬁes the least amount of trust that is needed to accept the risk
of accepting a non-authentic tender. In order to balance the risk of accepting a non-
authentic tender against the desire not to reject authentic tenders, the eProcurement
system chooses the lowest quality policy level needed to ensure that its trust exceeds
the threshold.
Figure 9 describes the process of choosing a suitable quality policy based on trust.
The diagram chooseQualityPolicy shows that there are 21 alternative quality policies
from which the eProcurement system may choose. After choosing the quality policy
in terms of an assignment, the eProcurement system communicates to the VA service
the chosen policy, as shown by the setQualityPolicy(qp) message at the bottom
of the diagram.
The trust level which the threshold is compared to, is captured by expressions
of the form trust(j).p, where j is one of the 21 quality policy levels; this value
is bound to the input parameter qp of the subjective diagram trust in Fig. 9. So,
5Remember that the quality policy scale is from 0 to 20.
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Fig. 9 chooseQualityPolicy and trust describe how the quality policy is found and set
for example, trust(7).p yields the return value of the subjective sequence diagram
trust, assuming quality policy level 7 is used. As shown by the lifeline head, the ePro-
curement system is the trustor. Therefore, the expression trust(j).p represents the
trust of the eProcurement system that a tender that receives a trusted verdict from the
VA service is indeed authentic, given that quality policy level j is used. Note that the
diagrams in Fig. 9 do not refer to one speciﬁc VA. Hence, trust(j).p may yield
different values for different VAs for the same tender.
5.2 Step 2. Analyzing the target
We now explain how the sub-steps of Step 2 were performed.
Step 2.1. Identify critical decision points. The only critical decision point that was
identiﬁed was the point where the signature quality policy is chosen by the eProcure-
ment system. The reason for this was that the analysis was performed from the point
of view of the eProcurement system, with the purpose of setting the right trust thresh-
old. This decision point is represented by the assignment in the diagram chooseQual-
ityPolicy in Fig. 9.
Step 2.2. Evaluate well-foundedness of trust. As explained in Sect. 3, this step was
not relevant in the project on which this paper reports. Our task was not to evaluate
one particular trust solution, but rather come up with a policy for how to choose
quality policy level.
Step 2.3. Estimate impact of alternative behavior. As the decision point under
analysis was the choice of quality policy level, the task of this sub-step was to estimate
the impact of choosing different levels with respect to how many of the authentic or
non-authentic tenders would receive the different verdicts from the VA service. This
would serve as a basis for the evaluation and comparison in the next sub-step. To do
so, we obviously needed to collect data. No historical data were available, and we
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Fig. 10 A simpliﬁed
description of how submitted
tenders are handled by the
eProcurement system, where
probabilities have been assigned
to alternatives
had to base ourselves on expert judgments. The experts were all employees of DNV
including the two co-authors from DNV. The data they provided is documented in
Figs. 10, 11, and Table 1. Figure 10 is a reﬁnement of Fig. 8. It is unchanged above
the palt operator. The ﬁrst operand of the palt operator represents the cases where
tenders are authentic, while the second alternative represents the cases where they
are non-authentic. We consider a tender to be authentic if it actually comes from the
company (EO) in whose name it has been submitted. This applies even if the employ-
ees who have signed the tender electronically is not strictly speaking authorized by
the company to do so, as long as the company acknowledges the tender and intends
to honor its commitment. To emphasize the fact that the EO is the only entity who ac-
tually knows whether the tender is authentic, we have used guards on the EO lifeline
in the model to represent whether a tender is authentic or not; the two cases are rep-
resented by the guards t.authentic==true and t.authentic==false, respec-
tively. The probability 0.95 assigned to the ﬁrst palt operand in Fig. 10 captures that
95% of received tenders are authentic. The remaining 5% are non-authentic and the
second palt operand is therefore assigned the probability 0.05. The two operands of
the palt operator in Fig. 10 refer to the same parameterized diagram (i.e. tenderVal-
idation in Fig. 11), as the behavior of the system for the two cases only differ with
respect to the probabilities for the alternatives. The tenderValidation diagram has
three input parameters; namely the quality policy (qp), the probability (x) of being
judged as trusted by the VA with respect to the selected quality policy, and similarly
the probability (y) of being judged as not trusted as opposed to inconclusive in the
other case. The ﬁrst operand of the outermost palt operator in tenderValidation
gives the probability for the tender being reported trusted by the VA, and therefore
is accepted for further evaluation by the eProcurement system. The second operand
shows the case where the tender is reported as notTrusted or as inconclusive,
and therefore rejected by the system; this will occur with probability 1 − x. Within
this alternative, the notTrusted verdict from the VA will occur with probability y,
while the inconclusive verdict will occur with probability 1 − y.
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Fig. 11 tenderValidation
shows how tenders are handled
The actual values of x and y depend on whether the tender is authentic or not.
Therefore the references to tenderValidation in the operands of the palt in Fig. 10
bind x and y to different entities. In the ﬁrst operand representing the cases where
tenders are authentic, x is bound to t1 and y is bound to r1. In the second operand
representing the cases where tenders are non-authentic, x is bound to t2 and y is
bound to r2. The intuitive meaning of t1, t2, r1, and r2 for a given quality policy
qp can be summarized as follows: t1 denotes the probability of assigning a trusted
verdict to an authentic tender; r1 denotes the conditional probability of assigning
a not trusted verdict (as opposed to inconclusive) for an authentic tender given that
a trusted verdict is not assigned; t2 denotes the probability of assigning a trusted
verdict to a non-authentic tender; r2 denotes the conditional probability of assigning
a not trusted verdict (as opposed to inconclusive) for a non-authentic tender given
that a trusted verdict is not assigned.
Table 1 shows how the representatives from DNV estimate that the probabilities
will vary according to the quality policy. Note that even though the VA service offers
a quality scale from 0 to 20, it was deemed sufﬁcient to analyze only ﬁve different
quality policy levels for the purpose of this analysis. Based on a consideration of
criteria for assigning quality levels, the following steps on the scale were selected
for analysis: 0, 5, 7, 10, and 20. The ﬁrst line in the table provides the values of
the parameters t1, r1, t2, and r2, in the diagram in Fig. 10, if the quality policy 0
(qp= 0) is chosen. The second line provides the values in the case where the quality
policy 5 is chosen and so on.
Given the data captured by Table 1, we calculated the probabilities for the possible
combinations of authenticity and verdicts, which amounted to a simple multiplication
of the probabilities assigned in the objective diagrams in Figs. 10 and 11. For exam-
ple, the probability that a given tender is authentic and receives a trusted verdict is
obtained by 0.95 × t1, while the probability that it is non-authentic and receives an
inconclusive verdict is obtained by 0.05× (1−t2)× (1−r2). Table 2 shows the re-
sult from these calculations (when inserting the values from Table 1 for the variables
t1, t2, r1, and r2).
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Table 1 The probabilities
corresponding to the quality
policy
Quality policy t1 r1 t2 r2
0 0.65 0.05 0.05 0.10
5 0.80 0.15 0.01 0.20
7 0.95 0.40 0.005 0.50
10 0.75 0.70 0.002 0.80
20 0.80 0.80 0.001 0.90
Table 2 Probabilities for authentic and non-authentic tenders
Quality policy Authentic Non-authentic
Trusted Not trusted Inconclusive Trusted Not trusted Inconclusive
0 0.61750 0.01663 0.31589 0.00250 0.00475 0.04275
5 0.76000 0.02850 0.16150 0.00050 0.00990 0.03960
7 0.90250 0.01900 0.02850 0.00025 0.02488 0.02488
10 0.71250 0.16625 0.07125 0.00010 0.03992 0.00998
20 0.76000 0.15200 0.03800 0.00005 0.04955 0.00500
Figure 12 shows the left-hand part of Table 2 as a trend-graph, i.e. it shows the
probability that a tender is authentic and receives each of the three possible verdicts,
depending on the chosen quality level.6 On the left-hand side of the graph, we see that
the probability of getting a trusted verdict is relatively low (but increasing), while the
probability of getting an inconclusive verdict is correspondingly high (but decreas-
ing). According to the domain experts providing the data, the reason for this is that
when a request for tenders is announced with low certiﬁcate and signature require-
ments, relatively many of the received tenders will use certiﬁcates from CAs that are
not supported by a VA; there are many CAs offering low quality eIDs, and a VA
service is primarily aimed at supporting CAs with higher quality eIDs. After qual-
ity policy level 7, we see a decrease in the probability of receiving a trusted verdict.
According to the same experts, this is due to the fact that when higher quality policy
levels are used, more of the received tenders will use certiﬁcates from CAs that are
supported by the VA, but of insufﬁcient quality.
Figure 13 shows the right-hand part of Table 2 as a trend-graph, i.e. it shows
the probability that a tender is non-authentic and receives each of the three possible
verdicts. Here we are operating with very small scales, due to the small amount
(5%) of non-authentic tenders, and the probability for getting the trusted verdict is
almost non-existing for all quality policy levels. Not surprisingly, the probability for
a non-authentic tender getting the not trusted verdict increases with increasing quality
policy level. Furthermore, the probability of an inconclusive verdict decreases with
increasing quality level, as more of the received tenders will use certiﬁcates from CAs
that are supported by VA when high quality policies are used.
6Recall that 95% of tenders are assumed to be authentic in all cases.
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Fig. 12 Trend graph for authentic tenders
Fig. 13 Trend graph for non-authentic tenders
Step 2.4. Evaluate and compare alternative behavior. In order to decide which of
the quality policies that will give the optimal behavior of the system, we looked at the
probabilities for desirable and undesirable outcomes (opportunities and risks) for the
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different quality levels, with the goal of ﬁnding the optimal balance. For each quality
level, the desirable outcomes are as follows:
– A tender that has been accepted by the system, due to a trusted verdict from the
VA, is authentic.
– A tender that has been rejected by the system, due to a not trusted or an inconclu-
sive verdict from the VA, is non-authentic.
We seek to maximize the probabilities of these outcomes, since these outcomes rep-
resent opportunities. The probabilities are given as follows:
– P(aut|acc)—The conditional probability of a tender being authentic, given that it
is accepted by the system.
– P(not aut|not acc)—The conditional probability of a tender being non-authentic,
given that it is rejected by the system.
On the other hand, for each quality level, the undesirable outcomes are as follows:
– A tender that has been accepted by the system, due to a trusted verdict from the
VA, is non-authentic.
– A tender that has been rejected by the system, due to a not trusted or an inconclu-
sive verdict from the VA, is authentic.
We seek to minimize the probabilities of these outcomes, since these outcomes rep-
resent risks. The probabilities are given as follows:
– P(not aut|acc)—The conditional probability of tender being non-authentic, given
that it is accepted by the system.
– P(aut|not acc)—The conditional probability of a tender being authentic, given
that it is rejected by the system.
From the diagrams in Figs. 10 and 11 we get the following values directly: the
probability P(aut) = a for a tender being authentic is 0.95, irrespective of the quality
policy, while the probability for a tender being non-authentic is P(not aut) = 1 − a.
We also have the probabilities P(acc|aut) = t1 and P(not acc|aut) = 1 − t1 for
a tender being accepted and not accepted by the system, given that it is authentic,
while P(acc|not aut) = t2 and P(not acc|not aut) = 1 − t2 give the probabilities
for a tender being accepted and not accepted, given that it is non-authentic. Values
for t1 and t2, depending on the chosen quality level, are taken from Table 1. The
probabilities for a tender being accepted and not accepted are obtained as follows:
P(acc) = P(aut) × P(acc|aut) + P(not aut) × P(acc|not aut)
= a × t1+ (1 − a) × t2 (1)
P(not acc) = 1 − P(acc) (2)
The conditional probabilities, mentioned above, were calculated for the different
quality levels by applying Bayes’ theorem as follows:
P(aut|acc) = P(acc|aut) × P(aut)
P (acc)
= t1× a
a × t1+ (1 − a) × t2 (3)
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Table 3 Table showing the probabilities related to opportunity (column 2 and 5) and risk (column 3 and
4) for the different quality policies
Quality policy P(aut|acc) P (aut|not acc) P (not aut|acc) P (not aut|not acc)
0 0.995968 0.875000 0.004032 0.125000
5 0.999343 0.793319 0.000657 0.206681
7 0.999723 0.488432 0.000277 0.511568
10 0.999860 0.826374 0.000140 0.173626
20 0.999934 0.791832 0.000066 0.208168
P(aut|not acc) = P(not acc|aut) × P(aut)
P (not acc)
= (1 − t1) × a
1 − (a × t1+ (1 − a) × t2) (4)
P(not aut|acc) = 1 − P(aut|acc) (5)
P(not aut|not acc) = 1 − P(aut|not acc) (6)
The results of the calculations are shown in Table 3. For P(aut|acc), which we
want to maximize, there is little difference between the values of P(aut|acc) for the
different quality policies. On the other hand, for P(not aut|not acc), which we also
want to maximize, we see that for level 7 we have a much higher value than for the
others.
5.3 Step 3. Capturing a policy to optimize target
The numbers in Table 3 provide useful input, assuming of course that the expert
judgments are sound. However, they do not take the nature of the call for tender into
consideration, which of course is an essential factor when formulating a policy. After
all, the signiﬁcance of the numbers in Table 3 depends heavily on what is to be pro-
cured. If the cost of goods to be procured is low (e.g. pencils for the administration),
we would probably worry only about P(aut|acc) and based on that choose quality
policy 0. This is partly because the difference in P(aut|acc) for the quality policy
levels does not matter much when the cost of goods to be procured is low, and partly
because a higher quality level might frighten off potential submitters of tenders.
On the other hand, if the cost of the goods to be procured is very high (e.g. new
ﬁghter planes in the extreme case) the procurer would probably want as much legal
coverage as possible and use quality policy level 20, since this gives the best value for
P(aut|acc). Moreover, if the goods to be procured are so costly that it is important
to avoid disqualifying authentic tenders as well as obtaining a high level of trust in
certiﬁcates, quality policy level 7 seems to be the best option.
Based on these considerations we ended up with the policy rules speciﬁed in
Figs. 14–16. We make the assumption that the eProcurement system trusts the VA
and its assessments. This is important since an eProcurement system cannot make
use of the VA service if it is not trustable. The trigger of each rule contains a condi-
tion which limits the applicability of the rule to a set of system states. For rule qp0 in
Fig. 14 the condition is that the cost of the goods to be procured is low, while for rule
qp20 in Fig. 15 it is that the cost is very high. For rule qp7 in Fig. 16 the condition
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Fig. 14 Policy rule for the
selection of quality policy level
0
Fig. 15 Policy rule for the
selection of quality policy level
20
Fig. 16 Policy rule for the
selection of quality policy level
7
is that the cost is high, that disqualifying authentic tenders should be avoided, and a
high level of trust in certiﬁcates is required. Depending on which one of these three
conditions that is satisﬁed, the eProcurement system must use either quality policy
level 0, 7, or 20.
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Table 4 The number of hours
used on the trust analysis, not





6 Evaluation of the trust analysis method
In this section we evaluate the performance of the trust analysis method in the indus-
trial project with respect to the criteria presented in Sect. 4.3.
EC1: The trust analysis should provide the customers with a good basis for making
trust policy decisions. This means that sufﬁcient information about the impact of
the potential alternatives must be provided.
The project gave strong indications that the trust analysis method is feasible in prac-
tice. We went through the various steps of the method (with exception of Step 2.2) in
close interaction with the industrial representatives of the customer and delivered a
result in the form of a policy that we believe gives an institution making use of ePro-
curement system with a VA service useful input on selecting the right quality policy
level. Based on models developed in the modeling step of the method we collected
expert judgments and documented them in the models.
Of course an industrial case like this can never give solid repeatable evidence of
anything. There are too many factors inﬂuencing what happens. In the case of our
project it may be argued that we should have used historical data rather than expert
judgments, but such data were not available. It may also for example be argued that
we should have had involvement of representatives of an eProcurement institution,
and having the inventors of the trust analysis method in the analyst team is of course
also rather extraordinary.
EC2: The trust analysis should be cost effective.
The trust analysis was carried out in a series of ﬁve meetings, each of which took
about 1.5 hours. Typically, four analysts and two to four participants/representatives
of the customer took part in the meetings. In addition, the analysts spent time between
the meetings developing models and preparing the next meeting. Table 4 shows an
estimate of the total amount of time spent on the trust analysis. Note that time spent
on writing a ﬁnal report is not included in the numbers—this depends heavily on
the type of report the customer wants. There are some issues that must be taken into
consideration when evaluating these numbers. Firstly, this was the ﬁrst time the trust
analysis method was applied to a real industrial case. Hence, even though the analysis
team included authors of the paper [17] proposing the trust analysis method, none of
the analysts had any experience with applying the method in a realistic setting. It
can reasonably be assumed that the process will be more effective as the analysts
gain experience with applying the trust analysis method. Furthermore, the reason for
having as many as four analysts was a desire to learn as much as possible from this
ﬁrst application of the method. Normally, we believe two analysts would be enough.
Based on the experience gained, we believe that it should be possible to carry out
this kind of analysis with within a time frame of ca. 80 man-hours spent by analysts
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(not including writing a ﬁnal report) and ca. 20 man-hours spent by participants.
Whether this counts as being cost effective has to be evaluated in light of the values
at stake in the target of analysis.
EC3: The modeling approach should be sufﬁciently expressive to capture the in-
formation, assumptions, and constraints of relevance.
The participants provided a lot of information about the target during the analysis
process. There were no instances where we were not able to capture the relevant
information in the models. The diagrams in Figs. 8–11 contain all the information
that was ﬁnally used (and deemed relevant) for ﬁnding the best trust policy. These
diagrams have been abstracted from more detailed models of the target. We also
formalized the policy we recommended in the end.
EC4: The models should be comprehensible for the participants of the trust analy-
sis.
During the meetings, models were presented and explained by an analyst in order to
validate the correctness of the models. There were many instances where the partici-
pants pointed out parts of a model that did not correctly represent the target, provided
additional information, or asked relevant questions about some detail in a model.
This indicates that the models were in general comprehensible for the participants,
and our experience is that the models served well as an aid in establishing a common
understanding of the target between the participants and analysts. The fact that all the
participants in this analysis had a strong technical background may have contributed
to making the models easier for them to understand than would be the case for a
more diverse group. Note also that we do not know whether the models would have
been well understood by the participants without any guidance or explanation, as all
the models were presented by an analyst. In particular with respect to subjective dia-
grams and their relation to the objective diagrams, we believe it is necessary to have
an analyst explain the diagrams in order for them to be understood by the participants
if they have no prior experience with the notation, other than some background in
UML.
There was one aspect of the models that proved hard to understand for the par-
ticipants. This occurred when the operands of palt operators contained more palt
operators. In Fig. 10 the palt operator contains references to the diagram in Fig. 11,
which again contains a palt operator with another palt operator inside one of its
operands. This nesting of operators made it hard for the participants to understand ex-
actly what each of the alternatives represented. In order to explain, one of the analysts
drew a tree-structure where the root represented the outermost palt operator and
each branch represented a palt operand. Based on this experience, we believe that
the presentation style of UML interaction overview diagrams are better suited than
sequence diagrams to present cases with nested alternatives. Interaction overview di-
agrams have the same kind of semantics as sequence diagrams and are often used in
combination with sequence diagrams, but nested alternatives are represented syntac-
tically by a branching point (the operator) with branches (the operands), rather than
boxes inside boxes.
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7 Conclusion and related work
The paper has presented experiences from using a UML-based method for trust analy-
sis in an industrial project focusing on the modeling and analysis of a public ePro-
curement system making use of a validation authority service for validating electronic
certiﬁcates and signatures. The contributions of the paper include:
1. a detailed account of how the method proposed in [17] scales in an industrial
context; in particular, we have illustrated the speciﬁc constructs for capturing
– beliefs of agents (humans or organization) in the form of subjective probabili-
ties;
– factual (or objective) probabilities of systems which may contain agents whose
behavior is described in the form of subjective probabilities;
– trust decisions in the form of policy rules;
2. an evaluation of the feasibility of the method in an industrial context; in particular,
it is claimed that
– the project gave strong indications that the trust analysis method is feasible in
practice;
– this kind of trust analysis can be carried within the frame of 100 man-hours (not
including writing of a ﬁnal report);
– there were no instances were the analysts were not able to capture the relevant
information in the models;
– the models to a large extent were comprehensible for the industrial participant
with some experience in UML but no background in the speciﬁc extensions
used by the method.
The method for trust analysis makes use of models that capture the subjective
trust considerations of actors, as well as their resulting behavior. We are not aware
of other approaches that combine these elements in this way. However, the issues of
uncertainty, belief, and trust have received much attention in the literature. We now
present a small selection of the proposed approaches.
Giorgini et al. [6] presents a formal framework for modeling and analyzing trust
and security requirements. Here, the focus is on modeling organizations, which may
include computer systems as well as human actors. The approach is based on a sep-
aration of functional dependencies, trust, and delegation relationships. Trust and se-
curity requirements can be captured without going into details about how these will
be realized, and the formal framework supports automatic veriﬁcation of the require-
ments.
An interesting approach to modeling and reasoning about subjective belief and
uncertainty is subjective logic [7, 8], which is a probabilistic logic that captures un-
certainty about probability values explicitly. The logic operates on subjective belief
about the world. Different actors have different subjective beliefs, and these beliefs
are associated with uncertainty. The approach makes it possible, for example, to cal-
culate to what degree an actor believes that a system will work based on the actor’s
beliefs about the subsystems, or to calculate the consensus opinion of a group of ac-
tors. Subjective logic deals strictly with the actors’ beliefs and reasoning, and does
not address the question of how their beliefs affect their behavior.
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The belief calculus of subjective logic can be applied in risk analysis to capture
the uncertainty associated with such analysis, as shown in [9]. This is achieved by
using subjective beliefs about threats and vulnerabilities as input parameters to the
analysis. Through application of the belief calculus, the computed risk assessments
provides information about the uncertainty associated with the result of the analysis.
With respect to situations in which the outcome of a choice of one actor depends
on the subsequent choice of another actor, the ﬁeld of game theory [4] is highly
relevant. Game theory provides strategies for making rational choices with respect
to desirable and undesirable outcomes from the point of view of the different play-
ers/actors. These potential outcomes are described by a payoff structure in terms of
the loss and gain to which the various players are exposed; a rational player will seek
the outcome with the best payoff for herself. Not surprisingly, game theory can also
be applied to analyze trust, as shown by Bacharach and Gambetta [1]. They explain
how the trustor’s choice to trust or not, and the trustee’s subsequent choice to deceit
or not, can be modeled in terms of this rational choice theory.
A formal model for trust in dynamic networks based on domain theory is pro-
posed by Carbone et al. in [2]. Here, trust is propagated through delegation in a “web
of trust”, where the trust of one actor is affected by the trust of other actors. An im-
portant contribution of the approach is the distinction between a trust ordering and
an information ordering. The former represents degrees of trust, while the latter rep-
resents degrees of precision of information from which trust is formed. An interval
construction is introduced to capture uncertainty, and a simple trust policy language
is proposed based on the formal model.
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